SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
v.
STORMCATSRULE,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
Action No.: RSC-CM-5130
Before: Judge EffortlessBrit
DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE STATE’S BAIL CONDITIONS
The Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully opposes, in part, the
condition sought by the State seeking an order to prohibit the Defendant from possessing a
firearm or other weapon, pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P. 7.1(7).
LEGAL STANDARDS
1. The court shall impose the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions
sufficient to secure the defendant’s appearance and the safety of victims and witnesses. See Rid.
R. Crim. P. 7.1(6)
2. The fixing of bail before trial for any individual defendant must be based upon standards
relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1
(1951)
3. When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives
substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner. This requirement
has traditionally been referred to as "procedural" due process. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 746-747 (1987) citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 424 U. S. 335 (1976)
4. This Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects individuals against two types of
1
government action. So-called "substantive due process" prevents the government from engaging
in conduct that "shocks the conscience," or interferes with rights “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.” Salerno, at 747, citing Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 342 U. S. 172
(1952), Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 302 U. S. 325-326 (1937).
5. In assessing pretrial-release conditions, we review factual findings for clear error, but the
conclusions based on such factual findings present a mixed question of fact and law and require
the exercise of sound judgment as to the values underlying the legal principles. Therefore, we
make an independent examination of the record to determine whether the order is consistent with
the defendant’s constitutional rights and arrive at our conclusion de novo. United States v.
Garcia-Perez, 22-50314 (9th Cir. 2024), see also United States v. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989,
994 (9th Cir. 1990).1
6. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation
promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is
consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. New York State Rifle &
Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___ (2022).
7. Accordingly, we need not attempt to determine when the frequency and/or pattern of
arrests becomes so egregious that it could support a conclusion that the arrests are probative or
prior criminality. United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 2009).2
8. The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the
2 While we concede that the factual circumstances in Berry are different in facts and procedure, this Court ought to
take this under advisement nonetheless due to the fact that the Court in Berry addressed the repeating of records,
stating “We realize, of course, that there may be situations where the number of prior arrests, and/or the similarity of
prior charges to the offense of conviction, becomes so overwhelming and suggestive of actual guilt that they become
exceedingly difficult to ignore.” The Circuit Court of Appeal explicitly cautioned this approach.
1 In Perez-Garcia, the Circuit Court of Appeal dealt with Jesus Perez-Garcia with respect to the issuance of a
firearm prohibition as a bail condition, albeit the Circuit Court of Appeal was dealing with en banc review primarily,
it touched on bail conditions with respect to the cited material.
2
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), citing Coffin v.
United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
9. To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the
fairness of the factfinding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully
guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) citing In re Winship, 397
U.S. 385 & 364 (1970).
10. The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic
component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. Williams, at 503, see also Coffin at
453.
ARGUMENTS
I. The Restriction Does Not Achieve its Intended Purpose
11. The Rules are clear, such that the Court in its bail conditions shall only impose the least
restrictive condition or combination of conditions sufficient to secure the defendant’s appearance
and the safety of victims and witnesses.
12. The State, in its Motion for Conditions, posits the rationale for their conditions that
because the Defendant had a Solami in his possession when the Search Warrant was being
conducted, that “[a]s a result, there is a presumption that weighs in favor of strict pretrial release
with conditions.” State’s Motion for Pretrial Release on Conditions, ¶ 4
13. The State further posits three (3) justifications in support of its position. To start off, the
State incorrectly posits the standard posed by 18 U.S.C. § 1342(g)3. To this end, the State’s
analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 1342(g) is no longer credible.
3 18 U.S.C. § 1342(g) does not exist as a recognizable statute as posited by the State. See Legal Information Institute
3
14. For the purposes of analysis, we should instead turn to the Supreme Court, persuasive
precedent4 on the matter (See Legal Standards paras. 1–3, 5-6) and the Ridgeway Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
15. The State has not proven that the Defendant is dangerous, nor has it proven that the
evidence is particularly strong. The Defendant, for the purposes of judicial economy, will reserve
any constitutional arguments for later briefing at the direction of the Court, but in the State’s
posited test, it fails (even if it were valid) simply because the State has not proven that the
Defendant is a danger to the community.
16. When accounting for the facts, the Defendant never hurt anyone with the Solami, never
threatened violence or death, and never otherwise acted aggressively or engaged in dangerous
conduct. The State therefore paints an unreasonably grim picture of the Defendant’s character,
which therefore defeats the purpose of the condition because there are no victims or witnesses
alleged, nor any reason to suspect that the Defendant is particularly dangerous.
II. The Restriction Unconscionably Deprives the Defendant of their Presumption of
Innocence
17. The State, in its Motion, uses the Defendant’s arrest records as proof of the Defendant’s
danger. Stating specifically that “The defendant has 27 prior arrests and 3 citations. The
defendant has never filed a habeas corpus petition to challenge these arrests, which were all
made by competently trained peace officers. Accordingly, the Court should consider these arrests
as legitimate,” going on to say “These prior arrests clearly demonstrate that the defendant has
on-going access to firearms, even when they are seized.” State’s Motion for Pretrial Release on
Conditions, ¶ 21 and ¶ 24.
18. The State’s contention of the Defendant’s alleged danger to the community is unfounded
4 Which absolutely exists
4
at best, unconstitutional at worst. The State’s argument that the Defendant’s criminal history
provides indicia for violence violates the Defendant’s presumption of innocence. While the
Defendant concedes that the arrests are violent in nature and of abundance, the Defendant also
contends in the same breath that apart from an arrest taking place in August 4, 2026, none of the
arrests have resulted in prosecution or in any meaningful adjudication, making the validity of the
arrests an open question yet to be resolved.
19. On the constitutional side, the assertion is violatory of the presumption of innocence. To
implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the
factfinding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against
dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 385 &
364 (1970).
20. Further, the principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is
the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), citing Coffin v.
United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). Any assertion that a Defendant committed the crime
based on unadjudicated arrests is antithetical to the Supreme Court’s grandstanding precedent
protecting presumption, and the Defendant respectfully implores the Court to view the assertion
in similar succession.
5
ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
The Defendant certifies that the State of Ridgeway, by and through their undersigned
counsel of record, has been served by means of electronic filing.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests that the State’s Motion for Pretrial
Release on Conditions be DENIED IN PART, to the extent necessary to equitably balance the
Defendant’s constitutional rights with the necessity provided in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
To borrow a quote:
“Man, proud man, drest in a little brief authority,
most ignorant of what he’s most assured.”
- Measure for Measure (Act II, Scene II)
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ iiCryptic_LawMD
iiCryptic_LawMD
RBN# 10233
State Public Defender
Ridgeway Public Defender’s Office
6
