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THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
MASTERQV, an individual; TRIPIAFER23, an
individual
Plaintiff,
-against-
WGT05, an individual in his official capacity
as a corporal of the Ridgeway State Police;
and SMASHCANS, an individual in his official
capacity as a magistrate judge of the Superior
Court of the State of Ridgeway
Defendants.
RSC-CV-1411
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS
Presiding Judge: Hon. xXBoomBlast339Xx
Plaintiffs file this response in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss.
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant smashcans' counsel, who is Detachment_Result, holds that he is entitled to the
affirmative defense of judicial immunity per case law. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (his
main argument); Cf. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988). After citing those cases, Defendant
smashcans goes on to apply a balancing test a fortiori. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
He concludes with holding that he is immune from monetary damages per White.
BODY OF PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE
1. Mireles v. Waco only applied to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not the claims in this civil action,
which are 7 R. Stat. §§ 121.403, 121.404: Waco only extends to Id., at § 121.404.
Defendant cites Mireles v. Waco as the case law backing his holding. 502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991). There, the Supreme Court of the United States held that judicial immunity "can be
overcome only if [the] judge’s actions are nonjudicial or were taken in the complete absence of
all jurisdiction." Id., at 9.
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However, it is important to note that the claim brought in trial court was 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which mirrors 7 R. Stat. § 121.403. See Waco, at 10 ("In this case, respondent Howard
Waco, a Los Angeles County public defender, filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against petitioner,
Raymond Mireles, a judge of the California Superior Court, and two police officers, for damages
arising from an incident in November 1989 at the Superior Court building in Van Nuys, Cal.").
The Official Misconduct statute states that it is "any individual who is a public servant
and commits an act relating to his office but constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official
functions, knowing that such act is unauthorized; or refrains from performing a duty which is
imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office" who is liable. Ibid. §
121.403 states that it is "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage" who is liable, and the language of the tortfeasor in that statute mirrors the
same for the tortfeasor in 42 U.S.C. § 1983: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws…"
While Waco did plainly hold that "like other forms of official immunity, judicial
immunity is an immunity from suit", that was in the context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, which
is mirrored by 7 R. Stat. § 121.403. The tortfeasor of § 121.404 is one who has committed an act
outside of their office/authority rather than one, under their office/authority, violating rights.
Clearly, 7 R. Stat. § 121.404 is moreorso a tort to be launched at public officials injuriously
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overexercising or incompetently exercising their office/authority, not public officials who violate
rights. 7 R. Stat. § 121.404 ("Official Misconduct") does not include the well-established
"violated right" prong of 7 R. Stat. § 121.403 ("Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law").
Official Misconduct requires the tortfeasor to be a "public servant" while Deprivation of Rights
under Color of Law requires the tortfeasor to be any person acting under the law.
To illustrate, under Official Misconduct, a public servant is one who is a part of the
government. Defendant smashcans is a public servant as he is a magistrate judge (position
created by 3 R. Stat. § 131.201) of the Superior Court of the State of Ridgeway, which is a court
created by Rid. Const., Art. Ⅴ, § Ⅳ and empowered by Id., at § Ⅰ as the judicature of the
government of the State of Ridgeway: it follows that he is a public servant because he is a part of
the state judicature.
In comparison, under Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law, Defendant smashcans is
a person who "under statute" violated rights: by using his statutory power to issue search
warrants, 6 R. Stat. § 131.013, he violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
In conclusion, Official Misconduct is for injurious and unauthorized (i.e., explicitly
prohibited or not given) acts or omissions of one's office/authority while Deprivation of Rights
under Color of Law is for statutory acts depriving one of their rights. Waco did not hold whether
or not Mr. Mireles' exercise of his power was unauthorized: it only held that the act, regardless of
how it was carried out, was within his jurisdiction and associated powers. So, because the two
torts are for two completely different things. Waco only holds persuasive authority for Official
Misconduct and binding authority for Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law.
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2. Defendant smashcans is liable for the tort of Official Misconduct.
a. He did act outside of his authority as a magistrate judge.
