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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Defendant AlbertWellesley
TonyBlony492,RBN19309
Filing username: TonyBlony492
Counsel for: Plaintiff
SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
thr33six8, Case No. RSC-CV-8427
Plaintiff,
vs. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
AlbertWellesley,et.al., Defendant AlbertWellesley
Defendant.
Position on the Motion
Plaintiff thr33six8 opposes Defendant AlbertWellesley’s Motion to Dismiss in its
entirety. The Motion should be denied. The Amended Complaint states claims upon
which relief can be granted under Ridgeway Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(5) and Rule 8.
Defendant’s reliance on federal pleading standards does not change the result under
Ridgeway’s notice-pleading rules.
Response to Grounds and Facts
Defendant’s Factual Background largely restates the chronology already set forth
in the Amended Complaint and then characterizes Plaintiff’s claims as speculative or
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Defendant AlbertWellesley
inconsistent. Those characterizations are inaccurate. The Amended Complaint alleges,
with specific dates, communications, and case citations, that:
• Multiple anonymous complaints were filed with the State Bar.
• Plaintiff was placed on interim suspension.
• As a direct result, Plaintiff could not continue as counsel of record in named
matters (including Tripiafer23 v. JE9SE, RSC-CV-8563; noahbadnolie v.
robloxagone13, RSC-CV-9831; Icecoldwateryes v. WGT05, RSC-CV-8006;
and TheUnknownSavagx v. ShadowCulture, et al., RSC-CV-3946).
• At least one case was dismissed for failure to prosecute and others were
stayed because of the suspension.
These are concrete facts, not legal conclusions. Defendant’s assertion that
Plaintiff has pleaded no concrete injury is simply wrong. Loss of the ability to practice,
loss of specific client representations, and adverse case dispositions constitute concrete
economic injury.
Defendant also claims the Complaint is internally inconsistent regarding the
existence of evidence. It is not. The Complaint alleges that complaints and purported
evidence were submitted to the Bar; it simultaneously alleges that those materials were
legally and factually insufficient to support an interim suspension, particularly under the
process required by 3 R. Stat. §§ 151.204 and 151.205. Alleging the existence of
materials the Bar relied upon is not inconsistent with alleging that those materials failed
to meet the required standard.
The statutory authority question—whether the Bar Integrity Act or 3 R. Stat. §§
151.003, 151.204, and 151.205 authorized the precise interim suspension imposed
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Defendant AlbertWellesley
without a Supreme Court hearing—is a disputed legal issue that cannot be resolved
against Plaintiff on a motion to dismiss.
Argument
A. The governing pleading standard is Ridgeway Rule 8, not federal
Iqbal/Twombly.
Defendant repeatedly invokes Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Those decisions interpret Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8. They are not binding on this Court.
Under Twombly, a complaint must contain enough factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face—i.e., the plaintiff must plead facts that
allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Conclusory
allegations that merely recite the elements of a cause of action are insufficient; the
complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Iqbal refined that standard. A court must first disregard legal conclusions and
bare assertions of wrongdoing. It then accepts the remaining well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief. Plausibility is a context-specific inquiry that requires the court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense; it does not require probability, only more than a
sheer possibility of misconduct.
Even if those federal standards applied, the Amended Complaint satisfies them. It
does not rest on bare labels. It supplies a detailed chronological narrative of specific
events, specific communications from the Bar, specific statutory and rule citations, and
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Defendant AlbertWellesley
specific concrete injuries (named cases stayed or dismissed because Plaintiff could not
appear). Those factual allegations, accepted as true, support a reasonable inference of
unauthorized official action and resulting deprivation of rights.
Under Ridgeway’s actual rules the standard is more lenient. Rule 8(a) requires
only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Rule 8(f) directs that pleadings “shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice.” The Amended Complaint easily meets that standard.
B. Count One states a claim for Official Misconduct.
The Complaint alleges that AlbertWellesley, acting as a public servant, imposed
an interim suspension without the Supreme Court hearing required by 3 R. Stat. §
151.204 for disciplinary action involving suspension. It further alleges concrete injury:
loss of the ability to practice and adverse dispositions in specific cases. Those
allegations, taken as true, state a claim that Defendant committed an unauthorized
exercise of official functions knowing it was unauthorized (or, alternatively, refrained from
performing a duty clearly inherent in the office). Whether the Bar Integrity Act supplies
independent authority is a legal question that cannot be resolved against Plaintiff at the
pleading stage.
C. Count Two states a claim for Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law.
The Complaint alleges that AlbertWellesley acted under color of law, deprived
Plaintiff of a statutory right to practice (3 R. Stat. § 151.006), and did so without adequate
process. Notice and an interview occurred; Plaintiff invokes the Fourteenth Amendment.
The allegation that the evidence was insufficient under the applicable standard is a
factual contention that must be accepted as true for purposes of this motion. Causation
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Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Defendant AlbertWellesley
is adequately pleaded against the official who imposed the suspension. Participation by
other Bar personnel does not eliminate liability at the pleading stage.
D. Technical arguments do not warrant dismissal.
The official-capacity caption versus the request for individual-capacity punitive
damages is a remedial issue that can be clarified by amendment if necessary. It does
not require dismissal of the underlying claims. Alleged inconsistencies about the
temporary nature of the suspension and the length of the factual narrative are not
grounds for dismissal under Rule 8 or Rule 12(a)(5).
Conclusion
The Amended Complaint states plausible claims for Official Misconduct and
Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law. It alleges concrete injury, unauthorized official
action, and inadequate process with sufficient factual particularity. Defendant’s Motion
misapplies federal pleading standards, mischaracterizes the allegations, and seeks to
resolve disputed legal and factual questions at the pleading stage.
