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Filed on 2026-07-30 (UTC+0:00)
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
NOAHBADNOLIE, an individual
Plaintiff,
-against-
ROBLOXAGONE13, an individual in his official
capacity as a Senior Patrol Officer of the
Palmer Police Department pursuant to 7 R.
Stat. § 121.404
Defendant.
RSC-CV-9831
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON SERVICE IN
CIVIL ACTIONS IN OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES
Presiding Judge: Magistrate Hon.
vonhagen123
Plaintiff files this brief in order to record the answer to whether or not the State of
Ridgeway shall be served in this civil action. Short answer: no (unless ordered by this court).
BRIEF BODY
Representative capacities have never been taught that well even though there are only
two: personal/individual capacity and official capacity. Individual capacity makes the party pay
damages themselves. Official capacity shifts liability to the party's office/employer, having them
pay damages imposed. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (Marshall, J.) ("...while
an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the
official’s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an
official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself.") (footnote omitted); see also
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930–931 (1997) ("We have observed that 'a suit against a
state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office. . . . As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself''")
(quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)); contra Landor v.
Lousiana Dept. of Corrections and Public Safety, 609 U.S. ____ (2026) (footnote 6).
In Ridgeway, civil actions against officials/agents of the state government have a caveat
because of 7 R. Stat. § 122.004 ("Proceedings against an individual in their official capacity as
an agent of the government shall be construed as cases against the government").
The State has sovereign immunity per statute. Id., at § 122.002 ("The state government,
…and their agencies and departments shall be immune from all claims except those in this
section, and such claims later established where liability is expressly created against the
government."). Thanks to that statute, on-duty government officials, which include police
officers, sheriff deputies, state troopers, secretaries, etc., can only be sued under Official
Misconduct, Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law, and/or Impedance of Civil Rights causes
of action.
In a civil action against a government official for Official Misconduct, the official is
named in their official capacity, but they themselves must pay monetary damages. 7 R. Stat. §
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121.404(b). However, For Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law, the official is held liable in
their individual capacity. This is not stated, but this is true because the statute mirrors 7 U.S.C. §
1983. Cf. State v. Lx1nas, 1 Rid. ____ (2022) (slip op., at 3) (since Rid. Const. Art. Ⅰ, § Ⅴ is
almost the same as Vt. Const., Ch. I, Art. 9, courts should look to the Vermont Supreme Court's
rulings on that article). So, what does the supreme court say about 7 U.S.C. § 1983? They said
that an official sued under Section 1983 is held in their individual capacity if a federal or state
right is violated. See, e.g., Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. ____, ____ (2024) (slip op., at 6) (footnote
1) ("And when a state or municipal employee violates a federal right while acting 'under color of
law,' he can be sued in an individual capacity, as Freed was here.")
So, it is fair to say that the State shall not be named as a defendant. I also object to
naming the State in such an action because that would be an excuse to impose the same liabilities
twice. Sue the official for $10,000, and the government for $10,000? Get $20,000. In my
opinion, that raises a question of double jeopardy. However, I am only reviewing a question of
the process of service. Now, what does tort law say?
Since Official Misconduct and Deprivation of Rights claims are official capacity, 7 R.
Stat. § 121.404(b), and if such capacity is governmental, the State pays damages, then the
solicitor general shall be served. 7 R. Stat. § 122.005; contra Id., at § 122.008 ("The Solicitor
General may refuse to defend an agent of the government if they were clearly acting in an
individual capacity, or a capacity that is not in line with the laws, directives, orders, policies, or
standard operating procedures of the government and its agencies.") (emphasis added).
In Ridgeway, it is rare to just serve the official. E.g., thr33six8 v. PeakEffect, Rid.
Superior Ct. RSC-CV-2553 (2024) (plaintiff only served defendant; no issue raised);
NationalLegislator v. Im_Thunderr, Rid. Superior Ct. RSC-CV-3348 (2024) (plaintiff only
served defendant; no issue raised). It's uncommon to serve the official and the attorney general.