Now that I have shown that Waco does not bindly apply to this tort, I will analyze it
according to this case's facts to show liability: immunity will be applied later.
The Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure "have the force of law". See Rid. Rule Crim.
Proc. 1(2); see also Id., at 1(3) (the rules' scope, which, relevantly, includes search warrant
proceedings). Also, because these have the force of law, they can also make up a judge's
jurisdiction. See U.S. Const., Art. Ⅵ, cl. 2 ("...the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); Cf. Rid.
Const. (implied supreme law of the land clause through whitelisting the powers of each branch).
So, if Defendant smashcans were to not act in accordance with the rules, then it was, to
paradoxically quote Waco, done "in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Waco, 502 U.S., at
12.
A search warrant has two stages: (1) the filing of an application required by 6 R. Stat. §
131.011/Cf. Rid. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(3)(1) (only includes the affidavit part), and (2) the final
judgment on the application. Rid. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(5). The application must be formed
according to Rid. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(3), and it goes without the saying that the search warrant
must conform to the form rules. Id., at 7. Should Defendant smashcans not act in inaccordance
with any of these rules and the rules in general, he has completely acted outside of his authority.
With that in mind, how did he act outside of his authority? Easy: the search warrant itself
was illegal. I have already written about this in an unfiled memorandum of law, so I will provide
the excerpt:
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The definition of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm is "[possessing] any
firearm or ammunition without being in possession of a valid Ridgeway Firearms
License, or [possessing] a weapon, firearm, or ammunition that was sourced from
an illegal dealer." R.C.C. § 2.29. In the criminal code, the definition of possession
is when "the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was
aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate
his possession" (emphasis added). 6 R. Stat. § 121.001.
State law provides that to issue a search warrant, "upon review of the
application, affidavits [required by 6 R. Stat. § 131.011], and evidence submitted,
if satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuing of the search warrant," a
search warrant may be issued by the presiding judge. 6 R. Stat. § 131.010.
According to the search warrant itself, it appears that the only fact to
suggest the occurence of such a crime is Plaintiff being "seen with an M2-A on
his back while inside of PPD Gargage [sic]". That is enough probable cause to
arrest the Plaintiff: assuming the affiant testified that he had neither an AFL nor a
RFLID, then he did committ the misdemeanor of Unlawful Possession of a
Firearm. On the other hand, possession only covers procuring, receiving, or being
in control of contraband "for a sufficient period [in order] to have been able to
terminate [the] possession [of the contraband]".
That "sufficient period" part is key here. The search warrant does not say
that it was observed that Plaintiff had the weapon over a sufficient period of time.
It simply says that he was "seen" with it "inside of PPD Garage [sic]".
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Furthermore, the affiant of the affidavit in support of the search warrant
"shall disclose every material fact known to the affiant which bears upon the
existence of probable cause, including facts tending to negate it." Rid. Rule. Crim
Proc. 44(3)(4). As previously stated, the "sufficient period" element of the act of
possession is a material element to the misdemeanor of Unlawful Possession of a
Firearm, so the affiant had the procedural (i.e., imposed on him by the Ridgeway
Rules of Criminal Procedure) duty to include that. Aditionally, disobedience of
this rule can subject the affiant to perjury. Ibid. So, even more, the affiant had to
prove that, lest he be subject to the penalty of the felony of perjury.
With that said, looking back at the search warrant, it said that Plaintiff was
"seen". That's not a word indicating being seen over a period of time. The
definition of seeing is "to perceive by the eye". That is not specific enough to1
prove the "sufficient period" element of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm: even
then, here is no objective indicator that it was over the aforementioned "sufficient
period": there's no prepositional phrase like "for 2 minutes", "for 5 minutes" in
order to be self-evident to prove the "sufficient period". Even worse, the choice of
verb does not imply a "sufficient period" of time. Had the affiant used "observed",
of which the definition is "to look at", that would add a scintilla of backing up2
the "sufficient period" element. Yet, the affiant could've elaborated on it in
accordance with his aforementioned duty of candor, such as "For 5 minutes, I
2 “Watch.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/watch. Accessed 13 Aug. 2026.
