IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
ADAM STRATTON, individually and in his
official capacity as Attorney General,
Petitioner,
v.
LargeTitanic2, in his official capacity as
President of the Senate of the State of
Ridgeway,
Respondent.
Case No. RSC-CV-4876
FIRST AMENDED PETITION
Related: No. DCE-2026-0101
CORRECTION OF THE RECORD
Paragraph 9 of the original petition stated that the Respondent declared the Petitioner in
contempt alone, from the chair, and that no vote of the Senate was taken. That was wrong. A
motion to hold the Petitioner in contempt was put to the Senate and voted on, and a later motion to
reconsider it was voted down. The Senate’s published voting record is set out below. The Petitioner
withdraws paragraph 9 of the original petition, Part A.1 of its argument, and every statement in it
that rested on the absence of a vote. This amended petition replaces the original in full.
On September 16, 2026, Senior Judge Arthur_Chen granted the Petitioner’s emergency
motion and stayed the contempt order. The stay was granted on the original petition. The Petitioner
asks that it remain in effect until final decision, on the grounds stated in this amended petition, none
of which depends on the withdrawn paragraph.
The Petitioner was arrested despite the stay. At 8:01 PM Pacific time the same day, the
Court found no probable cause for the arrest in No. DCE-2026-0101, and he was released at 8:06
PM. The petition is not moot. The contempt order stands, it can be enforced again the moment the
stay lifts, and a challenge to an arrest “shall not be held moot on the basis that the person was
released from prison.” 7 R. Stat. § 133.001.
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1. The Petitioner, Adam Stratton, is the Attorney General of the State of Ridgeway. Const.
art. IV, § V. He brings this petition in both capacities. He sues individually because the
order took his own liberty. He sues as Attorney General because the Senate held him in
contempt while it was questioning him, as Attorney General, about acts of his office, and
the order punishes the officer for the answers.
2. The Respondent, LargeTitanic2, is the President of the Senate. Const. art. III, § VI. He is
named in his official capacity only, as the officer who presides over the body that made the
order and who directed its execution. A proceeding against an officer in his official capacity
is a case against the government. 7 R. Stat. § 122.004. The Petitioner seeks no damages in
this case, and he does not sue any Senator for a vote.
3. The Superior Court is “a court of law and equity” with original jurisdiction over all
misdemeanors under the Criminal Code, all civil claims, and any controversy not assigned
elsewhere, and it is empowered to hear expungements and to provide the writ of habeas
corpus. 3 R. Stat. §§ 131.001, 131.004(a), (c), (e); Const. art. V, § IV.
1
4. The petition rests on 7 R. Stat. § 122.101, which subjects any government “order” that
“impedes on an individual’s rights, immunities, or privileges secured by state statute or the
constitution” to a permanent restraining order and to “injunctive relief reversing any harm
done,” and on the writ of habeas corpus. 7 R. Stat. §§ 133.001, 133.004. Section 122.101
expressly creates liability against the government, so sovereign immunity does not apply.
7 R. Stat. § 122.002.
5. The Solicitor General defends this proceeding, 7 R. Stat. § 122.005, and serves at the
pleasure of the Attorney General, 2 R. Stat. § 122.002. The Petitioner will give the Solicitor
General no direction concerning the defense of this proceeding and will take no action
against any officer of the Department of Justice on account of it. For the same reason the
mediation step in 2 R. Stat. § 123.001 cannot be performed: the Petitioner cannot arbitrate
his own claim, and passing the duty to his own deputy under 2 R. Stat. § 121.107 cures
nothing. The habeas ground is outside § 123.001 in any case, because the writ may be
sought “at any time.” 7 R. Stat. § 133.001.
FACTS
6. On September 16, 2026, the Senate was in session at the State Capitol with the Respondent
presiding. The Petitioner appeared before it as Attorney General, and Senators questioned
him about acts taken in that office. See Standing Rules of the Ridgeway State Senate (3d
ed.) (“Senate Rules”), Rule X(4) (government officials may be invited to the chamber to
answer Senators’ questions).
7. In the course of that questioning, a motion was put “to hold adamstratton in contempt of the
Senate for obstruction of proceedings.” The conduct complained of was the Petitioner’s
answers and remarks during the questioning, which were called outlandish.
8. Five Senators were present. The Senate’s published record of the vote is: eothyu, aye; mp5,
aye; c4j2y, abstain; aspenfun, abstain; north, abstain. Two Senators voted for contempt.
Three did not.
9. The Respondent treated the motion as carried. A motion to reconsider was then put and
failed, two to three: eothyu and north, aye; mp5, c4j2y, and aspenfun, nay. No second vote
on contempt was taken.
10. The Senate never afforded the Petitioner time to answer the contempt or to speak on it.
Before the votes he was given no statement of the charge, no opportunity to respond, and no
opportunity to be heard by counsel.
