All dates and times are in ISO 8601 format unless otherwise specified.
Filed on 2026-09-13 (UTC+00:00)
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
THR33SIX8, an individual,
Plaintiff,
-against-
ALBERTWELLESLEY, in his official capacity as
associate director of the Ridgeway State Bar,
RASHHYYYY, and COMPLAINAINTS, who are
defendants under a pseudonym.
Defendants.
RSC-CV-8427
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Presiding Judge: Hon. Arthur_Chen
Pursuant to Rid. Rule Civ. Proc. 47(2), Plaintiff thr33six8 moves for a preliminary
injunction: namely, he moves for this court to either enjoin Defendant AlbertWellesley to undo
the interim suspension put on Plaintiff. Alternatively, this court may enjoin Defendant's
employees instead pursuant to Id., at 47(4)(2).
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Although it is not required for the movant to state the grounds (when they've already been
established, be it in a filed pleading or prima facie), I feel it is necessary to insert this section into
the motion. See Rid. Rule Civ. Proc. 47(2)(2) (listing the grounds where a court shall grant a
preliminary injunction).
Procedurally, a preliminary injunction shall be granted when the movant establishes (1)
that there is "a substantial likelihood of success on the merits", (2) "that the movant will suffer
irreparable injury for which damages are an inadequate remedy if the injunction is denied", (3)
"that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the harm the injunction would cause the
party restrained," and (4) "that the injunction is not adverse to the public interest." Id., at
47(2)(2)(1–4). These obligations for the movant to establish mirror the ones set under SCOTUS
precedent. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) ("A plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.") (emphasis added). I
should stress that the SCOTUS standard of proof is the "likely" standard, not the "possibility"
one. Id., at 22 ("Our frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to
demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.") (citing Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983)).
While the introduction of the SCOTUS standard may sway this court into adhering to it
rather than the procedural standard, the procedural rules' standard takes priority, and this Court
shall adhere to that standard. See Rid. Rules Civ. Proc 1(6)(1) ("'Shall' and 'must' impose a
duty."), 1(5) ("These rules shall be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding…as [Rid Const., Art. Ⅴ, § 1] requires…")
GROUNDS
1. There is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
How would a movant establish likelihood of success on the merits? Well, establishment
just falls on the merits, and, naturally, the success from the merits of the claims. It is the merit of
the claims, not the merits reinstated in a motion like this, that is the first factor. The better the
merits, the stronger the likelihood. Cf. Trump v. Cook, 609 U.S. ____ (2026) (SCOTUS found
that the government wasn't likely to succeed on the merits of appealing and therefore failed the
first factor of the Winter test); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010) (per curiam).
As for substance of the merits, this can be weighed in two ways: appositively, how well
the statutory and common law back the claims' merits, or oppositively, how strong the law
pushes back against the claims' merits. Considering that the appositive approach is preferred, I
will establish them thus.
…I already established them. In fact, I incorporate the arguments for merit here. Please
see the response in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss and the amended complaint.
2. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted.
This factor is similiar to the unspoken common law rule of pleading: no injury, no
victory. Only chagrin, thrown in the bin. Insufficiently pled, your case is surely dead. On the
other hand, this factor does stress future injury. In my mind, this factor is moreorso better called
the "impending doom" factor, but that name contrasts with how it is in common law: if neither
wrench nor coin, enjoin.
Stakes, just like the balance of equities, are the weights in determining irreparable injury,
but so is considering how to undo the hypothetical injury. While I already have enough stakes
from equitable interests, I also have weights in future injury.
In a world where this injunction is denied, then my cases would get dismissed for failure
to prosecute, and other times where my clients have been wronged cannot be addressed by me.
No amount of Benjamins can change how one views horrible events behind a glass wall, and,
again, no other attorney is willing to pick up my clients. Furthermore, some of the civil actions
where I am the counsel of record for the plaintiff are stayed due to my interim suspension. And
because me and my clients have been unable to find a suitable attorney and my clients are
laymen, they cannot overcome the stay unless I become suspended. The worse case scenario is if
the case gets dismissed with prejudice because I couldn't have filed a response to a motion to
dismiss.
The solicitor general's office has been moving on my clients' contra-government civil
actions, and I've already seen one go down while I stood behind a glass wall, which is
TheUnknownSavagx v. ShadowCulture et al., RSC-CV-3946 (2026). Tripiafer23 v. smashcans,
RSC-CV-1141 (2026) has been through a similar fate, but without prejudice for failure to
prosecute (thanks to the stay running out). Even though I filed a 15-page memorandum in
response to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the judge ignored it and stayed proceedings. If I
haven't said it, smashcans, MurkenDawg v. dev_Typ, RSC-CV-6755 (2026), and more are all
stayed conditionally because of my interim suspension. The condition is that another attorney or
the plaintiff make an appearance, but that has not happened, and the time limit on those stays has
already ran out. My clients, who are laymen, cannot fix them. Only I can.
