Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT NICKLAUS_S, Plaintiff, MATTCERN, in his official capacity as Colonel of the Ridgeway State Police, Defendant. Civil Action No. RSC-CV-3940 RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Mattcern (“Defendant”) hereby files a response to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. INTRODUCTION Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings early last week, arguing that Plaintiff lacks sufficient legal grounds to challenge the Firearm Licenses Act (hereinafter “the Act”). We argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to an Advanced Firearms License as property right because he is excluded from eligibility and the issuing agency retains broad discretion to deny his application. Defendant rebuffs the former claim by arguing that he is entitled to the license as a liberty; the latter claim, he argues, is unsupported by a wealth of historical evidence. Neither of his defenses can be rationalized in both law and history. First, while the right to bear arms is considered a fundamental right, weapons that are both dangerous and unusual are not protected under the meaning of the Second Amendment. Second, even if they were protected, the regulation of such firearms is consistent with the Bruen framework. Therefore, this Court should grant Plaintiff’s motion, deny Defendant’s cross-motion, and resolve this question outright. ANALYSIS I. While the Second Amendment protects fundamental self-defense rights, it does not provide a universal right to possess automatic firearms. Plaintiff’s one and only claim to his Second Amendment right is the individual need to possess automatic firearms for self-defense. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, the Supreme Court held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. Plaintiff makes both claims here, and in accordance with those decisions, we must justify our licensing regime by demonstrating that it is consistent with historical tradition. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct., at 2127 (2022). Our record of historical evidence, along with decades of legal analysis, affirms that regulating the individual possession of automatic firearms is legal. But this is not the defeating blow. While our license requirements are restrictive, sweeping state bans of high-capacity guns have been upheld time and time again. A. Automatic and semi-automatic firearms that are both dangerous and unusual are not protected under the Second Amendment. The wisdom of Heller allows the government to regulate weapons “prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons” Heller, 554 U.S., at 627, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 148-149 (1769). Indeed, the Second Amendment does not protect the right to own such weapons. But for a regulation to pass muster on these grounds, the firearm must be both dangerous and unusual. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S.Ct. 1027, 1031 (2016). Further to this point, a category of firearms cannot be prohibited “just because they are dangerous” Ibid. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 636). While virtually every firearm is dangerous, the automatic firearms at issue in this case are unusual when placed in the context of their common use. Thus, the Licensing Act is constitutional because its restrictions are consistent with history and supported by voluminous records of state laws prohibiting the possession of dangerous and unusual automatic firearms. 1. The Stetson M1-A and Cardiac-5 are dangerous and unusual. Efforts to bring automatic firearms like the Stetson M1-A and Cardiac 5 (hereinafter “Stetson”) to market is a modern development. To determine if this category of weapons is protected, we must turn to their ordinary use. Indeed, the Supreme Court generally looks at whether guns are used for a lawful purpose such as recreational use and self-defense. See, e.g., Snope v. Brown, 145 S. Ct. 1534, 1535 (2025) (cert. denied). In that case, for example, the Court recognized that “[l]aw-abiding citizens use both AR-15s and handguns for a variety of lawful purposes, including self-defense in the home” Id. Even then, there is a distinction between semi- automatic and automatic firearms. Id. (“Semi-automatic handguns and rifles are distinct from automatic firearms such as the M-16 automatic rifle used by the military”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not stake a claim to possess semi-automatic firearms described above, but only automatic guns that are “capable of firing all of its rounds from a single barrel and with a single trigger pull” Sworn Declaration of Robert Spitzer, Appendix 1 ¶¶ 18–31. Ridgeway did not capriciously regulate these weapons at its founding merely because they were high capacity, but instead because their adaptation to civilian markets threatened public safety and provided criminals with unusually powerful firearms to harm and kill. And this is not uncommon. “New gun laws are not enacted when firearm technologies are invented or conceived. They are enacted when those technologies circulate sufficiently in society to spill over into criminal or other harmful use” Id. at Appendix 16 ¶¶ 17-19. Over the years, thousands of criminals have used automatic firearm technology to engage in criminal activity. In response, many states have regulated their use, including the State of Ridgeway in its Licensing Act. Begin with the 1989 tragedy in Stockton, California. On the morning of January 17, Patrick Purdy parked his truck at a local elementary school and entered the premises through a nearby gate; he was carrying a semi-automatic AK-47 that was modified to fire automatic shots. A seemingly routine school day turned fatal when he began his rampage by shooting into the playground. Purdy continued by firing into the school, ultimately claiming the lives of five children. “Later that year, California enacted the first assault weapons ban in the country” Spitzer Declaration, 3 at ¶¶ 8-10. Even though his AK-47 was originally semi-automatic, the danger that automatic weapons posed to public safety became apparent. As of today, “eleven states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws broadly restricting assault weapons” Giffords Law Center, Assault Weapons, https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/hardware- ammunition/assault-weapons. But the lessons do not end with the Stockton tragedy. Even earlier in American history, automatic firearms became friends of gangsters in the 1920s and early 1930s. Like the modified AK-47 used by Purdy to kill five schoolchildren, automatic firearms—such as the Tommy Gun and Browning Automatic Rifle—were “actually used relatively infrequently by criminals generally, but when they were used, they exacted a devastating toll and garnered extensive national attention…” Chris McNab, Firearms and American Law Enforcement Deadly Force (NY: Osprey Publishing, 2009), 97-98. And similar to California’s ban in 1989, “at least 32 states” responded to the dangers of automatic weapons and “enacted anti-machine gun laws” Spitzer Declaration, 7 at ¶¶ 12-13; see also Exhibit B of Spitzer Declaration. It is no secret that automatic guns are dangerous and unusual in most contexts. They are seldom used for lawful purposes, as evidenced by mass casualty events both in Ridgeway and America, and possess complex technology that is not comparable to any other weapon in the market. Ridgeway is not only entitled to regulate these firearms, but they are also not protected under the Second Amendment.1 While the Licensing Act does not categorically ban the possession of the Stetson M1-A and Cardiac-5, its licensing regime—no matter how burdensome it may be—is constitutional. This Court should affirm that conclusion. II. Because the Firearm Licensing Act is constitutional, applicants do not possess a liberty interest and thus are not entitled to due process. As we understand it, “there can be no doubt that [liberty] must be broad indeed” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). Beyond mere physical restraint, the word liberty recognizes many constitutional freedoms—such as the right to bear arms—“as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). It is undisputed that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is an individual constitutional right, see Heller, 554 U.S. 570, and a fundamental liberty that is generally entitled to procedural due process. But this too has its limits. One such limitation being the prohibition or regulation of “dangerous and unusual weapons” Heller, 554 at 627. And when this applies, the Supreme Court has held that the Second Amendment does not kick in to protect “weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” Id. at 625. Procedural due process is only applicable when ‘life, liberty, or property’ has been deprived. Acquiring a license to possess high-capacity firearms capable of inflicting mass casualties is not a fundamental liberty, nor is it entitled to due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. CONCLUSION Therefore, this Court should grant Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion. 1 The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals put it best: States must show that a regulated class of firearms “are Arms that ordinary people would keep at home for purposes of self-defense [or] weapons…that are not possessed for lawful purposes” Bevis v. City of Naperville, Illinois, 85 F. 4th 1175, 1194 (2023). August 5, 2026 /s/ S. Stickza ` Stickza Assistant Solicitor General Ridgeway Department of Justice Palmer, RW 33368 [email protected]

Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.pdf

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