1 “See.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/see. Accessed 13 Aug. 2026.
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observed Plaintiff bearing a Stetson M2-A while he was inside of the Palmer
Police Department's garage, and I had checked that he had neither an AFL nor a
RFLID", which not only includes an objective, self-evident prepositional phrase
for the "sufficient period" element, but it also shows that Plaintiff was not
authorized to have it, which satisifies the "without being in possession of a valid
Ridgeway Firearms License" element of the misdemeanor.
Furthermore, that wasn't the affiant's only avenue to prove the
misdemeanor. The affiant could have also testified that Plaintiff procured or
received the contraband, which is enough for the act of possession, and is
therefore enough for the misdemeanor of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm. Yet,
as shown in the lackluster statement of Plaintiff being "seen with an M2-A on his
back while inside of PPD Gargage [sic]", it appears that the affiant did not have
knowledge of the procurement or Plaintiff receiving the contraband. The affiant
had that other avenue to go through, and, since he had no knowledge, he did not
go that avenue, and instead went for the "without authorization" avenue for the
misdemeanor of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm. In my opinion, this is enough
to make Hon. smashcans issue a search warrant to obtain the affiant's English
grades. Honestly, this material that the affiant put up is worthy of a D.
Since there was not enough factual matter for Plaintiff to have committed
the misdemeanor of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm, R.C.C. § 2.29, and
Defendants have not introduced any evidence suggesting that Defendant
smashcans was provided proof of either the "sufficient period" or any other
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factual matter when he heard and signed the search warrant, I have
proven—under the preponderance of evidence—the claim that there was no
probable cause of the misdemeanor of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm. For
Defendants to disprove this, all they have to do is show evidence proving that
Plaintiff did possess the contraband over a "sufficient period". Until then, this
claim remains proven.
Issuing a search warrant based on a lack of the required factual matter is not
within the judge's jurisdiction because there is no probable cause. 6 R. Stat. §
131.013/Rid. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(5) ("An authorized judge, upon review of the
application, affidavits, and evidence submitted, if satisfied that probable cause exists for
the issuing of the search warrant, shall issue a search warrant signed by him…")
Defendant may say that the subject of the "if satisified that probable cause exists
for the issuing of the search warrant" conditional phrase is the judge. However, if it were,
then this would mean that the determination of probable cause is according to the judge's
belief and not the facts. Coming from the Fourth Amendment, probable cause is an
objective standard of rewiew, which is based on facts and evidence, and it is not a
subjective one compared to the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if it were true that the
subject of that conditional phrase was the judge, then it would be unconstitutional as it
would apply the Fourteenth Amendment's subjective standard of review instead of the
Fourth Amendment, which is required for search warrants.
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Since it was not satisified that there was probable cause for Unlawful Possession
of a Firearm, Defendant smashcans was not able to issue a search warrant: if he did, it
would be unreasonable for the forgoing reasons.
Thankfully, under that conclusion, it follows that it was completely outside of his
authority per Waco, but it also follows that it was outside of his statutory and
constitutional powers because issuing that search warrant would go against the Fourth
Amendment.
All in all, there is a cause of action for Official Misconduct, of which Defendant
smashcans is the tortfeasor, who shall be held liable in his official capacity as a
magistrate judge of the Superior Court of the State of Ridgeway.
3. Defendant smashcans is liable for the tort of Deprivation of Rights under Color of
Law.
Hold your horses: I have already written that I will cover immunity later. Now, about the
other cause of action…
a. Defendant was acting under the laws.
For my reasoning for Official Misconduct, this also applies. However, just to be more
specific, he has a statutory power under 6 R. Stat. § 131.013 and a procedural power under Rid.
Rule Crim. Proc. 44(5) to issue search warrants. That is the prong for Deprivation of Rights
under Color of Law; his "under statute", if you will.
b. Defendant's actions under the laws deprived Plaintiffs of their rights.
