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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
iiCryptic_LawMD,
Plaintiff,
v,
Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office, AND
The Sheriff of Ridgeway County, in their
official capacity
Defendants.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
Hon. AlbertWellesley
Docket Number: RSC-CV-5252
1. COMES NOW the Defendants, the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office and the Sheriff of
Ridgeway County in their official capacity (collectively, "Defendants"), by and through
counsel, and respectfully move this Court to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Administrative Claim
for Relief with prejudice pursuant to Ridgeway Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In
support thereof, Defendants state as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION & LEGAL STANDARD
2. Dismissal under Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a pleading fails to state a
claim upon choosing relief that can be granted. While the Court must accept well-pleaded
factual allegations as true, it is not bound to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of
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Motion to Dismiss
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factual allegations. Where the allegations on the face of the complaint demonstrate that
the plaintiff is legally barred from relief, the action must be dismissed.
3. In this matter, Plaintiff’s Administrative Claim for Relief fails on its face because
Plaintiff explicitly concedes the underlying misconduct that formed the legal and factual
basis for the involuntary general discharge.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
4. On or about March 24, 2026, Plaintiff was hired as an unsworn Probationary Correctional
Officer. Following brief assignments, Plaintiff entered the Deputy Academy and
ultimately transferred to the Training Division as a Primary Instructor.
5. In May 2026, the Internal Affairs Unit initiated an investigation into an operational
complaint involving the unauthorized execution of a search warrant. Just prior to the
investigation, the Supervisor for Internal Affairs announced that any personnel who
executed a search warrant without Special Response Team (SRT) approval would face
termination.
6. On May 22, 2026, Plaintiff was contacted as an involved accused. On May 26, 2026,
Defendants conducted a pre-disciplinary hearing. At this hearing, Plaintiff, appearing pro
se, explicitly "conceded the core facts of the incident in question"—specifically admitting
to participating in the execution of a search warrant without obtaining the mandatory SRT
approval. Following this admission of a critical policy violation, Plaintiff was issued an
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Motion to Dismiss
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involuntary general discharge. Plaintiff’s subsequent internal appeal and Department of
Justice pre-suit mediation were both denied.
III. ARGUMENT
7. A. Count I Must Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff's General Discharge Was Grounded in
Conceded Policy Violations, Not "Arbitrary Punishment"
8. Plaintiff alleges that the involuntary general discharge constitutes "arbitrary punishment"
under 4 Rid. Stat. § 123.401(e)-402, claiming Defendants failed to account for mitigating
factors. This claim is legally deficient.
9. Under 4 Rid. Stat. § 123.401(e), arbitrary punishment is defined as discipline that takes
no accounting of the underlying circumstances or lacks an evidentiary baseline. However,
Plaintiff’s own complaint text invalidates this claim. In Paragraph 18, Plaintiff admits to
"conceding the core facts of the incident in question" during the pre-disciplinary hearing.
10. Because Plaintiff formally admitted to executing a search warrant without mandatory
SRT tactical approval, Defendants possessed a clear, non-arbitrary, and legally sound
operational baseline for termination. An appointing authority does not act arbitrarily
when it enforces clear structural policies against an employee who has openly confessed
to violating them. Mitigating factors cannot legally override an agency's authority to
separate personnel who bypass essential tactical security approvals. Consequently, Count
I fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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Motion to Dismiss
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B. Count II Must Be Dismissed Because Standard Supervisor Policy Announcements Do
Not Constitute Unlawful Coercion or Oppression
11. Plaintiff asserts in Count II that Defendants violated civil service employment rights
under 4 Rid. Stat. § 123.501(f) & (g) by creating an "oppressive, obstructive, and coercive
environment" via the Supervisor's disciplinary announcement. This argument
misconstrues the statutory protections of the State of Ridgeway.
12. 4 Rid. Stat. § 123.501(f) properly protects civil servants from illegal employer oppression
and bad-faith obstruction. It does not, however, insulate employees from clear
programmatic warnings regarding serious operational infractions. A supervisor’s
prospective notice that unauthorized tactical deployments (such as serving warrants
without SRT clearance) will lead to immediate termination is a standard exercise of law
enforcement management.
13. Setting clear operational boundaries and detailing the disciplinary consequences of
violating them ensures structural safety; it does not constitute an "unbiased process
obstruction". By declaring strict penalties for unsafe tactical behavior, supervisors protect
agency integrity. Because the announcement was a lawful exercise of supervisory
authority, Plaintiff's claim of a "predetermined investigation" lacks any foundational basis
in law. Count II must be dismissed.
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Motion to Dismiss
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IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an Order:
1. Dismissing Plaintiff's Administrative Claim for Relief in its entirety with prejudice;
2. Denying Plaintiff’s requests for equitable relief, declaratory judgment, and full
reinstatement; and
3. Granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Date: September 17th, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Wynneboy2010
Assistant Attorney General
Major Crimes Division
Public Integrity Division
R. Bar No. 19204
1100 Lakeside Drive
Annex Building
Palmer Ridgeway 80013
Counsel for the State of Ridgeway
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Motion to Dismiss
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of September, 2026, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed electronically via the Ridgeway Courts
Electronic Filing System, which will automatically send notification of such filing to the
Plaintiff, pro se:
iiCryptic_LawMD
E: [email protected]
Date: September 17th, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Wynneboy2010
Assistant Attorney General
Major Crimes Division
Public Integrity Division
R. Bar No. 19204
1100 Lakeside Drive
Annex Building
Palmer Ridgeway 80013
Counsel for the State of Ridgeway
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Motion to Dismiss
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