11. The Senate made no finding that the Petitioner blocked, halted, or prevented the session
from proceeding, and no finding that he acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.
12. No written order of the Senate was issued. No warrant was issued. The Senate did not direct
its Sergeant-at-Arms to take the Petitioner into custody.
13. The Respondent instructed smashcans, an officer of the Ridgeway State Police, to take the
Petitioner into custody. The officer arrested and booked him at the Capitol on a charge
under R.C.C. § 1.06. His sworn statement of probable cause reads in full: “On 09/16/2026,
I was instructed by the president of the Senate to take this subject into custody for
obstructing the Senate proceedings. I booked the suspect at the booking room within the
cap.”
2
14. At or around 7:40 PM Pacific time, Senior Judge Arthur_Chen granted the stay. The Judge,
present in person, told the arresting officer six times to stop. The officer did not, and the
Petitioner remained in custody.
15. At 8:01 PM, the Court reviewed the officer’s sworn statement and found no probable cause.
The Petitioner was released at 8:06 PM. The contempt order has not been withdrawn.
GROUNDS
A. The contempt motion failed under the Senate’s own rules.
The Senate may hold a person in contempt only “by a two-thirds (⅔) vote.” Senate Rule
V(3). Its rules say what that number is: “Five (5) Senators shall be considered two-thirds of the
Senate as a whole.” Senate Rule VII(2). The Senate has seven seats. Senate Rule IV(3)(b). Two
Senators voted aye. Two is not five, it is not two-thirds of the seven seats, and it is not two-thirds of
the five Senators in the room. A majority of the Senators present declined to vote for contempt.
The Respondent may argue that abstentions drop out, so that two ayes and no nays is a
unanimous vote. The rules do not read that way. Where the Senate meant two-thirds of those
“present and voting,” it said so, in the rule immediately before this one. Senate Rule V(2). Rule
V(3) does not use those words, and Rule VII(2) supplies the number. A rule that lets the Senate put
a person in jail should not be read to let two of seven Senators do it while the rest sit silent. The
Respondent, who is named on the cover of the Standing Rules as their reviser, announced as carried
a motion that his own rules say failed, and then ordered the arrest.
The failed motion to reconsider changes nothing. It left the first vote where it was, at two.
B. Making statements is not obstructing a session.
R.C.C. § 1.06 reaches two things: failing to appear on a lawful subpoena or writ of
command, and “obstruct[ing] any session of the whole or partial Senate.” The motion used the
word “obstruction,” but the conduct was statements that were called outlandish. That is a judgment
about what was said, and putting the statutory word in a motion does not turn speech into
obstruction. For contempt of court, the Legislature wrote an offense covering “disorderly,
contemptuous, or insolent behavior” and any “noise, or other disturbance directly tending to
interrupt the proceedings of the court.” R.C.C. § 1.08. It put none of that in § 1.06. The Senate
sitting as a tribunal is bound by the statute the Senate sitting as a legislature enacted. Its own rules
say so: the Senate may hold a person in contempt only where it acts “under statutory authority.”
Senate Rule V(3). The statute is § 1.06, and “contemptuous behaviour” is not its test.
Section 1.06 also requires that the obstruction be “without lawful justification.” The
Petitioner was speaking because the Senate was questioning him. Answering the questions of the
body that put them is lawful justification for speaking, whatever the body thinks of the answers.
The Supreme Court of the United States reached the same result where the whole House
had voted. In Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917), a United States Attorney facing an
impeachment inquiry sent the investigating subcommittee’s chairman a letter the House found
defamatory and insulting. The House adopted a resolution holding him in contempt and had him
arrested. The Court ordered him discharged on habeas corpus: the contempt power exists to remove
obstructions to the body’s work, and it does not reach a statement because the body is affronted by
it. See also Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821) (“the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed”). The Senate could have had the Petitioner shown out. Const. art. II,
§ VI. That is the remedy its own rules provide for a disorderly non-member: the Sergeant-at-Arms
may “remove or eject” him. Senate Rule II(3)(c). Imprisonment added only punishment.
3
A contrary reading would collide with the right to freedom of speech “concerning the
transactions of government.” Const. art. I, § IX; U.S. Const. amend. I; see Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S. 116 (1966) (state legislature violated the First Amendment by excluding a member-elect
because of his statements on public questions). And no person is guilty of an offense without
culpability as to “each material element,” which the Senate did not find. 6 R. Stat. §§ 121.002,
121.003.