I also face unavailability to act when my clients have been wronged. I have been sent
clips of my clients being shot by a police officer for no reason, Fourth Amendment violations,
and more, but I cannot begin litigation for the clients because of my interim suspension. No other
attorney wants to pick up those cases, and neither wrench nor coin can address the unavailability
to act on those horrible events.
Simply put, I face my cases being dismissed and my career being damaged from being
unable to act.
3. The injunctive relief outweighs any harm to Defendant AlbertWellesley.
The rule from which this comes mirrors the SCOTUS factor for such, which is called
"balance of equities." Historically, in Ridgeway, the balance of equities favors individuals who
have faced adverse action from the government. E.g., thr33six8 v. errcore et. al., RSC-CV-8917
(Rid. Superior Ct. 2025) (preliminary injunction granted, enjoining a search warrant issued upon
plaintiff); Cf. turntable5000 v. 306rylan (D. Mf. 2022) ("It cannot be the case that a harm is
incurred by the Defendant when he is enjoined from occupying his position as a Governor when
that very occupation was illegal. Plaintiff has fairly demonstrated his equitable interests.")
SCOTUS precedent has never mainly ruled over this issue: at best, they say reasonings
regarding "balance of equities" in their judgments, but that's just required by the Winter factors.
E.g., Cook, 609 U.S. (Jackson, J., concurring) ("On the equities, the Government has not
identified any injury whatsoever beyond the harm that a President purportedly suffers when a
Governor of the Board of the Federal Reserve exercises power 'over [his] objection.'")
It appears the best route is to just simply weigh what harm I'd suffer and what harm
Defendant AlbertWellesley would suffer. I'll measure in stakes.
I have a stake for how many times I am the counsel of record for a plaintiff. I am the
plaintiffs' counsel of record in Tripiafer23 v. JE9SE, RSC-CV-8563 (2026), Tripiafer23, et al., v.1
smashcans, et al., RSC-CV-1141 (2026) (class of two plaintiffs), RA4ZERR v. djnisnn,
RSC-CV-6755 (2026), rawequals v. CephalGPT, RSC-CV-1389 (2026), MurkenDawg v.
dev_Typ, RSC-CV-5829 (2026), noahbadnolie v. robloxagone13, RSC-CV-9831 (2026),
TheUnknownSavagx v. ShadowCulture, et al., RSC-CV-3946 (2026), r_zuelius v. WGT05,
RSC-CV-1716 (2026), and Icecoldwateryes v. WGT05, RSC-CV-8006 (2026), and I am the
defendant's counsel of record in aspenfun v. masterqv, RSC-CV-8952 (2026). Amended Compl. ¶
1 While channel access is closed, this civil action has not seen a final judgment be entered, and it is therefore still
active.
40. Including the repeats in class actions (Tripiafer23 and masterqv appear twice), I have eleven
clients for which I am the counsel of record.
I have a duty for these nine clients of mine. The Ridgeway State Bar themselves puts a
duty on me for these clients. To name a few, they're the duty of playing the role of a lawyer,
counselor/advisor, and advocate. See generally Rules of Professional Conduct. As a lawyer, I
have to help them litigate. As a counselor, I have to give sage legal advice to my clients. As an
advocate, I have to stand up for my clients, which is my statutory right. 3 R. Stat. § 151.006
("Every attorney duly admitted or authorized to practice law in this state shall have the right to
appear before any court of the state, or any public board, committee, or office in the interest of
any client").
These clients have small voices. They've been wronged by the government, who are
sworn to act for them, but no attorney picks up their cases and resolves them (because to
paraphrase one attorney, attorneys are too scared to deal with cases that even raise a hint of
Callahan immunity). Not even the governments' attorneys will act on their injustices. Their
constitutional rights, which are federal and state-level, are defenselessly trampled upon. And
they are simply laymen, laymen who do not know that Bivens actions are a portable causes of
action against police officers and that qualified immunity is thinner than a credit card. They
weren't taught or researched the importance of these rights that were created so there would be
no overreach.
That is why I am their attorney. I know those facets of the law, and I use them to
strengthen their voice. And the State of Ridgeway recognizes how important people like me are,
not just for the sake of LARPing, but so everybody feels welcome and heard here.
So, why in the world did Defendant AlbertWellesley write that I pose a "risk to the
public?" While he does have an understandable stake in attorneys being competent at their
litigation, he has a statutory stake in attorney ethics, not the public. 3 R. Stat. § 151.201 ("The
Board of Legal Ethics shall establish ethical codes, conduct regulations, and enforce ethical
standards") (emphasis added).
