SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
TonyBlony492,
Plaintiff,
vs.
iiCryptic_LawMD
Defendant.
____________________________________/
CIVIL DIVISION
CASE NO.: RSC-CV-4274
REQUEST FOR HEARING
JUDGE: Hon. _______
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ALL COUNTS WITH PREJUDICE,
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE, NOTICE OF HEARING REQUEST
COMES NOW the Defendant, appearing pro se, pursuant to Rid. R. Civ.
P. 12(1)(5), requests from this Honorable Court the following:
DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND MOTION TO
DISMISS ALL COUNTS WITH PREJUDICE
Request for Judicial Notice
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rid. R. Evid. 201(5), the Defendant requests
from this Honorable Court that judicial notice of adjudicative fact ought to be
taken for the matter of Thr33six8 v. AlbertWellesley, et al., RSC-CV-8427
(Neither party has a direct link to this matter, other than that the Plaintiff is
represented by the Plaintiff), where Plaintiff is, according to the electronic case
management system, is reflected to be counsel of record for the Plaintiff.
THEREFORE, having taken into consideration the items to be considered
under Rid. R. Evid. 201(5), it is to be noticed that the electronic case
management system for Thr33six8 v. AlbertWellesley, et al., RSC-CV-8427,
demonstrate that Plaintiff served as counsel of record in a matter alleging
abuse of process and tortious interference.
INDEX OF EXHIBITS ATTACHED HERETO:
EXHIBIT A: A copy of the electronic case management system’s
Docket Sheet housing the complaint in Thr33six8 v. AlbertWellesley, et al.,
RSC-CV-8427, found here.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss all counts with Prejudice
Legal Standards of Review
1. Any individual who damages another's business relationships, contracts,
or career with a third party causing economic and career harm to another
commits tortious interference and is liable for compensatory damages; and
may be liable for punitive damages of up to $8,000.00. See 7 Rid. Stat. §
121.203.
2. Any individual who abuses a legal process such as a court proceeding or
administrative proceeding by means of providing vexatious, fraudulent, or
frivolous complaints to get another in trouble commits abuse of process and
shall be liable for injunctive relief and punitive damages of up to $5,000.00.
3. Our first task is to presume that a legislature says in a statute “what it
means” and means in a statute “what it says there.” Ridgeway Parks Service, et
al., v. SteKing2008, 1 Rid. ___, 5-6 (2022).
4. Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff
must have suffered an "injury in fact,” an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of. The injury has to be fairly
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be
"likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by
a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561
(1992) (internal citations omitted) (punctuation modified for readability, core
message left intact); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975), Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972); see also Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102
(1983)) (1990).
5. For purposes of this Subtitle, the term “Administrative Proceeding” is
limited to misconduct and internal affairs investigations of departments or
agencies. See 7 Rid. Stat. § 111.001.
6. The mere filing of a bar charge is not ‘use’ of a judicial process as
required for abuse of process. Accursio v. Tree House, at ¶39 Ariz. (2026)
(internal citation omitted).
7. We have described the bar as a public corporation created as an
administrative arm of the court for the purpose of assisting in matters of
admission and discipline of attorneys. In those two areas, the bar's role has
consistently been articulated as that of an administrative assistant to or
adjunct of this court, which nonetheless retains its inherent judicial authority
to disbar or suspend attorneys. See In re Rose, 22 Cal. 4th 430 Cal. Rptr. 2d
298, 993 P.2d 956 (2000).
8. The freedom includes exhibits attached to the complaint, Rid. R. Civ.
P. 7(2)(4), or documents referenced in the pleading if they are central to
the claim. Taking all facts pleaded in the complaint as true and
construing all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, we review the complaint and
all exhibits attached to the complaint. Bogie v. Rosenberg, No. 12-1923, at 6
(7th Cir. 2013) (paraphrased).
9. Other papers permitted by these rules include a memorandum or brief, a
notice, a stipulation, an offer of judgment, a designation of the record, an
affidavit, a proof of service, a proposed order, and an exhibit or item of
documentary evidence offered in support of a pleading or motion. See Rid.
R. Civ. P. 7(2)(4) (emphasis added).
10. An attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law
to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the attorney. See Rid. R. Pro. C. 3.3(a)(1)
(emphasis added).
11. The Ridgeway State Bar shall be an administrative board of the
Supreme Court of the State of Ridgeway, under judiciary administration, at the
direction of the Director of the State Bar, and to which all practicing attorneys
must be admitted prior to legal practice. See 3 Rid. Stat. § 151.002.
12. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance
between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance, it has been
thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest
officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428 (1976); see also Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949, cert denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); see
also Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404 (CA2 1926); cf.; see also Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. at 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975).
Analysis
A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim
13. The Plaintiff, in their initial filings, see Dkt. 1.1-1.2, allege that
“Defendant intentionally interfered with the relationship.” Dkt. 1.1 ¶(v), for
tortious interference.
14. For tortious interference also, Plaintiff alleges that “Plaintiff thereby
lost the professional relationship and the associated career and reputational
benefits he had sought to obtain.” Dkt. 1.1 ¶(viii).
15. Plaintiff’s Exhibit A, see Dkt. 1.2, depicts the Plaintiff being
terminated by the client in a related proceeding (State v. TortaDiver,
RSC-CM-6368) due to the objections.
