SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
TORTADIVER,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ACTION NO.: RSC-CM-6368
JUDGE: HON. Arthur_Chen, Senior Judge
MAGISTRATE: HON. Vonhagen123
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TWO OF THE INFORMATION,
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through his/her undersigned counsel,
iiCryptic_LawMD, pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(3)(3)(2), requests from this Honorable Court
the following:
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT TWO OF THE INFORMATION
1. Attached herein is a Memorandum of Law in support of the Motion to Dismiss Count two
of the Information, charged as Official Misconduct pursuant to Rid. Crim. C. § 2.15, sub 1.
2. The Memorandum of Law is attached to this Motion pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P.
13(1)(4), providing that in relevant part, no motion to dismiss shall be filed without including a
Memorandum of Law.
3. The Defense requests from this Honorable Court a dismissal with prejudice concerning
count two of the Information for the aforesaid charge for a few main reasons:
● The State does not comply with Rule 4(4)(4) in charging the Defendant.
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE, HEARING REQUEST
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, by and through the undersigned, do certify that on the
Date stated in this Motion, the State has received the filed version of this Motion, pursuant to
Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(1)(3).
TAKING NOTICE that the Defendant, pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(5), request a
hearing on this Motion, to take place within the specified period for non-discovery motions.
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNT TWO OF THE INFORMATION
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through his/her undersigned counsel,
iiCryptic_LawMD, pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(1)(4), files this Memorandum of Law with
this Honorable Court in support of the above-entitled motion:
LEGAL STANDARDS
1. Whoever, being a public servant, commits an act relating to their office but constitutes an
unauthorized exercise of their official functions, knowing that such an act is unauthorized. See
R.C.C. § 2.15 (Official Misconduct) (Some language omitted).
2. A motion to dismiss or for appropriate relief may be founded upon, without limitation,
that the charging instrument fails to comply with Rid. R. Crim. P. 4(a) or charges no offense
known to the law. See Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(3)(3)(2) (Some language omitted).
3. Each offense charged shall be stated in a separate count. Each count shall state a plain
and concise statement of the act constituting the offense, sufficient to give the defendant and the
court reasonable notice of the charge. See Rid. R. Crim. P. 4(4)(4).
4. A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element when if the element involves
the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that
nature or that such circumstances exist. See 6 R. Stat. § 111.011, sub. 1.
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
TORTADIVER,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ACTION NO.: RSC-CM-6368
JUDGE: HON. Arthur_Chen, Senior Judge
MAGISTRATE: HON. Vonhagen123
5. If a civilian charges the National Guard Base with a motor vehicle, guardsmen are
authorized to use lethal force on the trespasser. See Sec. 6(a), S11-39 (Military Exclusion Zone
and Installation Security Act (“MEZ and Base Act”)).
6. If a civilian is driving recklessly or u-turns twice or more within the Military Exclusion
Zone, guardsmen may utilize lethal force. See Sec. 6(f), S11-39 (MEZ and Base Act).
7. The first presumption in statutory interpretation is that a legislature says in a statute
“what it means” and means in a statute “what it says there.” Ridgeway Parks Service v. SteKing,
1 Rid. ___ (2022) (internal citations omitted).
8. Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, a police officer may use deadly
force to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect only if the officer has a good-faith belief that the
suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (Primary holding).
ANALYSIS
9. Count Two of the Information, charged as Official Misconduct (RCC § 2.15), alleges that
the Defendant “did unlawfully committed [sic] an act relating to their office, but constituted an
unauthorized exercise of their official functions by firing his weapon at a fleeing vehicle that
posed no threat to the safety of any one or property including the Ridgeway National Guard
Base.” See Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 2-8.
A. Factual Background
10. All times relevant are in Eastern Standard/Daylight Time.
11. On August 17, 2026 at 7:49 p.m., the Defendant was on patrol stationed at the Military
Exclusion Zone (“MEZ”) alongside kola188 and nikozoomalt.
12. Forty (40) seconds later, the victim collided with the MEZ, prompting the Defendant to
engage the victim by lethal force.
13. The victim, after regaining control of their vehicle after the collision, attempts to flee
from the Guardsmen, only to have their vehicle disabled.
14. After the vehicle disabled, the victim attempted to approach the Defendant and the other
Guardsmen on duty, but was swiftly killed by the Defendant.