Since Defendant unreasonably issued a search warrant, and the search warrant itself is
unreasonable, it follows that Defendant smashcans with his 6 R. Stat. § 131.013 power violated
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Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights as well as Plaintiffs' Rid. Const., Art. Ⅰ, § Ⅷ right to be
"free from search or seizure."
Therefore, there is a cause of action for the tort of Deprivation of Rights under Color of
Law, of which Defendant smashcans is the tortfeasor, who shall be held liable in his official
capacity as a magistrate judge of the Superior Court of the State of Ridgeway.
4. Defendant smashcans is not entitled to judicial immunity.
a. The Waco judicial immunity inquiry is not satisified.
While I have written that Waco only applies to 7 R. Stat. § 121.403 claims, it also
provided a fire exit for judicial immunity, which was that it does not apply to acts done "in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction." Waco, 502 U.S., at 12.
More specifically, it is that "a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in
nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Ibid. Also, Defendant quotes, "that he
may have made a mistake or acted in excess of his authority does not make the act nonjudicial."
Waco, 502 U.S., at 9. Waco itself further went on by creating an inquiry on judicial immunity, of
which the second part was written as the following:
"Because the Court of Appeals concluded that Judge Mireles did not act in
his judicial capacity, the court did not reach the second part of the immunity
inquiry: whether Judge Mireles’ actions were taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction."
Even though Waco stresses the nature and function of the act, Waco, 502 U.S., at 13
("...as the language in [Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)] indicates, the relevant
inquiry is the 'nature' and 'function' of the act, not the act itself."), that is not relevant to the facts
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of this civil action. See generally Waco, 502 U.S., at 14–15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The inquiry
for judicial immunity is if (1) the actions were judicial, and (2) the actions were intra vires. Ibid.
The second prong's intra vires does not count mistakes nor errors in excess of Defendant
smashcan's authority.
First, the "excess" part. Excess means "the state or an instance of surpassing usual,
proper, or specified limits". However, in the contexts of the facts of Waco, it appears that3
"excess" is similar to its use in phrases like "excessive force", where it implies that the force was
too much for the situation rather than outside of one's authority. Waco concerned the petitioner's
barbaic, angry exercise to order that respondent, who was a public defender, be brought before
him. Waco, 502 U.S., at 10 ("The officers allegedly 'by means of unreasonable force and violence
seize[d] plaintiff and remove[d] him backwards' from another courtroom where he was waiting
to appear, cursed him, and called him 'vulgar and offensive names,' then 'without necessity
slammed' him through the doors and swinging gates into Judge Mireles' courtroom.").
Excessive force has been read as when too much force is applied rather than when force
is used ultra vires. No common law ruling supports the theory that excessive force is ultra vires.
There is more proof toward the theory that it is intra vires but actionable. See, e.g., Tennesse v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Returning to the facts of Waco, it was held that it was within the judge's powers to order
the respondent to be brought before him, but they did not address whether or not he could be
held liable for the excessive manner in which he was taken: rather, the Supreme Court took on
3 "Excess." Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/excess. Accessed 15 Aug. 2026.
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the issue of judicial immunity, and, to reiterate, the justices held that petitioner was acting intra
vires, although the manner was excessive.
So, the "in excess of authority" refers to intra vires acts done excessively, as in the
manner did not meet the facts. It was not written in the ultra vires sense. As I have already
shown, Defendant smashcans was acting ultra vires when he issued the search warrant on a lack
of factual matter required to form probable cause of the misdemeanor Unlawful Possession of a
Firearm. I am not saying that it was an intra vires exercise that was blacklisted by Plaintiff's
rights. I am saying that it was an ultra vires exercise that was not whitelisted by both the
Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure and the state's statutes, and said exercise violated
Plaintiff's rights.
Because Waco only extends to excessive although intra vires actions, Defendant
smashcans is not entitled to judicial immunity.
b. Judicial immunity is unconstitutional in the State of Ridgeway.
This proposition, a legal "hot take", would go wonderfully in a memorandum of law, but I
feel obliged to tackle this subject due to Defendant's counselors calling this case "frivolous."
