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Motion to Dismiss
TonyBlony492,RBN109309
Filing username: TonyBlony492
Counsel for: Defendant Xotlkz and Defendant Acenxrblx
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
takosull1, Case No. RSC-CV-8640
Plaintiff,
vs. Motion to Dismiss
Xotlkz, Acenxrblx,
Defendant.
Relief Requested
Defendants Acenxrblx and Xotlkz respectfully move this Court for an order
dismissing Count 3 (Official Misconduct – 7 R. Stat. § 121.404) and Count 2 (Deprivation
of Rights Under Color of Law – 7 R. Stat. § 121.403) as to both Defendants, with
prejudice as to those counts, on the ground that Plaintiff has wrongfully named the
Defendants solely in their individual capacity when the Complaint’s own allegations
establish that the challenged conduct was performed under color of law as sworn
Ridgeway State Police troopers and therefore must be treated as official / quasi-official
capacity under controlling Ridgeway statute.
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Motion to Dismiss
Defendants further request that the Court deny any relief under those counts
against them in individual capacity and grant such other relief as the Court deems just
and proper. Counts 1 (Battery) and 4 (Negligence) are not the subject of this motion.
Grounds and Governing Law
(a) 7 R. Stat. § 121.404(b) provides that suits for Official Misconduct “shall
proceed in a form of quasi-official capacity, such that the defendants shall
be named as parties in official capacity.”
(b) 7 R. Stat. § 121.403 creates liability for acts performed “under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.”
(c) 7 R. Stat. § 122.004 provides that proceedings against an individual in
official capacity as an agent of the government “shall be construed as
cases against the government.”
(d) 7 R. Stat. §§ 122.005–122.008 establish the Solicitor General’s duty to
defend official-capacity claims and the circumstances under which
individual-capacity treatment is permitted.
(e) The Complaint itself alleges that both Defendants were sworn Ridgeway
State Police officers acting in the course of an enforcement action and
under color of state law (Complaint ¶¶ 2, 4, 8, 20, 28, 53).
Under these provisions, naming the Defendants solely in individual capacity for
counts that depend on their status as troopers acting under color of law is statutorily
improper.
Conferral and Party Positions
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Motion to Dismiss
Counsel for Defendants conferred with Plaintiff regarding the capacity defect and
the grounds for this motion. Plaintiff responded by stating that Counsel should “not wait”
and should “File now.” Thus, the parties were unable to reach agreement. This motion is
therefore filed.
Argument
I. Count 3 must be dismissed because the statute requires official / quasi-official
capacity naming.
Section 121.404(b) is mandatory and unambiguous: Official Misconduct actions
“shall proceed in a form of quasi-official capacity, such that the defendants shall be
named as parties in official capacity.” The Complaint names both Defendants exclusively
in their individual capacity (caption; ¶¶ 3, 5) while simultaneously alleging that they were
public servants exercising official functions (¶¶ 2, 4, 61–66).
7 R. Stat. § 121.404(b) - Such suits shall proceed in a form of quasi-official
capacity, such that the defendants shall be named as parties in official
capacity; however where the court imposes monetary damages to the
plaintiff, it shall be the duty of the defendant’s individual capacity to pay
such damages as ordered.
That is a direct statutory violation. Because the Complaint’s own allegations
establish that the Defendants were acting as troopers, the capacity designation required
by § 121.404(b) is official / quasi-official, not purely individual. Count 3 therefore fails as
a matter of form and must be dismissed as to both Defendants.
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Motion to Dismiss
II. Count 2 is likewise subject to dismissal under the same logic.
Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant acted “under color of state law as a
Ridgeway State Police officer” (¶ 53) and seeks redress under 7 R. Stat. § 121.403. By
the Complaint’s own terms, the challenged conduct was performed in the Defendants’
capacity as sworn troopers.
Under Ridgeway law, acts performed under color of law by public servants are the
classic subject of official-capacity treatment (7 R. Stat. §§ 122.004–122.008). Naming
the Defendants solely in individual capacity for a claim that depends entirely on their
status as officers acting under color of law is therefore improper. While § 121.403 does
not contain the identical mandatory language found in § 121.404(b), the statutory
scheme as a whole treats color-of-law conduct by public servants as official in nature.
Dismissal of Count 2 is warranted on that ground.
III. SCOTUS capacity precedents confirm the distinction and support dismissal.
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that the distinction
between individual-capacity and official-capacity suits is fundamental:
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“Personal-capacity
suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for
actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast,
‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.’”).
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (a suit
against a state official in his official capacity is not a suit against the official
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Motion to Dismiss
but rather a suit against the official’s office and is no different from a suit
against the State itself).
The similiar has been said by Hafer v. Melo.
These precedents are valid and persuasive. They establish that when a plaintiff
relies on an official’s status and actions under color of law, the capacity in which the
defendant is named has decisive legal consequences.
Here, Plaintiff has chosen to name the Defendants solely in individual capacity
while grounding every allegation in their official status as Ridgeway State Police troopers
acting under color of law. Ridgeway statute goes further than the federal baseline: §
121.404(b) requires quasi-official capacity naming for Official Misconduct claims
The SCOTUS framework confirms that capacity is not a mere formality; it
determines the nature of the claim and the proper defendant. Plaintiff’s failure to name
the Defendants in the capacity required by Ridgeway law (and consistent with the official
character of the conduct alleged) warrants dismissal of Counts 2 and 3.
IV. Counts 1 and 4 are unaffected.
Battery and Negligence are ordinary individual torts that do not require the
defendant to be acting under color of law. This motion does not seek their dismissal.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants request this Court to:
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Motion to Dismiss
1. Dismiss Count II WITH PREJUDICE against both Defendants ;
2. Dismiss Count III WITH PREJUDICE against both Defendants ;
3. Alternatively, if the Court declines to dismiss Count III with prejudice,
Defendants request that Count III be dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE
and
4. Grant other reliefs the Court deems just and proper.
