IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
HALO4ASIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RIDGEWAY PARKS SERVICE,
Defendant.
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Case No. RSC-CV-0750
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
STRIKE
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE
Plaintiff Halo4asin, appearing pro se, opposes Defendant Ridgeway Parks Service’s Motion to
Strike. The motion attacks an ‘unauthorized new claim’ and ‘supplemental document’ without
identifying an operative supplemental pleading because none exists. Plaintiff filed a motion
seeking leave to supplement later if production supports a post order claim. Rule 12(3) permits
striking from a pleading; it does not authorize striking a motion, declaration, reply, or proposed
order simply because Defendant opposes the relief requested. The Motion to Strike should be
denied.
I. RULE 12(3) DOES NOT REACH THE PAPERS DEFENDANT SEEKS TO
STRIKE
1. Rid R. Civ. P. 12(3) authorizes the Court to strike from a pleading an insufficient defense
or redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. Plaintiff’s Supplemental
Motion, declaration, reply, and proposed orders are motions or supporting papers. They
are not pleadings within Rule 12(3).
2. No Supplemental Complaint has been filed as an operative pleading. Plaintiff requested
leave before filing one. Defendant therefore asks the Court to strike an unauthorized
pleading that does not exist.
3. The Motion also fails to identify with particularity which ‘supplemental document’ it
seeks to strike. It gives no title or Bates number. If Defendant means the September 14
Supplemental Motion, Rule 12(3) is both the wrong procedural vehicle and, even if the
motion were somehow treated as a pleading, the forty eight hour period for a Rule 12(3)
motion expired long before September 22. If Defendant means Plaintiff’s later reply or
proposed order, those papers are not pleadings either.
II. DEFENDANT MISUSES RULES 10 AND 11
4. Defendant invokes Rule 10(8)(1), but Rule 10 governs the form of pleadings. Subdivision
8 makes a failure to comply with Rule 10’s form requirements grounds for clerk rejection
or a Rule 12(3) motion. Defendant identifies no Rule 10 caption, paragraph, format, or
other form defect in Plaintiff’s papers. Rule 10(8)(1) is not a rule governing leave to
supplement.
5. Defendant also cites Rule 11(10)(1). Rule 11(10) concerns the nature and extent of a
sanction after a Rule 11 violation is properly established. It is not an independent
pleading amendment rule. A party seeking Rule 11 sanctions must proceed by a separate
sanctions motion and comply with Rule 11(5)’s forty eight hour safe harbor. Defendant’s
Motion to Strike does neither.
6. Further, Rule 11(12) states that Rule 11 does not apply to discovery requests, responses,
objections, and motions governed by the discovery rules. Defendant cannot transform a
dispute over Plaintiff’s request for preservation and discovery into an automatic Rule 11
basis to erase the filing.
III. PLAINTIFF USED THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED FOR LATER
OCCURRING EVENTS
7. The challenged Failed Final Outcome and later § 121.102(e) character rationale arose
after the operative pleading and after the Court’s August 20 reevaluation order. Rule
16(6)(1) expressly permits a party, on motion and reasonable notice, to seek permission
to file a supplemental pleading addressing later transactions, occurrences, or events.
8. That is what Plaintiff did. Plaintiff’s pending motion asks for limited preservation and
production and for leave to supplement only if the resulting record supports a post order
claim. Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff never moved for leave is contradicted by the
title and requested relief of the filing itself.
9. Plaintiff’s earlier reference to Rule 10(d) should be read as a citation to the currently
published Rule 16(6). Correcting the rule number does not change the substance of the
request and does not convert the pending motion into an unauthorized supplemental
pleading.
IV. THE SCHEDULING ARGUMENT DOES NOT SUPPORT STRIKING
THE PENDING MOTION
10. Defendant relies on Rule 13 scheduling principles. Even assuming an earlier deadline for
amendment or joinder has expired, the events Plaintiff may seek to supplement did not
yet exist when that deadline was fixed. Later occurring facts arising from the court
ordered reevaluation constitute good cause for the Court to permit the Rule 16(6) process
or to modify any deadline to the extent modification is necessary.
11. The proper disposition of a request for leave is for the Court to grant or deny leave after
considering governing standard. It is not to pretend that a proposed future pleading has
already been filed and then strike it for lack of the very permission Plaintiff is presently
requesting.
V. DEFENDANT REQUESTS RELIEF RULE 12(3) EXPRESSLY DOES NOT
PROVIDE
12. Defendant asks that Plaintiff’s supposed supplemental document be ‘stricken from the
record.’ Rule 12(3) expressly provides that striking matter from a pleading does not
remove any document from the record. A filing once accepted remains on the docket, and
an order striking matter governs only its effect.
13. The current Rules likewise distinguish correction or supersession from removal. Rule
16(1) provides that filed documents are not altered or removed; a corrected or amended
filing is a new filing. Defendant’s requested expungement style relief is therefore
inconsistent with the rule it invokes.
VI. REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court: (A) DENY Defendant’s Motion to
Strike in its entirety; (B) hold that no operative supplemental pleading has been filed without
leave; (C) leave Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion, declaration, reply, and proposed orders on the
docket for consideration according to their legal effect; (D) construe Plaintiff’s pending leave
request under Rid. R. Civ. P. 16(6), and, if necessary, find good cause for any related scheduling
modification based on the later occurring post order events; and (E) grant such other and further
relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully Submitted,
_________________________
Halo4asin
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Dated: September 14, 2026