16. The encounter is as follows, with emphasis added to material
statements in support of the Defendant:
TORTADIVER: Tony, respectfully[,] I do not doubt your abilities
as an attorney however I do not want to make a
fool out of myself in court and I would like to
avoid any confusion within the court[.] and for
those reasons, I am letting you go. I apologize for
any inconveniences however this is the best
decision moving forward.
With regards,
Torta
PLAINTIFF: Sir, I am currently handling this with the other
attorney. Please give me a chance to resolve this,
so I can be Your [sic] attorney.
TORTADIVER: Respectfully Tony, I am not reconsidering my
decision. This reflects poorly on myself and I feel
that it is not worth causing any further trouble.
Please understand that this decision is not
personal but it is in the best interest of myself.
PLAINTIFF: Alright. May I please ask one question?
TORTADIVER: Go on.
PLAINTIFF: Would you consider hiring me in the future?
TORTADIVER: I have yet to decide whether I need legal help in
the foreseeable future.
PLAINTIFF: Alright, please consider hiring me in the future.
[END OF CONVERSATION]
17. This Exhibit displays a clear conversation between client and Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff does not definitively refuse legal service in the future, and that it is
their decision whether they need legal help at all.
18. Further, in the beginning of the conversation, the client clearly states
that they “do not doubt your [plaintiff’s] abilities as an attorney,” signalling
that help may or may not come in the future.
19. To back it up, the predicate for client’s termination is simply to avoid
them looking like a fool and avoiding confusion, and that it is in their best
interests, not directly because of what occurred.
20. Plaintiff alleges in their civil complaint, inter alia, that they have lost
associated career reputation and a professional relationship. This is true, but
the Plaintiff does not allege that their entire reputation has been damaged, as
the statute requires.
21. Tortious interference is committed when “[A]ny individual damages
another's business relationships, contracts, or career with a third party
causing economic and career harm to another.” 7 Rid. Stat. § 121.203 (text
omitted) (paraphrased) (emphasis added).
22. Further, for abuse of process, the Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant
used both a court process (the objection to Plaintiff’s appearance) and an
administrative process (the State Bar Ethical Committee report) for improper,
collateral purposes. This characterization is materially false as a matter of fact
(contradiction) and law.
23. Even if Plaintiff was correct in their allegation that the objection was
done maliciously, the Defendant enjoys litigation privilege, as objecting is a
core tenet of advocacy, not a judicial process as the Plaintiff so explicitly frames
it in their Complaint. Many State Supreme Courts and Federal Circuits have
held as such, and holding in the alternative gravely chills advocacy and
exposes zealous advocates to retaliatory claims, this included.
B. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Sue
24. Defendant realleges and reincorporates paras. 13-23, including the
attached conversation (see para. 16), in demonstration of lack of standing.
25. Plaintiff fails to allege actual harm to their career. As the conversation
between the Plaintiff and the client clearly demonstrates, the avenue for
representation in the future is not foreclosed nor precluded, but rather
shrouded in reasonable speculation of future legal trouble in the first place.
The tortious interference claim thus lacks standing as: (1) the Plaintiff did not
suffer an ‘injury in fact,’ (a) the Plaintiff’s “injury” is not concrete and
particularized, (b) the Plaintiff’s injury is conjectural and hypothetical, (2) there
is no causal connection between the “injury” and the conduct complained of
the injury, and the injury is not fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, as the client cited independent reasons for termination, and (3) the
“injury” is unlikely to be redressed by a favorable decision, as the client offered
independent reasons, and the objections are protected advocacy functions,
none of which can be summarily struck by a decision, especially because the
conduct occurred in a separate matter.
26. The same test and circumstances apply to abuse of process, see
paras. 13-24, Def’s Motion to Dismiss. Defendant merely exercised a protected
function of advocacy under litigation privilege, of which this Court may request
further briefing on.
27. Ultimately, the Plaintiff’s complaint is an attempt to use the judiciary
to validate subjectively hurt feelings and chill zealous advocacy rather than to
redress a legally cognizable wrong. As an officer of the court, a duty is owed to
the tribunal and to the broader administration of justice to separate emotional
grievances from viable causes of action. By failing to exercise the bare
minimum standard of care required to investigate the statutory definitions and
frameworks explicitly barring this suit, Plaintiff has allowed an emotional
grievance to dress up as a valid claim, which it is not. Further, the law does not
provide a remedy to broken pride, and as such, cannot be mobilized as a
vehicle for venting administrative frustration. As such, the Court should
decline to entertain the Plaintiff’s misguided attempt to use the judicial process
for ulterior purposes.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court GRANT IN FULL the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss all
counts with prejudice.
NOTICE OF HEARING REQUEST
WHEREFORE the Defendant, having filed a Motion to Dismiss with
Prejudice, request a hearing to be conducted on request of the moving party,
pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 7.2(11)(1).
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
WHEREFORE the Defendant, having filed the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss with Prejudice electronically, certifies to have served the opposing
party, in compliance with Rid. R. Civ. P. 5(2).
DATED: September 20, 2026 Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ iiCryptic_LawMD
iiCryptic_LawMD
Defendant, pro se
RSB#10233
