All dates and times are in ISO 8601 format unless otherwise specified.
Filed on 2026-07-30 (UTC+0:00)
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
the STATE OF RIDGEWAY
Prosecution,
-against-
AMPLI, an individual
Defendant.
RSC-CM-7105
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER
Presiding Judge: Hon. Mytrius
Defendant moves for this court to reconsider their interlocutory order of striking witness
AdamStratton.
GROUNDS
As this part of the motion contains reasons, each section shall be numbered. See Rid. Rule Evid.
13(a)(2) ("A pretrial motion shall state the grounds on which it is based and shall include in
separately numbered paragraphs all reasons…")
1. This court misapplied case law when it struck AdamStratton.
During the hearing for Defendant's motion for discovery, the presiding judge struck
AdamStratton, who was the judge who issued Defendant's search warrant, from being admitted
as a witness, and he also struck smashcans, who was a judge. The judge said that he could not be
admitted because of case law, citing Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) and
Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276 (1904). However, striking him was a gross application of
case law.
For easy reference, I include the facts of Morgan:
"This case originated eleven years ago. As a result of proceedings begun
in April, 1930 under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 159, 7 U. S. C. §
181 et seq., the Secretary of Agriculture in June, 1933, issued an order setting
maximum rates to be charged by market agencies for their services at the Kansas
City Stockyards. The market agencies brought suit to set aside his order. The
district court issued a temporary restraining order, under which amounts charged
in excess of the rates fixed by the order were impounded, and later it upheld the
order. 8 F. Supp. 766. On appeal here, 7 U. S. C. § 217; 28 U. S. C. §§ 44, 47a, the
case was sent back to the district court in order to determine on the issues raised
by the pleadings whether the agencies had been denied the 'full hearing'
demanded by § 310 of the Act. 298 U. S. 468." 313 U.S., at 413 (Frankfurter, J.).
I believe that the Supreme Court's opinion in Morgan is irrelevant to this criminal case.
That case only served to extend the Ritch precedent of judges and their testimonies.
All dates and times are in ISO 8601 format unless otherwise specified.
Filed on 2026-07-30 (UTC+0:00)
For reference, Ritch held that "[w]hile in some cases on a plea of res judicata evidence
aliunde the record is proper to show what particular questions were tried and determined in the
former case, it is not competent to introduce the testimony of the trial judge as to the matters then
considered and passed on by him." 195 U.S., at 276–277. The Supreme Court's opinion was that,
as for proving something, it was better to the trial judge's judgment rather than have him testify
his reasoning for the judgment. Id., at 307 (Brewer, J.) ("Nevertheless no testimony [of a judge
regarding their decision(s)]should be received except of open and tangible facts—matters which
are susceptible of evidence on both sides").
Hon. AdamStratton was not admitted as a witness in order for Defendant to have
testimony about the why of the search warrant signed by the judge, but the what: who was the
affiant, what the affidavit contained, and more. It is privileged information for him to testify as to
the whys of his judgment. See Rid. Rule Evid. 26 ("A judge has an absolute privilege to refuse to
disclose the mental impressions and thought processes relied on in reaching a decision,
whether harbored internally or memorialized in nonpublic material") (emphasis added).
As long as AdamStratton is asked about the whats of the search warrant, he is not
privileged and it does not go against the precedent set in Ritch. Therefore, the court misapplied
case law when it decided to strike him regardless. It would not be an error of law, however, to
limit questions imposed on him to just those of what was presented to him and the search
warrant's scope. That is a perfectly fine authority of judges. Cf. Minnesota v. Chauvin,
27-CR-20-12646 (2021) (judge limited mentions of race during trial).1
2. Hon. AdamStratton's testimony is relevant procedurally to strike him on grounds of
relevancy is erroneous.
The procedural test for relevancy is simple: if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence[,] and the fact is of consequence in
determining the action," it is relevant. Rid. Rule Evid 10(1–2).
If Hon. AdamStratton were to testify as to who the affiant was, what the affiant said in
the affidavit, and the scope of the search warrant, it would be relevant testimony because it
would prove the search warrant's validity, which satisifies both prongs.
I need not go into the semantics of search warrants because such arugments are best
heard in a motion to suppress, not a motion to reconsider.
CONCLUSION
Defendant moves for this court to reconsider its interlocutory order to strike Hon.
AdamStratton as a witness, and:
1. to allow Hon. AdamStratton to be admitted as a witness, and;
1 Within Minnesota, this criminal case is cited as State of Minnesota v. Derek Chauvin or the same with only the
defendant's last name. The year cited is when he was sentenced, which is April 20th, 2021.
All dates and times are in ISO 8601 format unless otherwise specified.
Filed on 2026-07-30 (UTC+0:00)
2. limit what either party can ask Hon. AdamStratton to the affiant behind the search
warrant application, the date of the search warrant, and other matters that are not
related to the mental processes behind his decisions.
AFFIDAVIT OF PRETRIAL MOTION
Because of Rid. Rule Evid. 13(a)(2), I, thr33six8, swear under the penalties of perjury the
following about the factual basis of this motion:
Sworn Statement
There was a hearing of my motion for discovery. The presiding judge, who is Hon.
Myrtius, cited case law in his decision to strike AdamStratton, who I admitted as a witness in my
disclosures. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Respectfully submitted,
———————————————
/s/ thr33six8
The Attorney of Defendant/Client Ampli;
Licensed Attorney in the State of Ridgeway
since July 23rd, 2026 (R.S.B. License
#19302).
