THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
STEMPIEE, an individual,
Plaintiff,
-against-
BRUNOMONTIEL1, an individual,
Defendant.
Docket No.: RSC-CV-7796
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Presiding Judge: Hon. VONHAGEN123
The Plaintiff, Stempiee, proceeding pro se, hereby replies to the affirmative defenses raised in
Defendant's Answer as follows.
RESPONSE TO FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiff admits that she was present at Defendant's property on or about August 4, 2026,
and admits that she engaged in the destruction of property belonging to Defendant.
Plaintiff does not contest this conduct and acknowledges it was wrongful.
2. Plaintiff admits that she was holding an axe and moved toward Defendant while doing so,
but denies that she intended to strike Defendant with the axe or with any other object, and
denies that any swinging motion she made was directed at Defendant's person.
3. Plaintiff states that property destruction alone does not entitle a property owner to
discharge a firearm toward the person responsible, whether as an intended warning or
otherwise. Defendant's proper recourse for the property damage described in Paragraph
1 was to contact local law enforcement, not to discharge a firearm in Plaintiff's direction.
RESPONSE TO FIRST AND SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
(SELF-DEFENSE; DEFENSE OF PROPERTY)
1. Plaintiff denies that Defendant's discharge of a firearm in Plaintiff's direction, on two
separate occasions, was a lawful or proportionate response to the circumstances
described in Paragraph 2.
2. 6 R. Stat. § 122.204, cited by Defendant, requires that the actor's use of force be justified
under the standards for self-defense set forth in 6 R. Stat. §§ 122.003–122.004, which
require a reasonable belief that force of the degree used was immediately necessary.
Plaintiff denies that discharging a firearm was reasonably necessary under the
circumstances, as opposed to withdrawing, seeking assistance, or contacting law
enforcement.
3. To the extent Defendant contends the discharge was intended merely as a warning in
response to Plaintiff's property destruction, Plaintiff denies that any degree of firearm
discharge directed toward a person is a lawful or justified response to property damage.
Defense of property under 6 R. Stat. § 122.204 does not authorize the use of deadly
force, or the threat thereof, against a person over conduct directed solely at property.
4. Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant's first discharge occurred while Plaintiff was in
close proximity to Defendant, and does not dispute that Defendant may have perceived
some degree of threat at that moment. However, Plaintiff denies that Defendant's second
discharge was justified on the same basis. At the time of the second discharge, Plaintiff
was no longer in close proximity to Defendant and posed no immediate threat to
Defendant's person. Defendant therefore had no reasonable basis to believe force was
immediately necessary to protect himself at the time of the second discharge.
5. Defendant discharged his firearm twice in the direction of Plaintiff, at a location where
Plaintiff's witness, iicxloudxy, was also present and unarmed. Defendant's conduct placed
both Plaintiff and a bystander in danger of serious bodily harm or death.
RESPONSE TO THIRD, FOURTH, AND EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
(FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM; JUSTIFICATION; LACK OF CAUSATION)
1. Plaintiff maintains that the Complaint properly states claims for Assault and Negligence,
as Defendant admits to intentionally discharging a firearm in Plaintiff's direction. Compl.
Statement of Facts ¶¶ 3–4; Def. Answer ¶¶ 7–8.
2. Defendant's discharge of the firearm was the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's
reasonable apprehension of immediate harmful contact, regardless of Defendant's
underlying motivation. At minimum, the second discharge, made when Plaintiff posed no
threat to Defendant, independently supports both claims.
RESPONSE TO FIFTH, SIXTH, AND SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
(CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; SUPERSEDING CAUSE; FAILURE TO MITIGATE)
1. Plaintiff admits that her own conduct, described in Paragraphs 1–2, contributed to the
confrontation, but denies that this conduct constitutes a superseding or intervening cause
excusing Defendant's decision to discharge a firearm at Plaintiff's person a second time
after any perceived threat had passed. Defendant's second discharge was a separate and
independent choice, disconnected from any threat Plaintiff's earlier conduct may have
posed.
2. Plaintiff denies that any damages sustained were attributable to a failure to mitigate, as
Plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid injury once Defendant began discharging the firearm.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff maintains that, even if Defendant's first discharge could be characterized as a response
to a perceived threat, Defendant's second discharge, made while Plaintiff was no longer near
Defendant and posed no threat, was neither necessary nor proportionate under the
circumstances. Defendant remains liable for Assault and Negligence as pled in the Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Stempiee
Stempiee
Plaintiff of the above-titled civil action, proceeding pro se
