THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
takosull0,
Petitioner,
v.
axcurxd, in his official capacity as a law
enforcement officer in the Ridgeway Sheriff’s
Office, pursuant to 7 R. Stat. § 133.002.
Respondent.
Hon.
Case No.:
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
Proceeding without counsel, Petitioner takosull0 hereby brings this petition for habeas
corpus and for their allegations against the Respondent, it is alleged as follows:
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1. Petitioner takosull0 is entitled to file habeas corpus petitions subsequent to an arrest.
2. Respondent axcurxd is the proper Respondent in this matter in his official capacity as
a law enforcement officer with the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office, per 7 R. Stat. § 133.002.
3. Jurisdiction and venue are proper as provided by 7 R. Stat. § 133.004.
GENERAL ALLEGIATIONS
4. On August 17, 2026 Petitioner takosull0 was in Ridgeway and arrested by
Respondent axcurxd.
5. The arrest on August 17, 2026 by Respondent axcurxd was for RCC § 5.13 -
Unauthorized Use of Emergency Lighting by a Security Company (Count 1), RVC § 3.01 -
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Reckless Driving (Count 2), and RCC § 5.14 - Unauthorized Use of a Siren by a Security
Company (Count 3).
6. Count 1, Unauthorized Use of Emergency Lighting by a Security Company under
RCC § 5.13 does and did not exist in the Ridgeway Criminal Code at the time of arrest.
7. Count 2, Reckless Driving under RVC § 3.01 requires a person to commit three or
more traffic infractions within a timespan of 60 seconds, or drive in a manner which disregards
the safety of persons or property in their vicinity.
8. On August 17, 2026 moments before the arrest, Petitioner was driving on Whyte
Road, where the speed limit is 70 SPS before turning onto Alder Mtn Road, where the speed
limit is also 70 SPS. The Petitioner was arrested shortly after turning onto Alder Mtn Road.
9. While on Whyte and Alder Mtn Road Petitioner was following all applicable traffic
laws, except Petitioner was speeding under R.V.C. § 1.01.
10. Speeding under R.V.C. § 1.01 is a civil infraction not punishable by arrest with a
maximum fine of $250.00. R.V.C. § 1.01 does not by itself permit arrest, and only provides for
one (1) traffic violation out of the three (3) required to make an arrest for reckless driving.
11. Speeding on a secluded backroad with a 70 SPS speedlimit also does warrant
reckless driving under the second provision of RVC § 3.01, “... [driving] in a manner which
disregards the safety of persons or property in their vicinity.”
12. Count 3, Unauthorized Use of a Siren by a Security Company under RCC § 5.14
does and did not exist in the Ridgeway Criminal Code at the time of arrest.
13. As previously stated in paragraphs 6 and 12, both Count 1 (RCC § 5.13 -
Unauthorized Use of Emergency Lighting by a Security Company) and Count 3 (RCC § 5.14 -
Unauthorized Use of a Siren by a Security Company) are not codified.
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14. Therefore, Petitioner’s detention is unlawful, arbitrary, and a direct violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
because Petitioner was arrested, charged, and detained for an offense that was neither enacted
nor codified into law. If the purported offense was never passed by the Legislature and was
never codified, then no criminal law establishing the offense exists at all. The charge therefore
has no legal foundation upon which Petitioner could be subjected to criminal liability, arrest, or
detention. An unenacted legislative proposal cannot itself create criminal liability, and the
absence of any codified offense confirms that there is no ascertainable law establishing the
purported crime. Accordingly, Petitioner could not have received fair warning that the alleged
conduct constituted a criminal offense. The resulting arrest and detention therefore violate the
fundamental requirement of due process that criminal liability be based upon a legally
established offense rather than an offense that exists only as a purported charge.
15. Alternatively, even if the purported offenses were passed by the Legislature,
Petitioner’s detention remains unlawful because the offenses were never codified. The United
States Supreme Court in Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001), recognized that due process
requires fair warning before criminal liability may be imposed. Here, the game’s mechanics
provide an in-game notification identifying the applicable statute and charge name. However,
although the purported statutes may have been passed by the Legislature, they were never
codified, and the corresponding offenses therefore did not appear within the body of enforceable
criminal law through which Petitioner could reasonably determine what conduct was criminal.
