IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
HALO4ASIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RIDGEWAY PARKS SERVICE,
Defendant.
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Case No. RSC-CV-0750
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Plaintiff Halo4asin, appearing pro se, opposes Defendant Ridgeway Parks Service’s Motion to
Dismiss. The motion fails at its premise. Defendant asks the Court to dismiss with prejudice
supposed supplemental claims that Plaintiff has not filed, while simultaneously acknowledging
in its own prayer for relief that Plaintiff’s pending paper is a ‘Supplemental Motion for Limited
Discovery, Preservation, Protective Relief, and Leave to Supplement.’ Plaintiff did not bypass
leave. Plaintiff asked for it. The post order Final Outcome remains an actual adverse
determination, and the Rules expressly provide a procedure for supplementation based on later
occurring events. The motion should be denied in full.
I. DEFENDANT SEEKS DISMISSAL OF SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIMS THAT
HAVE NOT BEEN FILED
1. No Supplemental Complaint is presently operative. Plaintiff filed a motion requesting
limited preservation and production and requesting leave to supplement only if the post
order record supports a supplemental claim. Plaintiff’s later reply again made the request
expressly conditional upon production.
2. Defendant’s Motion is internally contradictory. Section II asserts that Plaintiff never
sought permission to supplement, yet Defendant’s own requested relief asks the Court to
deny Plaintiff’s motion expressly titled, in part, ‘Leave to Supplement.’ A party cannot
establish a procedural default by ignoring the relief actually requested in the filing it
seeks to defeat.
3. Rid. R. Civ. P. 16(6)(1) provides the exact procedure Plaintiff used: on motion and
reasonable notice, the Court may permit a supplemental pleading setting out a
transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the pleading to be supplemented.
Plaintiff moved first. He has not filed the proposed supplemental pleading as an operative
pleading without permission.
4. Plaintiff’s earlier papers cited Rule 10(d) when referring to supplementation. Under the
presently published Rules, supplemental pleadings are governed by Rule 16(6). Plaintiff
respectfully corrects that citation and requests that the existing request for leave be
construed under Rule 16(6). The substance of the request has never changed.
II. THE CASE IS NOT MOOT OR CLOSED, AND THE POST ORDER
FINAL OUTCOME PRESENTS A LIVE CONTROVERSY
5. The August 20 order granted partial summary judgment in part and directed RPS to
vacate the prior Failed Final Screening and conduct a reevaluation. Defendant identifies
no final judgment dismissing the action and no order closing the case. Indeed,
Defendant’s own prayer asks the Court to direct the Clerk to formally close this case,
which is inconsistent with the premise that the case is already closed. The Court’s July 11
ruling also declined to eliminate Plaintiff’s request for monetary relief because the
damages issue could not be resolved at that stage, and Defendant identifies no later final
judgment resolving that remaining issue. Compliance with one interlocutory directive
does not itself extinguish every live issue arising from the very reevaluation that the
Court ordered.
6. The reevaluation did not leave Plaintiff without an adverse action. RPS changed Final
Screening to Passed but entered a separate Failed Final Outcome. That Failed Final
Outcome remains in force. Plaintiff therefore continues to suffer concrete, non
hypothetical injury from the same application and from the implementation of the Court
ordered reevaluation.
7. Ridgeway law expressly contemplates judicial review in this setting. 4 R. Stat. §
123.501(b)-(e) protects applicants against biased review and grants rights to a clear
reason, information concerning the reason, and conformity with legislative act. Section
123.501(g) grants a right to seek court review over prejudicial or harmful employment
practices, and § 123.501(h) protects petitioning the courts without harm. 7 R. Stat. §
122.101 separately authorizes injunctive relief against a government policy, order,
procedure, or directive that impedes statutory or constitutional rights and causes concrete
harm.
8. Rule 16(6) would have little purpose if jurisdiction automatically vanished whenever a
later occurring event followed partial relief in the same pending case. The Rule expressly
authorizes supplementation for events arising after the operative pleading. The September
Final Outcome is precisely such an event.
III. SUBJECTIVE WEIGHING IS NOT IMMUNITY FROM STATUTORY
REVIEW
9. Defendant overreads 4 R. Stat. § 121.103. That provision does permit an appointing
authority to weigh applications subjectively according to its own principles, but the same
sentence first commands that the appointing authority ‘shall indicate all attributes of
merit and demerit.’ The statute grants discretion within a regulated process. It does not
state that the process is immune from judicial review.
