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Opposition to Motion for Sanctions
TonyBlony492,RBN19309
Filing username: TonyBlony492
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
TonyBlony492, Case No. RSC-CV-4274
Plaintiff,
vs. Opposition to Motion for
iiCryptic_LawMD, Sanctions
Defendant.
Position on the Motion
Plaintiff TonyBlony492 respectfully opposes Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions in
its entirety. The Motion should be denied. Plaintiff’s claims are supported by material
facts and by a reasonable application of existing Ridgeway law. Defendant has not met
the standard for sanctions under 7 R. Stat. § 132.301 or Rid. R. Civ. P. 41(9).
Response to Grounds and Facts
1. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Supported by Material Facts
The Complaint and its exhibits establish:
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Opposition to Motion for Sanctions
• A professional co-counsel relationship existed between Plaintiff and the
client.
• Defendant knew of that relationship.
• Defendant publicly objected to Plaintiff’s appearance and privately
conditioned withdrawal of the objection on Plaintiff agreeing to contractual
terms satisfactory to Defendant.
• The client terminated the relationship, expressly citing the court dispute
and fear of being “made a fool of in court.”
• Within approximately one minute of learning that the client had terminated
Plaintiff, Defendant filed a report with the State Bar Ethical Committee.
These are material facts. They directly support the elements of tortious
interference under 7 R. Stat. § 121.203 and abuse of process under 7 R. Stat. § 121.402.
2. The Prior Case Is Irrelevant
Defendant’s reliance on Plaintiff’s involvement in Thr33six8 v. AlbertWellesley is
misplaced. The mere fact that an attorney has previously advanced claims under the
same statutes does not render a subsequent case unsupported by fact or law. Different
cases routinely involve the same causes of action. Defendant has not shown that the
prior matter involved substantially identical facts or that Plaintiff’s theory in the present
case is frivolous.
3. Out-of-State Authority Is Not Binding
Defendant relies on California and Arizona decisions interpreting those states’ bar
systems. Those decisions are not binding in Ridgeway. Ridgeway has its own statutes
defining the State Bar (3 R. Stat. § 151.002) and the term “administrative proceeding” (7
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Opposition to Motion for Sanctions
R. Stat. § 111.001). The Court should apply Ridgeway’s statutory text rather than foreign
interpretations of different regulatory schemes.
4. Defendant Continues to Cite a Non-Existent Case
Defendant again cites Ridgeway Parks Service, et al., v. SteKing2008, 1 Rid. ___,
5-6 (2022). Plaintiff has been unable to locate any such decision in the Ridgeway case
library or published reports. Repeated citation to unverifiable authority undercuts
Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff failed to exercise necessary care.
Argument
A. Legal Standard
Under 7 R. Stat. § 132.301, sanctions are available only when a party or attorney
knew or should have known that a claim was not supported by the material facts
necessary to establish it, or would not be supported by the application of then-existing
law to those facts. The standard is not whether the Court ultimately agrees with the
claim. It is whether the claim was so lacking in factual or legal support that it was
unreasonable to assert it.
B. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Supported by Material Facts and Existing Law
The Complaint alleges a concrete professional relationship, Defendant’s
knowledge of it, intentional interference through a conditioned objection, and resulting
termination of the relationship. These allegations track the plain language of 7 R. Stat. §
121.203.
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Opposition to Motion for Sanctions
The abuse-of-process claim alleges that Defendant used both the court objection
and the subsequent Bar report for collateral purposes — first to extract a co-counsel
agreement on his terms, and then as retaliation once that leverage disappeared. The
extreme timing of the Bar report supports the retaliatory inference. These allegations are
sufficient under 7 R. Stat. § 121.402.
Reputational and professional harm of the kind alleged constitutes cognizable
injury. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
578 U.S. 330 (2016); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
C. Sanctions Are Inappropriate
Even if the Court ultimately disagrees with Plaintiff’s legal theories, mere
disagreement is not the standard for sanctions. Plaintiff advanced colorable claims
supported by specific factual allegations and the text of the governing statutes. Awarding
sanctions under these circumstances would chill legitimate advocacy and expand
fee-shifting beyond what the Legislature intended.
D. Defendant’s Own Conduct Undercuts His Request
Defendant has repeatedly cited an apparently non-existent Ridgeway decision
and has relied on non-binding out-of-state authority while accusing Plaintiff of failing to
exercise necessary care. The Court should decline to reward that approach with
sanctions.
Conclusion
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Opposition to Motion for Sanctions
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court DENY
Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions in its entirety.