C. The Petitioner received no notice and no hearing.
Contempt of Senate is a criminal offense punished by imprisonment. The Constitution
guarantees the accused the right “to be heard by oneself and by counsel” and “to demand the cause
and nature of the accusation,” and provides that no person can “be justly deprived of liberty, except
by the laws of the land, or the judgment of the person’s peers.” Const. art. I, § VI. A correct vote is
not a hearing. In Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972), a state assembly adopted a contempt
resolution against a non-member by vote of the body, without notice or an opportunity to respond,
and the Court held that the resolution denied due process. Groppi involved a resolution passed two
days after the event, and the Court did not decide whether a legislature may act summarily in the
moment to stop a disturbance. But stopping a disturbance requires only removal. It does not require
a criminal judgment and a jail term without a word from the accused.
The Senate’s own rules show what it considers fair when less is at stake. A Member facing
censure is given up to five minutes “to make their case.” Senate Rule IX(1). A Member facing
expulsion is given notice by the Secretary and five minutes to speak in his defense. Senate Rule
IX(3)(a). Those Members risk a mark on a file or a seat. The Petitioner risked jail, and the Senate
never afforded him time to answer the contempt or to speak on it.
D. The order was not carried out the way the Senate’s rules or the law require.
When the Senate holds a person in contempt, its rules let it “direct the Sergeant-at-Arms to
take them into custody.” Senate Rule V(3). That did not happen. The Respondent instructed a
Major of the State Police, and the Major’s sworn statement names that instruction, and nothing
else, as the reason for the arrest. The rules also require that when the accused is brought before a
judge for a probable cause hearing, the court be told “whether a vote was held” and which Members
voted in favor. Senate Rule V(3)(b). The affidavit told the Court neither. Had it complied, the Court
would have been told that two Senators voted aye. The Court found no probable cause on it.
A contempt charge may be held only “upon order of the Senate.” S.B. 002, § 403(a)(i). Two
Senators voted aye, and the Senate issued no order an officer could execute or a court could read.
The arrest was made without a warrant. An officer may arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor
only when it is committed in his presence, or when “[a] warrant for the arrest has been issued.”
6 R. Stat. § 131.006(a), (d); see 9 R. Stat. § 223.002 (State Police may arrest without warrant a
person who violates the law “in the presence of a state trooper”). A vote of the Senate is not a
warrant, and warrants issue on oath or affirmation. Const. art. I, § VIII.
E. The Senate may question the Attorney General. It may not jail him for his answers.
The Attorney General is a constitutional officer elected by the voters of the State. Const.
art. IV, §§ V, VI. The departments of government are “separate and distinct, so that neither
exercise the powers properly belonging to the others.” Const. art. II, § V. The Constitution gives
the Senate its remedies against an executive officer whose conduct or answers it disapproves: it
may question him, it may legislate, and it may order an impeachment by two-thirds of its members,
to be tried by the Supreme Court. Const. art. VI, §§ III, IV, V. Summary imprisonment by the
questioning body is not among them. If the Senate can jail an executive officer for answers it finds
4
outlandish, no officer can answer it candidly, and the questioning the rules provide for becomes a
trap.
F. Article I, Section X does not bar review.
Article I, Section X protects “[t]he freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in the
Legislature.” The Petitioner does not sue any Senator and seeks nothing on account of any vote. He
asks the Court to decide whether an order imprisoning him is valid, which courts have done since
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) (members who voted for a contempt resolution were
immune, but the resolution was void and its execution actionable). See also Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Legislature placed this misdemeanor within this Court’s jurisdiction,
3 R. Stat. § 131.004(a), and the Constitution gives this Court the writ of habeas corpus with no
exception for prisoners of the Senate. Const. art. V, § IV. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States are cited as persuasive authority and, on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as
controlling.
RELIEF REQUESTED
The Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court:
(a) continue the stay entered September 16, 2026, until this petition is finally decided;
(b) declare the contempt order of September 16, 2026, void;
(c) permanently restrain the Respondent, and every person acting at his direction or under the
order, from enforcing it, 7 R. Stat. § 122.101;
(d) order any arrest or offense record arising from it, including No. DCE-2026-0101,
expunged, 7 R. Stat. § 122.101; Const. art. V, § IV;
(e) award the Petitioner his court costs, 7 R. Stat. § 132.203; and
(f) grant such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of September, 2026.
/s/ Adam Stratton
ADAM STRATTON
Petitioner, individually and as Attorney General
VERIFICATION
I, Adam Stratton, affirm under the pains and penalties of perjury that the facts stated in
paragraphs 1 through 15 of this amended petition are true.
/s/ Adam Stratton
ADAM STRATTON
Petitioner
5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on September 16, 2026, this amended petition was filed with the Clerk of the
Superior Court and a copy was served by electronic means upon the Respondent, LargeTitanic2,
and upon the Solicitor General. 7 R. Stat. §§ 131.103, 131.106, 133.003.
/s/ Adam Stratton
ADAM STRATTON
Petitioner
6