Petitioner was consequently provided with a charge name and purported statutory citation
through the game’s mechanics that did not correspond to any codified criminal offense. A
person cannot be expected to have fair warning of criminal liability from an offense that,
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although allegedly passed, was never incorporated into the State’s codified body of criminal law
and was therefore not reasonably ascertainable as an enforceable criminal offense. Accordingly,
the purported offenses failed to provide Petitioner with the fair warning required by the Due
Process Clause, and the resulting arrest and detention were constitutionally invalid.
16. Petitioner paid bail on August 17, 2026, at 10:57 PM EST/EDT in connection with
the unlawful charges identified herein. Because Petitioner incurred an actual cost for obtaining
his release, including the expenditure of real-world USD value through the purchase of Robux,
and because habeas corpus remains available following release from custody pursuant to 7 R.
Stat. § 133.001, Petitioner respectfully submits that the Court should provide an appropriate
form of relief notwithstanding his release.
17. Petitioner does not contend that ordering Respondent, or any other governmental
body, to reimburse the cost of bail would necessarily be legally appropriate. Rather, Petitioner
recognizes that such an award may lack a sufficient legal basis. Nevertheless, where the Court
determines that Petitioner was unlawfully detained, the Court should exercise its lawful
authority it possesses to provide an effective and equitable remedy sufficient to address the
consequences of that unlawful detention.
18. It is the Petitioner’s spontaneous reaction that a complete expungement of his
criminal history, including records unrelated to the unlawful detention at issue, be a fair and just
relief. Petitioner recognizes, however, that such relief would be extraordinary, particularly given
his existing record of eighteen (18) arrests and six (6) citations, constituting a Class II
expungement if under normal expungement circumstances. Because a Class II expungement
ordinarily requires the petitioner to satisfy the applicable eligibility requirements under 6 R.
Stat. § 131.604, Petitioner respectfully proposes that the Court condition expungement relief
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upon Petitioner's completion of community service pursuant to 6 R. Stat. § 131.602. Such a
condition would provide a reasonable means of ensuring that Petitioner demonstrates good
standing before receiving the requested equitable relief and prevents the Court from arbitrarily
issuing random relief, providing an actual basis behind the order.
19. Petitioner recognizes that the requested relief could be viewed as implicating the
Class II expungement provisions of 6 R. Stat. § 131.604. The Court may therefore conclude that
Petitioner is presently ineligible for a conventional expungement because § 131.604(c) provides
that the person must not have “committed, been arrested, or charged for any crime within the
last thirty (30) days.” Petitioner does not dispute that fewer than thirty (30) days have elapsed
since his most recent charge. However, Petitioner respectfully submits that § 131.604(c)
governs an ordinary petition for expungement under the Crime & Criminal Procedure Act of
2026 and does not necessarily restrict the Court's authority to fashion equitable relief in
response to unlawful governmental conduct. The present request is not premised upon
Petitioner's ordinary statutory entitlement to expungement; rather, it is presented as an
extraordinary equitable remedy arising from the government's alleged unlawful detention of
Petitioner. Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court distinguish the statutory
eligibility requirements governing ordinary expungement petitions from the Court's authority, if
any, to provide equitable relief necessary to remedy the unlawful conduct alleged herein.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:
A. Issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 7 R. Stat. § 133.001 and 133.004 and
declare Petitioner’s arrest and detention unlawful;
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B. Enjoin Respondent from relying upon the purported offenses as a basis for any future
arrest, detention, prosecution, disciplinary action, or other deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty;
C. Provide Petitioner with a conditional expungement of his criminal records, as set
forth in paragraphs 16 through 19, as equitable relief for the costs incurred in obtaining bail
following his unlawful arrest, subject to any conditions the Court deems just and appropriate
and therefore imposes upon the Petitioner as a prerequisite to expungement; AND
D. Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ takosull0
Petitioner Pro Se
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INDEX OF EXHIBITS
Exhibit A — Video evidence of the Petitioner being arrested, dated August 17, 2026.
Exhibit B — Evidence of Count1 and 3 not existing, dated August 17, 2026.
Exhibit C — Evidence of 70 SPS speed limit, dated August 17, 2026.
Exhibit D — Evidence of posted bail, dated August 18, 2026; though the purchase of
bail is dated August 17, 2026.
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