MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND POSITION
RE: State v. CELESTIALTACTICAL, Case No. RSC-CM-0784 — Basis for Resolution at
Manslaughter Rather than Murder in the Second Degree
PREPARED BY: Counsel for Defendant
August 5, 2026
I. INTRODUCTION
Counsel submits this memorandum in advance of arraignment to set forth the basis on
which the State's charges, and Count 1 in particular, should be resolved as a homicide offense
properly reflecting the circumstances established by the record itself, including the defendant's
own recorded statement and the Probable Cause Affidavit, rather than as an intentional, knowing
killing under R.C.C. § 3.02(b).
II. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CHARACTERIZATION OF
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT RELIED UPON IN THE AFFIDAVIT
The Probable Cause Affidavit states, at Paragraph 8, that the defendant's statement
"confirms that the defendant did not arrive during an active exchange of gunfire, nor did they
identify any threat that would justify the use of immediate lethal force." The defendant's actual
statement does not support so unqualified a characterization. The defendant stated that upon
arrival, he observed "there [were] no shooters left," and that his "first instinct [was] that they
must have left or they are roaming around." This is not a statement that the defendant believed
no threat existed; it is a statement that the defendant, in the immediate aftermath of an active
shooting involving the deaths of a sheriff's deputy, a civilian, and a state trooper, did not know
whether the individuals responsible had left the area entirely or remained nearby and unseen. The
distinction is material to the defendant's actual state of mind at the time of the incident and
should not be flattened into a concession that no threat was believed to exist.
III. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEFENDANT'S ARRIVAL ARE RELEVANT
TO HIS STATE OF MIND AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
The record, including Exhibit A, reflects that the defendant arrived at a scene in the
immediate aftermath of an active shooting in which a sheriff's deputy, a civilian, and a state
trooper had just been killed by armed suspects. Upon dismounting his vehicle, the defendant
discharged a round before any assessment of the scene had occurred, and was then subjected to
an involuntary loss of control of his character before returning to his feet. These circumstances
are relevant not as a justification for the defendant's subsequent conduct, but as context bearing
on the defendant's capacity for deliberate, considered judgment in the seconds that followed,
circumstances materially different from a calm, calculated decision to use deadly force.
IV. THE ABSENCE OF ANY PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP OR MOTIVE IS
RELEVANT TO THE DEFENDANT'S STATE OF MIND
The defendant had no personal relationship with, and no prior interaction with, the
decedent. The defendant's awareness of the decedent was limited to a generalized public
reputation. While counsel does not contend that reliance on reputation provides a lawful basis for
the use of force, the absence of any personal motive, grievance, or targeted intent toward the
decedent specifically is directly relevant to negating the deliberate, purposeful character of
conduct that would elevate this offense to intentional murder, as opposed to a reckless or
negligent homicide arising from a mistaken and tragic misjudgment made under chaotic
circumstances.
V. THE APPLICABLE LESSER HOMICIDE PROVISIONS
R.C.C. § 3.02(d) (Voluntary Manslaughter) applies where a defendant causes the death of
another in the heat of passion. R.C.C. § 3.02(e) (Involuntary Manslaughter) applies where a
defendant, having ignored a known or obvious risk, or having disregarded the life and safety of
others, causes the death of another.
The circumstances here, an armed guardsman arriving at the immediate scene of an
active-shooter incident involving multiple fatalities, discharging his weapon within seconds of
dismounting and before any meaningful assessment of the scene was possible, against an
individual who was in fact unarmed and was not engaged in any conduct the defendant could
articulate as an observed act of aggression, describe a disregard of an obvious risk (namely, the
risk of employing deadly force against an unconfirmed threat) far more accurately than they
describe a calculated, intentional killing. Counsel respectfully submits that Involuntary
Manslaughter, or in the alternative Voluntary Manslaughter given the acute stress of the
immediate aftermath of an active-shooter engagement, more accurately reflects both the
defendant's culpability and the record as it actually exists.
VI. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST
For the foregoing reasons, counsel respectfully requests that the State consider amending
Count 1 from Murder in the Second Degree under R.C.C. § 3.02(b) to Involuntary Manslaughter
under R.C.C. § 3.02(e), or in the alternative Voluntary Manslaughter under R.C.C. § 3.02(d),
prior to arraignment. Counsel further notes that resolution of Count 1 on this basis would bear
directly on the viability of Counts 2 and 3, given that both counts require an absence of legal
justification or knowledge of unauthorized conduct, respectively, which are more difficult to
establish against the backdrop of a documented, chaotic active-shooter aftermath and the absence
of any personal motive.
Counsel is available to discuss this matter further at the State's convenience.
Respectfully submitted,
By: ____________________________
BellaRevelation, Esquire
Criminal Defense Attorney
Counsel for Defendant CELESTIALTACTICAL