10. Section 121.102(e) likewise does not authorize an unexplained character veto. It
identifies a demerit for character defects ‘which would bring harm to the health of the
department or community.’ Whether the asserted decision was actually based on a
qualifying defect, whether the required merits and demerits were indicated and weighed,
whether the stated rationale was contemporaneous, and whether the process complied
with § 123.501 are questions of statutory compliance, not an invitation for the Court to
choose an applicant for RPS.
11. This Court has already rejected the categorical suggestion that RPS hiring decisions are
beyond review. In the July 11 ruling on Defendant’s earlier Motion to Dismiss, the Court
held that judicial interpretation of the governing civil service statute was a necessary
function and ruled that the reason required by § 122.404 had to be provided at the
moment of denial. The August 20 order then required RPS to vacate the prior result and
reevaluate the application in conformity with law. Defendant cannot now convert agency
discretion into total judicial immunity.
IV. THE MOTION IMPROPERLY DEPENDS ON CONTESTED FACTS AND
UNPRODUCED ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
12. Defendant asks the Court to accept as established that RPS ‘fully complied,’ that the later
character determination was substantively authorized, and that the final stage process was
lawful. Those are the very matters Plaintiff’s pending motion seeks limited records to
test. Defendant previously represented that it possesses concrete evidence supporting the
character determination while acknowledging that the underlying evidence had not yet
been formally introduced into the judicial record.
13. This Court’s July 11 ruling already recognized that a motion to dismiss is not the proper
forum to resolve genuine factual disputes. To the extent Defendant relies on facts outside
the operative pleadings to obtain dismissal for failure to state a claim, Rule 12 requires
the Court to provide the parties a reasonable opportunity to present material pertinent to
the converted disposition rather than dismiss the matter with prejudice on an undeveloped
record.
14. The requested discovery is therefore not an attempt to manufacture jurisdiction. It is
targeted preservation and production concerning a concrete adverse action entered after
the Court’s own reevaluation order. The timing, authorship, actual evidence relied upon,
and statutory merit/demerit record are directly relevant to whether any supplemental
claim is warranted.
V. THE MOTION ALSO FAILS AS MOTION PRACTICE
15. The Motion’s opening invokes Rid. R. Civ. P. 7.1(2)(3) as authority to dismiss. That
subdivision does not create a dismissal remedy. It requires a movant to state whether the
movant conferred with every affected party and the position of each party, or why
conference was impracticable. Defendant’s filing contains no such conference statement.
16. To the extent Defendant intended to proceed under Rule 12(1)(1) or Rule 12(1)(5), those
provisions do not cure the more fundamental defects above. There is no operative
supplemental pleading to dismiss, the adverse Final Outcome remains live, and the
governing statutes expressly preserve judicial review of prejudicial civil service practices.
VI. ALTERNATIVE RELIEF
17. If the Court concludes that any additional scheduling modification or procedural
formalization is required before supplementation, Plaintiff requests that the pending leave
request be construed under Rule 16(6) and, to the extent necessary, as a request to modify
any amendment deadline for good cause. The challenged Final Outcome and its later
character rationale did not exist when the original pleading was filed and could not
reasonably have been pleaded earlier.
18. At minimum, dismissal with prejudice is unavailable on this record. The Court should
deny the Motion to Dismiss, leave the pending Supplemental Motion for decision on its
own briefing, and permit the requested limited production before deciding whether any
supplemental pleading should be authorized.
VII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court: (A) DENY Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss in its entirety; (B) DENY Defendant’s request to dismiss any purported supplemental
claim with prejudice and to close this case; (C) construe Plaintiff’s pending request for leave
under Rid. R. Civ. P. 16(6), correcting the prior rule number citation without altering the relief
requested; (D) if necessary, find good cause to modify any scheduling deadline because the
challenged events arose only after the Court’s August 20 reevaluation order; (E) decide
Plaintiff’s pending Supplemental Motion on its own merits and developed record; and (F) grant
such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully Submitted,
_________________________
Halo4asin
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Dated: September 14, 2026
