IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v,
TortaDiver,
Defendant.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
Hon. Arthur_Chen
Docket Number: RSC-CM-6368
THE STATE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TWO OF
THE INFORMATION
COMES NOW, the State of Ridgeway, by and through the undersigned State Attorney,
Wynneboy2010, and respectfully submits this Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Count Two (Official Misconduct, under R.C.C. § 2.15). For the reasons set forth below, the State
requests that this Honorable Court deny the Defendant’s motion in its entirety.
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 18, 2026, Defendant Corporal TortaDiver was on patrol duty at a military checkpoint on
the road leading to the Ridgeway National Guard Headquarters. The victim, driving a Black Gridlock
vehicle, approached the checkpoint, collided with a Military Police vehicle, and immediately
proceeded to drive out of and away from the Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ).
Evidence derived from the Defendant's own point-of-view video recording (Exhibit C) demonstrates
that the Defendant was not even facing the road at the split second of the collision. He reacted solely
to the audio cue of the crash, turned around, and immediately unleashed lethal force with his firearm
against the vehicle. The Defendant continued to repeatedly fire at the Black Gridlock while it was
actively moving away from the checkpoint and escaping the MEZ. No other military police vehicle
pursued the victim.
The Defendant pursued the escaping vehicle onto a nearby bridge where his continuous gunfire set
fire to and burned the victim's personal property, causing the victim to be ejected. When the unarmed
victim, who was posing no active threat, attempted to approach the checkpoint on foot to ask why he
was being fired upon, the Defendant shot him dead. Sworn statements from fellow units on the scene,
Sergeant KOLA188 and Private First Class NIKOZOOMALT, confirm that the circumstances did not
justify lethal force under military regulations, noting that the victim was actively fleeing and did not
attempt to employ, draw, or point a weapon at anyone.
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
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LEGAL ARGUMENTS
I. The Charging Instrument Complies with Rid. R. Crim. P. 4 and Provides Full
Constitutional Notice
The Defendant erroneously claims that the State violated Rid. R. Crim. P. 4(4)(4) by failing to
provide a clear and concise statement of the acts constituting the offense. This defense argument
completely ignores the plain text of Count Two of the Criminal Information.
Under Ridgeway procedural law, a count is legally sufficient if it states the plain text elements of the
offense alongside the specific acts committed to satisfy those elements. Count Two explicitly charges
the Defendant with Felony Official Misconduct under R.C.C. § 2.15. It lays out the exact factual
allegations: the Defendant unlawfully committed an unauthorized exercise of his official functions as
a public servant by directly violating operational regulations—specifically, OPREG 3002(l) Murder,
OPREG 3002(i) Conduct Prejudicial to the Government, and OPREG 3003(d) Gross Incompetency. It
details the precise physical act: discharging his firearm at a fleeing vehicle that posed zero threat to
the physical safety of personnel or the security of the Ridgeway National Guard Base.
The information contains clear, unambiguous factual anchors that allow the Defendant to prepare an
adequate trial defense. There is no ambiguity or lack of notice.
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
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II. The Fleeing Felon Doctrine and MEZ Act Do Not Sanction Unjustified Deadly Force
The Defense attempts to cloak the Defendant’s actions under the protections of the Military Exclusion
Zone and Installation Security Act ("MEZ and Base Act") and the rule of Tennessee v. Garner. This
legal shield is inapplicable under closer scrutiny of the developed evidence.
While Section 6 of the MEZ Act outlines authorization for guardsmen to utilize force against reckless
drivers or trespassers charging a facility, it does not provide blanket immunity for summary execution
once a potential threat has entirely dissipated. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), strictly holds
that an officer may use deadly force to prevent escape only if they possess a valid, objective,
good-faith belief that the suspect poses an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury to the
officer or surrounding citizens.
The objective facts demonstrate that:
1. The Defendant did not observe the initial collision and fired purely as a blind reaction to a
sound.
2. The vehicle was actively traveling away from the checkpoint when the Defendant fired.
3. The victim was on foot, unarmed, and retreating/questioning orders when he was killed.
A vehicle driving away from a base cannot objectively be construed as an immediate threat to that
base. Fellow guardsmen on the scene explicitly stated they refrained from shooting because the
victim was "no longer actively posing a threat once he was leaving the MEZ".
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
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III. The Defendant Acted "Knowingly" in Excess of Authorized Official Discretion
Pursuant to 6 R. Stat. § 111.011, sub. 1, an individual acts knowingly when they are fully aware of the
nature of their conduct or the surrounding attendant circumstances. The Defendant was an active-duty
public servant bound by the strict limits of OPREGs. By deliberately choosing to hunt down, fire
upon, burn, and kill an escaping motorist who no longer presented an active risk to his post, the
Defendant knowingly engaged in an unauthorized abuse of his office under R.C.C. § 2.15.
CONCLUSION
The State’s Criminal Information is procedurally sound, legally compliant, and supported by a robust
Probable Cause affidavit detailing a severe breach of public integrity and official misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the State of Ridgeway respectfully requests that this Honorable Court DENY the
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Two in its entirety.
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
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Date: September 17th, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Wynneboy2010
Assistant Attorney General
Major Crimes Division
Public Integrity Division
R. Bar No. 19204
1100 Lakeside Drive
Annex Building
Palmer Ridgeway 80013
Counsel for the State of Ridgeway
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Opposition was electronically
served upon Defense Counsel, iiCryptic_LawMD, on this 17th day of September, 2026, through the
court's automated filing system.
Date: September 17th, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Wynneboy2010
Assistant Attorney General
Major Crimes Division
Public Integrity Division
R. Bar No. 19204
1100 Lakeside Drive
Annex Building
Palmer Ridgeway 80013
Counsel for the State of Ridgeway
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
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