IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
MASTERQV,
TRIPIAFER23,
Plaintiff,
v,
WGT05, in their official capacity as a Corporal
of the Ridgeway State Police,
SMASHCANS, in their official capacity as a
Magistrate Judge of the Superior Court of the
State of Ridgeway,
Defendant.
DEFENDANT SMASHCANS MOTION TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
Hon. EffortlessBrit
Docket Number: RSC-CV-1141
The Defendant, smashcans, through their undersigned counsel, respectfully moves this
Honorable Court to dismiss the claims against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(1)(5). The Complaint against the Magistrate Judge
arises from his signing of a search warrant, while also being employed by the Ridgeway State
Police.
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
1. Plaintiffs alleges that on August 1, 2026, Defendant, acting as a magistrate judge of this
Court, issued a search warrant RSC-SW-6740 directed to the Ridgeway State Police and
other assisting peace officers.
2. The warrant identified Plaintiff masterqv as the person to be searched.
3. Plaintiffs allege that the search warrant was executed on masterqv, which recovered
firearms, ammunition, lockpicks, and other property.
4. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant should have recused himself from issuing the warrant
because he is also employed by the Ridgeway State Police.
5. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s failure to recuse himself violated their Fourth
Amendment and Section 2(b) of the Ridgeway Code of Judicial Conduct.
6. Plaintiffs accordingly assert Official Misconduct and Deprivation of Rights under Color
of Law claims against Defendant based upon his issuance of the search warrant.
7. Plaintiffs are seeking punitive damages, and an injunction prohibiting Defendant from
hearing or signing any search warrants involving the Ridgeway State Police.
LEGAL STANDARD
8. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which is accepted as true, in order to
properly state a claim for which a plaintiff may be remedied. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9. In xLaZerify v. StudsPerSecond, the Ridgeway Supreme Court defined a “sufficient
complaint” as one that “has a facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
1 Although there is another Defendant in this matter, and that the allegations against him are similar, this motion is
intended to address Defendant smashcans only, and only seeks to dismiss the complaint against smashcans.
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct.” The Court further held that the plaintiff did not satisfy that standard,
partially because the complaint “did not adequately combine the factual allegations with
the legal conclusions that address all parts of the tort in question.”
10. This principal also applies where the plaintiff alleges a violation of civil rights. Under
these standards, the plaintiff must identify the right which was allegedly violated, and
plead facts (not legal conclusions) in order to establish the defendant’s conduct actually
caused the deprivation. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
11. U.S. 362 (1976).
12. There is also the question of judicial immunity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)
held that “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit.” In Waco, the Court held that in
order to overcome judicial immunity, the plaintiff must prove that either (a) the judge’s
actions were nonjudicial; or (b) the actions were taken in complete absence of all
jurisdiction.
13. Waco also affirmed that a “mistake or act[ed] in excess of his authority does not make the
act nonjudicial” (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227).
14. Plaintiffs also seek $10,000 in punitive damages from Defendant. White held that a judge
is also immune from a suit for money damages. (citing also Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson [502 U.S. 9, 10] v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)).
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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15. And in a much more older, but still very much relevant precedent, Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. 335 (1871) held that judges are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts,
“even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been
done maliciously or corruptly.”
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT IS ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR THE ACT
OF ISSUING A WARRANT; STUMP TEST
16. Both Ridgeway state law and real world federal law recognizes that judges have
immunity.
17. Rid. R. Civ. P. 8(2)(4) requires a defendant to plead affirmatively “the immunity of a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in a judicial capacity, subject to the limitation
stated in 7 R. Stat. § 121.403.”
18. And 7 R. Stat. § 121.403 expressly recognizes the immunity of judicial officers for
judicial acts, providing that, in an action against a judicial officer, injunctive relief shall
not be granted except under the circumstances specified by the statute.
19. Defendant has an absolute immunity against civil claims for actions arising from acts as a
judicial officer. The purpose of this immunity is because if every judge were able to be
sued over a legally issued warrant, then “the protection essential to judicial independence
would be entirely swept away.” See Fisher.
20. Fisher does not vindicate the alleged actions of Defendant, but he cannot be civilly liable
for the exercise of their power to issue warrants upon probable cause. The regulation of
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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this power comes through the appellate process, and the process of impeachment, not a
pursuit for money damages.
