THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
takosull0,
Petitioner,
v.
DannyDoesApprove, in his official capacity as a
law enforcement officer in the Ridgeway Park
Service, pursuant to 7 R. Stat. § 133.002.
Respondent.
Hon. AlbertWellesley
Case No.: RSC-CV-1769
FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
Proceeding without counsel, Petitioner takosull0 hereby files this First Amended Petition
for Habeas Corpus from leave of the Court, and alleges as follows against Respondent:
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1. Petitioner takosull0 is entitled to file habeas corpus petitions subsequent to an arrest.
2. Respondent DannyDoesApprove is the proper Respondent in this matter in his official
capacity as a law enforcement officer with the Ridgeway Park Service, per 7 R. Stat. § 133.002.
3. Jurisdiction and venue are proper as provided by 7 R. Stat. § 133.004.
GENERAL ALLEGIATIONS
4. On August 19, 2026 Petitioner takosull0 was in Ridgeway and arrested by
Respondent DannyDoesApprove.
5. The arrest on August 19, 2026 by Respondent DannyDoesApprove was for RVC §
9.04 - Excessive Noise Pollution.
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6. Excessive Noise Pollution under RVC § 9.04 is constituted when a person repeatedly
honks, applies a parking brake, or operates their vehicle in any other way which disturbs the
peace through excessive noise, and does not stop after being warned by a peace officer to do so.
7. Respondent alleges that Petitioner violated the “repeatedly honking” provision of
R.V.C. § 9.04, as stated in Respondent’s arrest narrative. Respondent’s narrative provides:
“Within Sterling City Limits; suspect was spam honking his horn driving around Sterling and
was told to stop honking or they will be arrested. As soon as the warning was given, the suspect
proceeded to start honking with his semi truck; The Hub.”
8. Petitioner denies that he was repeatedly honking his horn in the manner alleged by
Respondent. Although Petitioner does not possess video evidence establishing every moment
preceding the arrest, the surrounding circumstances provide substantial contextual evidence
inconsistent with Respondent’s allegation. As reflected in Exhibit A, the traffic stop initiated by
Ridgeway State Trooper Larkin_RBLX (“the Trooper” or “Trooper”) was based upon
Petitioner’s alleged failure to yield at a stop sign. During the traffic stop, the Trooper did not
identify repeated or excessive horn use as a basis for the stop, nor did the Trooper issue
Petitioner a citation for such conduct at that time. This is particularly relevant because, several
hours earlier on the same date, Trooper Larkin_RBLX had in fact issued Petitioner a citation
specifically for the same alleged violation under R.V.C. § 9.04, demonstrating that the Trooper
was aware of and had previously enforced the violation.
9. The circumstances surrounding the alleged horn use further distinguish Petitioner’s
conduct from the repeated and excessive conduct prohibited by R.V.C. § 9.04. In Porter v.
Martinez, 64 F.4th 1112 (9th Cir. 2023), the court considered restrictions on the use of vehicle
horns and recognized the relationship between horn use and legitimate traffic-safety purposes.
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The decision supports the principle that horn use in circumstances reasonably related to traffic
safety or the safe operation of a vehicle is materially different from the type of unnecessary or
excessive horn use targeted by a noise ordinance.
10. Following the conclusion of the traffic stop, Petitioner attempted to proceed from the
shoulder and return to the roadway. For some unknown reason, Respondent was standing
directly in front of Petitioner’s vehicle and thereby obstructing Petitioner’s ability to proceed
forward into the flow of traffic. Petitioner briefly sounded his horn in an attempt to alert
Respondent that Petitioner was attempting to leave the shoulder and proceed onto the roadway.
Such a brief warning, under these circumstances, was reasonably related to the safe operation of
the vehicle and does not constitute the repeated or excessive horn use contemplated by R.V.C. §
9.04.
11. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Respondent removed Petitioner from his vehicle
despite Petitioner not engaging in aggressive or resistant conduct and subsequently deployed a
taser against Petitioner while Petitioner was standing still. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989), the United States Supreme Court established that the reasonableness of a
law-enforcement officer’s use of force must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances
confronting the officer at the time the force was used.
12. Under the circumstances alleged herein, Petitioner was not engaging in violent,
threatening, or resistant conduct when the force was employed. Petitioner’s mere presence in his
vehicle, his attempt to proceed from the shoulder, and his brief use of the vehicle’s horn to alert
an officer obstructing the vehicle do not, without more, establish circumstances warranting the
level of force used against him. Accordingly, the force employed against Petitioner was
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disproportionate to the circumstances and objectively unreasonable under the standard
established by Graham.
13. For the foregoing reasons, the arrest and detention of Petitioner were unlawful
because the alleged conduct did not establish a violation of R.V.C. § 9.04. Furthermore, the
subsequent use of force against Petitioner, including the deployment of a taser while Petitioner
was standing still and not resisting, constituted unjustified and excessive force under the
circumstances. The unlawful basis for the arrest, together with the brutality and disproportionate
force employed against Petitioner, warrants equitable relief, including expungement of
Petitioner’s arrest as well as such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:
A. Issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 7 R. Stat. § 133.001 and 133.004 and
declare Petitioner’s detention unlawful;
B. Order the expungement of Petitioner’s arrest and charge arising from the unlawful
detention described herein; and
C. Order the government to pay and reimburse Petitioner for all filing fees, court costs,
and other fees or costs incurred in connection with this matter; and
D. Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ takosull0
Petitioner Pro Se
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INDEX OF EXHIBITS
Exhibit A — Evidence of the Petitioner being arrested, dated August 19, 2026.
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