MEMORANDUM OF LAW
RE: State v. SSEMZZX, Case No. RSC-CM-7022 — Count 2 Properly Charged as
Voluntary Manslaughter, Not Murder in the Second Degree
PREPARED BY: Counsel for Defendant
I. ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the death of PatrickStarCheeks1, arising from a single blow struck by Defendant
during a continuous violent encounter in which Defendant was fired upon five times by an armed
third party, is properly charged as Murder in the Second Degree under R.C.C. § 3.02, or whether
the circumstances support charging or instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of
Voluntary Manslaughter under R.C.C. § 3.02(d).
II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Defendant entered the RCSO Headquarters and threw an unsuccessful punch. A
bystander, previously unconnected to Defendant and to the decedent, thereafter opened fire on
Defendant, discharging four rounds, all of which missed. Defendant continued into the building,
and then pursued the decedent, who fled into the lobby area. As Defendant pursued the decedent,
the bystander reloaded and discharged a fifth round at Defendant. Within moments of that fifth
shot, Defendant struck the decedent once. The decedent, whose condition prior to this encounter
is not otherwise established in the record, died as a result of that single blow.
III. THE GOVERNING STATUTES
R.C.C. § 3.02(b) defines Murder in the Second Degree, in relevant part, as intentionally
or knowingly causing the death of another, or intentionally causing serious bodily injury by an
act clearly dangerous to human life which causes death.
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R.C.C. § 3.02(d) defines Voluntary Manslaughter as causing the death of another "in the
heat of passion."
Notably, Ridgeway's justification statute governing self-defense, Title III, § 304(b)(ii),
contains an express forfeiture provision: deadly force is not justifiable where "the actor, with the
purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the
same encounter." No comparable forfeiture-for-provocation language appears anywhere in §
3.02(d), or elsewhere in Title VI's homicide provisions.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Legislature's Choice to Include an Initial-Aggressor Forfeiture Rule in the
Self-Defense Statute, and Its Choice to Omit Any Equivalent Rule from the Voluntary
Manslaughter Statute, Must Be Given Effect.
Where the legislature includes particular language in one provision of a statutory scheme
but omits it from a related provision, courts presume the omission was intentional. Here, the
legislature demonstrably knew how to draft a rule barring relief to a defendant who provoked the
confrontation resulting in the use of force; it did exactly that in § 304(b)(ii). Had the legislature
intended the same forfeiture principle to govern the availability of the heat-of-passion mitigation,
it could have included comparable language in § 3.02(d). It did not. The absence of any such
limitation in the voluntary manslaughter provision should be read as a deliberate legislative
choice not to condition that mitigation on the defendant's blamelessness in initiating the
encounter.
B. The Undisputed Facts Establish Adequate Provocation and the Absence of Any
Cooling-Off Period.
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Voluntary manslaughter requires only that the death occur "in the heat of passion", the
statute does not require that the provocation originate from the decedent specifically, nor does it
require legal justification for the defendant's response, only an emotional and psychological state
inconsistent with the deliberation that separates murder from manslaughter.
Defendant was fired upon by a third party on two separate occasions during a single,
unbroken sequence of events, an initial volley of four rounds, followed by a reload and a fifth
round discharged mere moments before the fatal blow. Being the target of repeated,
near-continuous gunfire is provocation sufficient to inflame the passions of an ordinarily
reasonable person, regardless of the circumstances that preceded it. The temporal proximity
between the fifth shot and the fatal blow, occurring, on the record, essentially simultaneously,
forecloses any argument that Defendant had a meaningful opportunity to cool off and regain her
composure before acting.
C. Count 2 Should Be Charged, or in the Alternative Submitted to the Fact-Finder,
as Voluntary Manslaughter Rather than Murder in the Second Degree.
For the foregoing reasons, the facts of this case, even accepting the State's version in full,
support a charge of Voluntary Manslaughter under R.C.C. § 3.02(d), not Murder in the Second
Degree under R.C.C. § 3.02(b). Counsel respectfully submits this memorandum for the State's
consideration in advance of arraignment, and reserves the right to request that the lesser-included
offense be submitted to the fact-finder should this matter proceed to trial on the present charge.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant respectfully requests that the State consider
amending Count 2 to Voluntary Manslaughter in violation of R.C.C. § 3.02(d) prior to
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arraignment, or, in the alternative, that this memorandum be treated as notice of Defendant's
intent to seek a lesser-included-offense instruction at trial.
Respectfully submitted,
By: ____________________________
BellaRevelation, Esquire
Criminal Defense Attorney
Counsel for Defendant SSEMZZX
August 4, 2026
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