21. As Waco held, the only time a judicial officer’s immunity may be overstepped is when
(a) the judge’s actions were nonjudicial; or (b) the actions were taken in complete
absence of all jurisdiction.
22. In order to assess whether or not Defendant’s immunity stands, this Court should use the
Stump test. In Stump, the court agreed on a test in order to determine whether an act by a
judge is a judicial act. The two-part Stump test consists of asking (a) whether it is a
function normally performed by a judge; and (b) whether the parties dealt with the judge
in his judicial capacity.
23. Applying the Stump test here:
a. Defendant reviewed an application for, and authorized a search warrant against
Plaintiffs upon determining probable cause. The authorizing of a search warrant is
a normal function performed by a Judge. See Rid. R. Crim. P. 44; 6 R. Stat. §
131.009.
b. Although Plaintiffs were aware of the search warrant, Defendant signed it in his
official capacity as a judge, and did so through the official Court website, and in
his name as a magistrate judge.
24. Based on the Stump test, this Court should recognize that the actions which Plaintiffs
accuse Defendant of were a judicial act, and therefore, Defendant has absolute judicial
immunity.
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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25. Bradley also reaffirms this, holding that a judge is immune only for actions performed in
his judicial capacity. Id. at 360-63.
II. AN ALLEGED FAILURE TO RECUSE, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, BIAS, OR
ERROR DOES NOT DESTROY JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
26. The latter part of Plaintiffs complaint alleges that Defendant should have recused himself
because he is employed by the Ridgeway State Police, and this rendered his warrant
improper.
27. Even assuming this to be true, Defendant still has judicial immunity. Stump held that “a
judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when
he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley, at
351).
28. It does not matter if Defendant’s decision was made in error, malice, or excess of his
authority. What matters is if he acted outside his jurisdiction.
29. The search warrant which Defendant authorized was made against a citizen of the State,
in his role as a judge of that State, in a court of that State, and directed to peace officers
of that State. With all these facts, Defendant could not have possibly acted outside his
jurisdiction. His determination to sign the warrant was based upon probable cause, and
probable cause only.
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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III. THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT DOES NOT CREATE
LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT
30. Plaintiffs go so far as to accuse the magistrate of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct.
31. Regardless, White explained that immunity turns on the nature of the function performed,
rather than the identity of the person performing it.
32. Here, the reviewing and issuing of a search warrant is a judicial function.
33. Plaintiffs should have pursued that matter on appeal but instead decidede to contravene
the rules of vertical stare decisis and pursue a foil-hat interpretation of civil law, in order
to retaliate for a successful warrant against them.
IV. PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS LIMITED BY 7 R.
STAT. § 121.403
34. Firstly, Plaintiffs claim under 7 R. Stat. § 121.403 fails as a matter of law because the act
of issuing a warrant is a judicial act, and therefore Defendant has immunity.
35. Mireles held that judicial immunity is an immunity from suit itself. Judicial independence
would be undermined if judges were constantly subjected to personal liability every time
a litigant alleged a judicial act was unlawful. See Bradley.
36. As to 7 R. Stat. § 121.403, Plaintiffs seeks an injunction that enjoins Defendant “from
hearing any search warrant matters or signing any search warrant brought/applied by a
RSP Trooper.” See Compl. ¶ P.g. 6, para 4.
37. However, 7 R. Stat. § 121.403 only permits injunctive relief when “a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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38. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant violated any declaratory decree, and also
don’t plead facts demonstrating that declaratory relief was unavailable.
39. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot seek an injunction.
CONCLUSION
40. This is yet another borderline frivolous complaint made by the same attorney in several
other similar lawsuits, which allege civil right violations arising from search warrants.
41. The relief sought here does not at all remedy any possible injury. It seeks to take two cops
out of the field, and prevent one magistrate from hearing search warrant applications. The
complaint is just a retaliatory vehicle for what was a lawful, and successful search
warrant which took guns off our streets.
42. Defendant has judicial immunity, and has passed the Stump test. Accordingly, the
allegations in this Complaint do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
especially where that relief is excessive, irrelevant, and retaliatory.
43. Accordingly, the Complaint against Defendant should be dismissed.
Date: August 10, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for the Defendant’s
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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MOTION TO DISMISS
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