SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
v.
STORMCATSRULE,
Defendant.
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Action No.: RSC-CM-5130
Before: Judge EffortlessBrit
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EXHIBITS A, B, AND C FROM STATE’S
DISCOVERY DISCLOSURE
LEGAL STANDARDS
1. A defendant aggrieved by any of the following may move to suppress evidence, and any
evidence derived from it, from use by the State, evidence obtained by a search or seizure
conducted in violation of the right secured by Const. art. I, § 8, or 6 R. Stat. §§ 131.009 through
131.017 governing search warrants. Grounds under this subdivision include that the warrant
issued in blank or without specification of the place or item to be searched or seized. See Rid. R.
Crim. P. 13.1(1)(1)(5)
2. That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions,
free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants, without oath or affirmation first made,
affording sufficient foundation for them, and whereby by any officer or messenger may be
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his, her or
their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be
granted. (Emphasis added) See Const. Art. 1 § 8
3. An authorized judge, upon review of the application, affidavits, and evidence submitted,
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if satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuing of the search warrant, shall issue a search
warrant signed by him, to any sheriff, sheriff’s deputies, police officers, or other person
authorized by law to execute process, commanding the law enforcement officer forthwith to
search the property described in the warrant or the person named, for the property specified, [ . . .
]. (Omission & Emphasis added), See 6 R. Stat. § 131.013
4. The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965), quoting and citing Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)
5. [N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. See U.S.
Const. Amend. IV (emphasis added)
6. These words are precise and clear.1 They reflect the determination of those who wrote the
Bill of Rights that the people of this new Nation should forever "be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects" from intrusion and seizure by officers acting under the unbridled
authority of a general warrant. Stanford, at 481
7. The prohibition of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which forbids the Federal Government to convict a man of crime by using evidence obtained
from him by unreasonable search and seizure, is enforceable against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment by the same sanction of exclusion [ . . . ]. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
1 (1927) (Omitted text)
1 Referring to the text of the Fourth Amendment, viewable in the previous paragraph
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8. Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the
same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961)
9. Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so
facially deficient – i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be
seized – that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. In so limiting the
suppression remedy, we leave untouched the probable cause standard and the various
requirements for a valid warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984), citing
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988-991 (1984) (emphasis added), (citation omitted)
ARGUMENTS
I. The Warrant Fails the Particularity Requirement
10. The Warrant at issue (RSC-SW-1211, State’s Exhibit B), issued August 1, 2026, at its core
commands the Ridgeway State Police and any assisting peace officer of the state to search “[A]ll
personal vehicles, persons, safes, and residences that are shown through the Mobile Data
Terminal.”
11. The Warrant reiterates this verbiage in the limitations and conditions section in all capital
letters.
12. The Warrant bolsters this verbiage further by including a directive to seize “all illegal
items” in the section aptly titled “AND TO SEIZE the following property or things:.”
13. On August 5, Sergeant TheNoobyKids of the Ridgeway State Police filed a Receipt
(State’s Exhibit A) finding a total of ten (10) items across two (2) vehicles, only confiscating six
(6) of those items.
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14. The vehicles in question are a Blue Gridlock (HVI475) and a Pink Lawnmower
(DQK011). Five (5) items were attributed to the Gridlock, and the other five (5) to the
Lawnmower.
15. The Sergeant provided a video of their execution of the Search Warrant (State’s Exhibit
C) to complement the Affidavit of Probable Cause.
16. The Warrant fails to describe at all instances the specific property, safe, vehicles and parts
of the vehicles to be searched and seized. The Warrant also fails to particularize the specific
items to be seized, grouping it all as “any illegal items.”
17. The Supreme Court is clear on this generality. Not just clear, but explicitly talked about
this generality, which it has explicitly rejected. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984),
when talking about circumstances where suppression is an appropriate remedy, the Supreme
Court, as an example, stated plainly that “[A] warrant may be so facially deficient – i.e., in
failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized – that the executing
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.,” continuing that “In so limiting the
suppression remedy, we leave untouched the probable cause standard and the various
requirements for a valid warrant.” Leon, at 923, citing Sheppard, at 988-991 (1984)
18. This is to say that a Warrant that fails to particularize the place or the things to be seized
is an appropriate remedy for suppression.
19. Further, the Warrant is worded in such a way that leaves the reasonable officer with
discretion as to what residence, what vehicles, what safes, munitions and their calibers, and the
weapons to be seized. The Supreme Court has also rejected this in both Stanford and Marron,
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jointly stating that “As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant.”
20. This is to say that a warrant should be so particular with what is being seized that nothing
at all should be left to the discretion of the executor of the warrant. This is a clear-cut principle,
even particularity is enshrined in Ridgeway’s statutes, requiring specificity in 6 R. Stat. §
131.013.
21. The Framers clearly intended for the relevant language of the Fourth Amendment, as
provided in U.S. Const. Amend. IV and reiterated in Ker, for this to be a repulsion against State
invasion, to the point where the Supreme Court upheld this viewpoint by placing Fourth
Amendment obligations on the States in Ker, at 1.
22. The Framers of the Ridgeway Constitution wanted a more defined but equally strict level
of Fourth Amendment protection, providing that “. . . [W]hereby by any officer or messenger
may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his,
her or their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be
granted.” See Rid. Const. Art. I § 8
23. This is to say that any warrant not particularly describing the seizure or search of
suspected persons, places or properties is an explicit contravention of that right and should not
and ought not to be granted in the first place.
II. The Good-Faith Exception Does not Apply
24. The likely and anticipated counterpoint expected to be raised by the State, and that the
Court should expect, is the good faith exception, which is enshrined in the case of United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), most likely making the argument that even if the warrant is
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deficient, the fruits of the search in a valid warrant at the time still ought to be admissible. This
argument is unpersuasive.
25. To start off, Leon already established that with a warrant that fails to particularize, no
reasonable or reasonably well-trained officer can presume it to be valid. With the Warrant
(RSC-SW-1211) saying “all illegal items, any and all personal vehicles, properties, etc,” full
stop, no officer of reasonable training and experience can presume validity.
26. Further, the Court in Leon went on to explicitly say that the regulation of the
appropriateness of the remedy of suppression is intentionally exclusive of the probable cause
standard and the valid requirements for a warrant, which, among technical requirements,
includes particularity.
ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
The Defendant certifies that reciprocal service to the State of Ridgeway and its
undersigned counsel shall have received a filed copy of this motion by virtue of filing this
motion through E-File.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant respectfully requests the Court to GRANT this motion in full and
suppress the named exhibits (A, B, C of State’s Discovery, Dkt. 7) from the exhibits, and that any
iterations of the substance of the Exhibits shall be struck from prior pleadings and affidavits.
Respectfully Submitted
iiCryptic_LawMD
iiCryptic_LawMD
RBN #10233
State Public Defender
Office of the Public Defender
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