E.g., chexburger v. BattalionGavin, Rid. Superior Ct. RSC-CV-640 (2022) (plaintiff served
defendant and attorney general). It's common, especially in the legal buddies "inner circle" of
Ridgeway, to serve the official, the solicitor general, and attorney general. This is usally done in
big civil actions. See, e.g., Cyberphiliac v. Matrix_oc, Rid. Superior Ct. RSC-CV-3153 (2024)
(plaintiff served defendant, attorney general, and solicitor general); Cf. Ridgeway National Rifle
Association v. largeTitanic2, Rid. Superior Ct. RSC-CV-881 (2023) (attorney general was named
as a defendant but defendants were represented by solicitor general totoro987123). And while
Rid. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(d)(2) requires that civil actions against the State to be served upon the
attorney general, there is no rule stating that civil actions against an official in any capacity are to
be served upon the attorney general or solicitor general.
However, the language at that rule points toward civil actions against the State itself.
Look at the rule: "Upon the State, the County, a municipality, or any agency thereof by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the Attorney General of the State, and,
in the case of any agency, to its department head." The language here points to the State and its
subordinate administrative entities as defendants alongside whoever runs that administrative
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entity if it is an agency/department. Under the opinion in Printz, a judge would see Rid. Rule Civ
proc. 4(d)(2) as extending to cases where an official is sued in their official capacity. However, I
do not believe that the Supreme Court in that opinion intended that view of official capacities to
be binding because it only said that "it is no different" than suing the State itself. Printz, 521
U.S., at 931. Printz did not have questions of official capacity, and, thus, viewing the rule under
Printz is not binding.
So, the a fortiori theory that the attorney general shall be served because suits against an
official in their official capacity and therefore the official's agency and the state thereof is
weakened. Finally, while the solicitor general does have a duty to defend the official, his "duty"
is moreorso nonministerial because he may refuse to defend the official. If it were ministerial,
then the solicitor general would have to be served in a civil action against an official in their
official capacity or else the official can move to dismiss under Rid. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(a)(4)
(insufficency of service of process). I have not seen a case where this rule was invoked in a
dismissal. I have only seen that its federal sister, which is Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(5), has been
used in the context of no service upon any party. See generally Jorge v. Adler, D. Mass.
3:22-cv-30075-KAR (2023) (Memorandum and Order on Pending Motions, at 3) ("'Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) allows a party to challenge the way in which the opposing party
executed service of process, or the mode of delivery of the summons and complaint.'") (internal
citation omitted).
For reference, Adler was a civil action between two private, one-man parties, which
means there was no other party to be served. The defendant moved to dismiss the case under
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(5). However, the presiding judge ended up treating it as a motion to
quash service, which invalidated the plaintiff's previous service upon the defendant. "'If service
was ineffective, the court may treat the motion to dismiss as a motion to quash service of
process.'" Adler, at 5 (quoting Colon-Ortiz v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc., Civil No. 20- 1677 (BJM),
2022 WL 17067647, at *1 (D.P.R. Nov. 17, 2022)).
CONCLUSION
Since there is no explicit statutory or procedural requirement to serve an official who is
sued in their official capacity, it is just courtesy to also serve the attorney general and/or solicitor
general.
Since the State is not named as a Defendant (because I do not believe that the state
government itself is a tortfeasor here), I do not have to serve the attorney general per procedure.
See Rid. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(d)(2).
Unless this court orders that the attorney general and/or the solicitor general be served, I
will not serve either third party to this civil action.
All dates and times are in ISO 8601 format unless otherwise specified.
Filed on 2026-07-30 (UTC+0:00)
Respectfully submitted,
———————————————
/s/ thr33six8
The Attorney of Plaintiff/Client
noahbadnolie;
Licensed Attorney in the State of Ridgeway
since July 23rd, 2026 (R.S.B. License
#19302).