When it comes to litigation, ethics only concerns frivolous litigation, and that is a high
bar to climb. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). .After all, having a SLAPPA is the worst2
thing a victim can have. However, while frivolous actions are unsuccessful cases, not all
unsucessful cases are frivolous. A legal theory can be out there, but even if the complaint's
claims have a skosh of merit, the success lies on how well that party can argue their case and
prove the facts. In short, it only triggers a violation of ethics if an attorney brings forward
frivolous cases or engages in SLAPP.
Here, there is no SLAPP. There is no frivolous litigation. Defendant AlbertWellesley only
believes that this has occurred because the Department of Justice has convinced him to look at
my clients' cases through the Department's lens. That is not the work of an ethics officer.
In conclusion, I have way more than enough equitable stakes in this preliminary
injunction, be they statutory, obligatory, or career-related. Defendant AlbertWellesley faces no
harm from this injunction.
4. The injunction is not adverse to public interest.
Public interest does not just refer to the people and their opinions, but also the third-party
governments. Perry, 558 U.S., at 199 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Court today issues an order
2 Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation Attorney. A person/business' foot soldier to engage in SLAPP or a
vulture who preys on victims to engage in SLAPP.
that will prevent the transmission of proceedings in a nonjury civil case of great public interest to
five other federal courthouses located in Seattle, Pasadena, Portland, San Francisco, and
Brooklyn."); Cook, 609 U.S., at ____ (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Economic experts of all stripes
agree that '[t]he Federal Reserve’s independence is critical to fostering the long-term health and
stability of the national economy.")
However, the "public interest" factor is not solely about the public's opinion. Cf. FCC v.
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) ("Whether embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices."). The public interest factor is simply just a
factor where the court considers if the injunction contradicts the interests of everyday people and
the government. Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 606 U.S. ____, ____ (2025) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) ("In deciding whether to grant a stay, this Court, moreover, must balance the equities
and explore the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of the public
at large.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
If it isn't clear enough, defining public interest in terms of the preliminary injunction
factor is hard. Should a court weigh public interest as in "public safety" (i.e., should I let this
criminal with 10 battery records out on parole) or as in "public opinion" (i.e., how much would
the public benefit from this ruling). So, I will have to prove this by destroying any opposition.
This injunction is not against the public interest because there is a mere morsel of
opposition from public (of the government) individuals. Opposing that is the "determination"
that I pose a threat to the public by Defendant AlbertWellesley. While he is an agent of the
government, one that is run the people, he has a duty to respond to actual, bonafide violations of
ethical standards. His job is to bring foul attorneys to the Supreme Court of Ridgeway in order to
address violations of said standards. 3 R. Stat. § 151.204 ("Prior to disciplinary action involving
disbarment, suspension for cause, public reprimand, monetary sanction, or admonition by the
Board of Legal Ethics, the Board of Legal Ethics shall submit a disciplinary hearing before the
Supreme Court where the attorney may present a defense.")
If it isn't clear now, he's an investigator under SCOR. An investigator who finds and
investigates violations of ethical standards. His findings and opinions are meant to be grounded
in fact and after careful analysis, but here, Defendant AlbertWellesley has acted based on, bluntly
speaking, my opps' vexatious attempts at hindering my career: the interest is in that private party,
the opps. Who are the opps? Government officials who expect me to be sued by one of my
clients or the Department of Justice, which represents the defendants in a majority of my
contra-government civil actions.
And all the opps did was, at worse, malign the merits of cases that I was bringing or
connect unrelated situations to my career. At best, they inflated redudnant, miniscule mistakes
made in litigation that are only a dirty speck on the path to victory (for example, when I misread
a rule and filed a motion to strike for a motion to dismiss). My opps, of which all are government
officals, are only acting to slow down litigation against them. They are the public in the
governmental sense, but they are the public in the governmental sense. Public means the people,
not a small bunch of a class of butthurt defendants.
Only they would oppose this injunction. And because only they would oppose it, there is
no way to say that it is not on the public's side to grant this injunction: there only exists the
public's side, and there is no in-between. Logically, it follows that this injunction is in the public
interest.
All in all, the interim suspension goes against the interest of the people, is unfounded,
unreasonably harms my career, and does not address any harm within Defendant
AlbertWellesley's ambit as associate director of the Ridgeway State Bar and supervising ethics
officer of the Board of Legal Ethics.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Pursuant to Rid. Rule Civ. Proc. 47(4)(1), Plaintiff prays that this court grant this
preliminary injunction and that this court:
1. ENJOIN Defendant AlbertWellesley to undo the interim suspension imposed on
Plaintiff's license.
Respectfully submitted,
———————————————
/s/ thr33six8
Filer of this document and Plaintiff of the
above-titled civil action;
Licensed Attorney in the State of Ridgeway
since July 23rd, 2026 (R.S.B. License
#19302).
Timezone UTC–05:00.
/s/ TonyBlony492
The attorney of Plaintiff/Client thr33six8;
Licensed Attorney in the State of Ridgeway
since August 18th, 2026 (R.S.B. License
#19309)
Timezone UTC+02:00.
