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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
TonyBlony492,RBN19309
Filing username: TonyBlony492
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
TonyBlony492, Case No. RSC-CV-4274
Plaintiff,
vs. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
iiCryptic_lawMD,
Defendant.
Position on the Motion
Plaintiff TonyBlony492 respectfully opposes Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss All
Counts with Prejudice in its entirety. The Motion should be denied. Plaintiff has
adequately pleaded both tortious interference under 7 R. Stat. § 121.203 and abuse of
process under 7 R. Stat. § 121.402. Taking all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all
reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Complaint states viable claims upon which
relief can be granted.
Response to Grounds and Facts
Defendant’s Motion mischaracterizes both the facts and the law.
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
First, Defendant attempts to reframe the client’s termination as independent of his
conduct. The client’s own words, attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, directly link the
termination to the court dispute caused by Defendant’s continued objection and the
resulting fear of being “made a fool of in court.” That constitutes causation.
Second, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff suffered no concrete injury because the
client left open the possibility of future representation. This argument ignores the plain
text of 7 R. Stat. § 121.203, which protects “business relationships, contracts, or career.”
The loss of an existing professional relationship and the associated reputation-building
opportunity is precisely the type of harm the statute covers. The statute does not require
the total destruction of a plaintiff’s entire career.
Third, Defendant claims litigation privilege bars the claims. Litigation privilege
protects certain statements made during judicial proceedings. It does not confer
absolute immunity when a party uses court process for an improper collateral purpose.
Here, Defendant conditioned withdrawal of an objection on obtaining a private
co-counsel agreement on Defendant’s preferred terms, and then filing a Bar report within
approximately one minute of learning that leverage had disappeared.
Fourth, Defendant cites Ridgeway Parks Service, et al., v. SteKing2008, 1 Rid.
___, 5-6 (2022) for the proposition that the Court must presume the legislature says
what it means. The Plaintiff has been unable to locate any such decision in the
Ridgeway case library or published reports. In the absence of a verifiable citation, the
Court should disregard that authority.
Fifth, Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s involvement in an
unrelated case is irrelevant to whether the present Complaint states a claim.
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
Argument
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations
as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. The Court may not
weigh evidence or resolve factual disputes at this stage.
B. Plaintiff Has Standing and Has Alleged Concrete Injury
Plaintiff adequately alleged a concrete and particularized injury: the destruction of
a professional co-counsel relationship and the loss of the career and reputational
benefits that relationship was intended to provide. 7 R. Stat. § 121.203 expressly covers
damage to “business relationships, contracts, or career.”
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
reputational harm can constitute a concrete injury sufficient for standing. See
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021) (reputational harms can qualify as
concrete injuries); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (intangible injuries,
including reputational harms, may be concrete); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987)
(injury to reputation is a cognizable injury). The client’s statement that he might consider
Plaintiff in the future does not erase the present injury. Standing is satisfied.
C. Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim for Tortious Interference (7 R. Stat. § 121.203)
The Complaint alleges the following:
1. A lawful professional relationship existed;
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
2. Defendant knew of the relationship;
3. Defendant intentionally interfered by objecting to Plaintiff’s appearance,
publicly asserting an ethics violation that lacked substantial basis, and
privately conditioning withdrawal of the objection on Plaintiff agreeing to
contractual terms satisfactory to Defendant;
4. The interference caused the client to terminate the relationship.
These allegations, taken as true, state a sufficient claim under the statute.
D. Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim for Abuse of Process (7 R. Stat. § 121.402)
The Complaint alleges that Defendant used both the court objection and the
subsequent State Bar report for improper collateral purposes.
First, the objection was misused to compel a co-counsel agreement on his terms,
and then, once that leverage was lost, as a retaliatory measure. The extreme timing of
the Bar report (approximately one minute after learning of the termination) supports the
inference of retaliation. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim.
E. Litigation Privilege Does Not Bar the Claims
Even assuming litigation privilege applies to statements made in court, it does not
shield the use of process for a purpose other than that for which it was designed.
Conditioning the withdrawal of an objection on obtaining a private contractual benefit,
and then filing a near-immediate Bar complaint once the opportunity for that benefit
disappeared, falls squarely within the conduct that abuse-of-process liability is intended
to address.
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court DENY
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss All Counts with Prejudice in its entirety and allow this
case to proceed. Respectfully submitted,