First, it is in the interest of the State of Ridgeway for all people to have rights as well as
justice for deprivations of said rights. See Rid. Const., Art. Ⅰ, § Ⅰ ("Every person within this
state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs
which one may receive in person, property or character; every person ought to obtain right and
justice, freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely and without any denial;
promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws."); Id., at § ⅩⅣ ("That frequent recurrence
to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and
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frugality, are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep government free
"); Id., at § Ⅲ ("That all power being originally inherent in and co[n]sequently derived from the
people, therefore, all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees
and servants; and at all times, in a legal way, accountable to them. ") Cf. Id., at § Ⅳ ("That
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the
people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single
person, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community…").
In addition, the Constitution of the State of Ridgeway also holds that "[t]he Courts of
Justice shall be open for the trial of all causes proper for their cognizance; and justice shall be
therein impartially administered, without corruption or unnecessary delay." Rid. Const., Art. Ⅴ,
§ Ⅰ, and the Supreme Court of the United States has said that "common law principles of
legislative and judicial immunity…should not be abrogated absent clear legislative intent to do
so." Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1983).
The facts of this case make the doctrine of judicial immunity worse: why would a
magistrate judge, who also directs the State Bureau of Investigations and RSP SWAT, review and
issue a search warrant from the Ridgeway State Police? It is the statutory and historical duty of
the State Bureau of Investigations to obtain warrants to stop crime. A search warrant from
Defendant smashcans, then, is not "a warrant from 'a neutral and detached magistrate…'" Chatrie
v. United States, 609 U.S. ____, ____ (2026) (slip op., at 4) (quoting Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
At what point is Defendant smashcans not the "impartial" judge that this constitution
seeks to have within the State of Ridgeway's judicature? At what point should we have
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incompetency be saved from responsibility? After all, there was no probable cause for the
misdemeanor of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm, and the search warrant itself had an
erroneous scope. To save Defendant from liability here would not only be dangerous precedent,
but it would also severely wrong the State of Ridgeway's interest in justice for all.
In communtities like the State of Ridgeway and in the State itself, search warrants are ex
parte and are significantly favored toward law enforcement, especially agencies dedicated to
fighting organized crime, than the people. There has only been one case within the State of
Ridgeway where a person has even had the chance to address a search warrant within these
Courts of Justice, which is the civil action thr33six8 v. errcore et al., RSC-CV-8917 (2025).
There, the search warrant was voided because of a lack of valid probable cause. The instrument
to raise that issue was a motion for a temporary restraining order, but it was heard as a motion for
a preliminary injunction. That has been the only case of a to-be executed search warrant being
reviewed by this court.
Since it's minted into this state's constitution, judicial immunity is unconstititonal. It is
unconstitutional to apply it to Defendant smashcans' ultra vires actions because that would
ignore the legislation's blessings given to Plaintiffs: that "every person ought to obtain right and
justice", Rid. Const., Art. Ⅰ, § Ⅰ, and that "all officers of governments…are…at all times, in a
legal way, accountable to [the people]." Id., at § Ⅲ.
CONCLUSION
While it is not necessary to have a conclusion as a part of a response in opposition, I will
include it to include the relief sought. I want to include my reasoning as to the relief sought, but
this is a reply in opposition. For reasoning to follow, plaintiffs request:
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1. that Plaintiffs be given leave to file an amended complaint, OR;
2. alternatively, that the claim of Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law against
Defendant smashcans, who is requested to be held liable in his official capacity as as
magistrate judge of the Superior Court of the State of Ridgeway, be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, AND;
3. alternatively, that the claim of Official Misconduct against Defendant smashcans, who is
requested to be held liable in his official capacity as as magistrate judge of the Superior
Court of the State of Ridgeway, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Respectfully filed,
/s/ Tripiafer23
———————————————
Plaintiff of the above-titled civil action
/s/ masterqv
———————————————
Plaintiff of the above-titled civil action
———————————————
/s/ thr33six8
The Attorney of Plaintiffs/Clients
Tripiafer23 and masterqv;
Licensed Attorney in the State of Ridgeway
since July 23rd, 2026 (R.S.B. License
#19302).