15. After the victim’s body was despawned, the Defendant made a comment about how LFA
(Lethal Force authorized) was authorized due to the victim’s collision with Military Police.
16. Nikozoomalt, one of the Guardsmen interviewed by Military Police Investigations,
replied with “I bet,” and “he’s gonna try to get you.”
17. Kola188 made a similar comment, stating “well, yes he will report you,” going on to say
“cuz bacon is reporting everyone.”
18. The Defendant replied that the victim cannot truly make a report due to the Military
Police witnesses, to which kola188 said “ik,” “js [sic] saying.”
B. Core Arguments
I. The State fails to Comply with Rid. R. Crim. P. 4(4)(4) in charging the
Defendant by failing to provide a clear and concise statement on the act
constituting an offense
19. In order to understand the core of this argument, we must understand a key factual detail:
the witnesses do not truly dispute that the lethal force incident was lawful, with even
Nikozoomalt agreeing that it was lawful by saying “i bet.”
20. The State may rebut this argument by saying that “i bet” is too broad of a phrase, and can
mean affirmation or it can be used sarcastically. And this argument is initially appealing, but
upon closer scrutiny of the facts, this argument does not satisfy muster.
21. In scrutinizing the facts in closer detail, both witnesses agree on one thing: The victim is
a serial reporter, and that he will try to report the Defendant. While this can be construed to be
innocent such that the victim may or may not have a valid claim, this further fails because after
the Defendant rightfully clarifies that the victim does not possess a valid claim because of the
witnesses, to which kola188 agrees.
22. The Military Police Investigator, in its Affidavit, uses the Defendant’s late observation of
the initial collision and the reliance on sound as a discrediting factor, this is legally and factually
incorrect.
23. Under Garner, the Court held that a police officer may use lethal force to prevent the
escape of a fleeing suspect if the officer has a good-faith belief that the suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.
24. There was indeed a collision, as the victim’s point of view reflects that the victim had
been speeding before going to the MEZ, and colliding close to another Guardsman, posing a
significant threat of serious physical injury due to Ridgeway’s vehicle-to-person (VTP)
mechanism.
25. The victim, after colliding, attempted to flee, and at that point, became a fleeing felon.
26. Under Secs. 6(a) and (f) of the MEZ and Base Act, a Guardsman is authorized to use
deadly force on trespassing individuals and reckless drivers.
27. As the Ridgeway Supreme Court held in Ridgeway Parks Service v. SteKing, 1 Rid. ___
(2022), the first presumption in statutory interpretation is that a legislature says in a statute “what
it means” and means in a statute “what it says there.”
28. The MEZ and Base Act clearly meant for Guardsmen to use deadly force for both
trespassers and reckless drivers.
29. A person acts recklessly, in the most common formulation, when he “consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk” attached to his conduct, in “gross deviation” from
accepted standards. That risk need not come anywhere close to a likelihood. Speeding through a
crowded area may count as reckless even though the motorist’s “chances of hitting anyone are
far less [than] 50%.” Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. ___ (2021), citing Model Penal Code §
2.02(2)(c), citing also Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, ___ (2016) (slip. op., at 4), citing
also 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.4(f) (2018) (citing cases dealing with low
probability events).
30. Reckless conduct, which requires the conscious disregard of a known risk, is not an
accident: It involves a deliberate decision to endanger another. Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S.
___ (2016).
31. Under the SteKing presumption, the ordinary definition of “reckless” is dealt with with
respect to a conscious disregard of a known risk. The victim consciously disregarded the known
risk of actually colliding with a Guardsman or group of Guardsmen. By virtue of this, this
involves a deliberate decision to endanger others under Voisine.
CONCLUSION
32. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Defendant requests that this Honorable Court
GRANT IN FULL the Motion to Dismiss count two of the Information.
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, by and through the undersigned, do certify that on the
Date stated in this Motion, the State has received the filed version of this Motion, pursuant to
Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(1)(3).
NOTICE OF HEARING REQUEST
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, by and through the undersigned, do request and demand a
hearing on this motion pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(5), to be scheduled in accordance with the
scheduling regimen provided for non-discovery motions. See Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(5)(2).
DATED: September 15, 2026 Respectfully Submitted,
