Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT NICKLAUS_S, Plaintiff, MATTCERN, in his official capacity as Colonel of the Ridgeway State Police, Defendant. Civil Action No. RSC-CV-3940 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Mattcern (“Defendant”) hereby files a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings: INTRODUCTION The Firearm Licenses Act of 2026 (hereinafter “the Act”) was enacted by the state legislature to crack down on the use of automatic and high-capacity firearms. Unlike other weapons sold by licensed merchants in Ridgeway, these firearms are particularly dangerous; they cause higher damage relative to other firearms, and they have been historically used to inflict harm upon the community. While the licensure regime presents a hurdle to acquiring this class of firearms, it does not categorically bar their possession. Plaintiff attempted to apply for this license, but he was denied for having a criminal record. The Act, of course, forbids the licensure of individuals with criminal records—largely to mitigate the negligent use of high-capacity guns. Plaintiff fired back by filing suit, arguing that this provision does not provide proper recourse (hearings, appeals, or other means of review) for licenses that are rejected. He also argues that the State cannot muster a historical tradition in preventing people with criminal records from possessing firearms. The first argument is patently false, and the second is effortlessly defeated by a robust historical record dating back to 17th-century English laws and parliamentary records. ANALYSIS I. Plaintiff has not identified a cognizable liberty or property interest. Due process ensures that people are not deprived of life, liberty, or property without a procedure in place to protect them or otherwise contest a government decision. Procedural due process, of course, applies “only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972). The meat and potatoes of this case hinge on this foundation. Indeed, Plaintiff posits that there is no way for his property interests to be vindicated after being denied an application to purchase automatic, high-capacity firearms. And he further argues that he is entitled to such a process by way of his liberty and property interests. “But the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite” Id. And that certainly doesn’t change here. Start with the language of due process itself. In the history of this jurisprudence, procedural due process begins with a “benefit”—anything that someone can receive or claims entitlement to. Licenses and permits like the AFL undoubtedly fall into this category of property interests. But whether someone is entitled to these interests depends on the exact language of the governing statute. Indeed, “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire” and “more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Roth, supra, at 577 (emphasis added). Without mandatory entitlement to a government-conferred benefit or meaningful limits on governmental discretion in issuing a benefit, a procedural due process claim rarely survives. Plaintiff fails to establish that the Firearms Licenses Act confers an unequivocal entitlement to a firearms license. And without this necessary element, his due process claims cannot be reconciled with the statutory language. Indeed, “a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion” Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005); see also Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U. S. 454, 462–463 (1989). Under the Act, the Colonel has unfettered discretion “to deny AFL licensing or revoke an active AFL for any reason” 9 R. Stat. § 413.104. He is not required by state law to grant a license, even if an applicant satisfies every requirement. And for good reasons. In Castle Rock, the Supreme Court held that statutes requiring government action—say, for example, issuing a license—does not always create an entitlement to due process. Turning to other cases, the Court held that it is simply “common sense that all [enforcing] officers must use some discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city ordinances” Castle Rock, supra. Each case is variable, and the circumstances surrounding the enforcement of a mandatory provision undoubtedly require some level of discretion. However, if the Firearm Licenses Act required the Colonel to issue licenses to every applicant that satisfies the requirements, little to no discretion would apply, and he would have to grant their application. But that is not reality. And even if the picture-perfect citizen slipped his application under the station doors, the Colonel can deny his application for any reason, not limited to the criteria set forth in the Act. Finally, consider the factual background of this case. Plaintiff applied for a license and was denied for having a criminal record. Under the Act, anyone with a criminal record is not eligible for licensure. Plaintiff, therefore, is the total opposite of the ‘picture-perfect citizen’ described above. And even if the legislature required the Colonel to grant licenses to people who satisfy the requirements, the Plaintiff would not be eligible. Nor would he be entitled to procedural due process. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims fall short of compelling at every turn. Therefore, the Plaintiff lacks a requisite property interest to claim procedural due process for the denial of his application. He is not entitled to an Advanced Firearms License, nor is any other outstanding citizen for that matter. The Firearms Licenses Act makes this overwhelmingly clear by delegating full and unconditional discretion to the Colonel to deny applications. And even if that discretion was limited to some extent, the Plaintiff could not claim procedural due process rights because he, himself, violates the requirements for a license. He has an extensive criminal record, including criminal speeding and violations of traffic law that endangered the community. He is a criminal in the eyes of the Firearms Licenses Act. As such, he would not be entitled to due process even in the best of circumstances and, clearly, not even in the worst. II. History and tradition both confirm that preventing people with criminal records from possessing firearms constitutes a legitimate state interest. Somewhat recently, the U.S. Supreme Court established a new test for determining the constitutionality of firearm regulations—whether the government can “affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits…the right to keep and bear arms” New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct., at 2127 (2022). We must establish, then, that our requirements for an Advanced Firearms License are “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” Id. at 2126. The requirement at issue here concerns applicants with criminal records of any degree. Under the Firearms Licenses Act, applicants are not eligible for an Advanced Firearms License if they have a criminal record. That requirement is consistent with long-standing firearm restrictions against high-capacity firearms and magazines, and it serves an array of purposes, including public safety and domestic security. Our analysis begins with the earliest set of laws closely analogous to the present case. A. Statute of Northampton In 1328, King Edward III and Parliament enacted the Statute of Northampton, a law that was designed to dispel commoners from reveling, riding armed, and disturbing the peace in public. “[I]t is enacted, that no man great nor small…be so hardy…to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their armour to the King” Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3 (Eng.). The very language of this statute provided regulatory forfeiture of weapons for those that disturbed the peace and engaged in dangerous armed conduct. Britain would only develop a collection of criminal records in 1869, so while the Statute of Northampton is not a historical twin to this case, the principles underpinning its enactment carry weight. Plaintiff has been both cited and arrested numerous times for erratic public behavior, primarily deriving from traffic incidents and infractions. These actions are at all times dangerous to the public, and they undoubtedly disturb the peace to some degree. Therefore, the criminal record requirement can be rationalized by calling into question both his and others’ suitability for possession of high- capacity firearms that require careful attention to ensure the safety of the public. B. Milita Laws of Colonial America Early in our Nation’s history, the right to keep and bear arms became essential. So, in a true Republican fashion, the people came together and, through their representatives, enacted the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This marked a new journey of American firearm jurisprudence. “Nevertheless, Americans continued some English arms traditions, including the tradition of disarming those perceived as dangerous” Joseph G.S. Greenlee, “The Historical Justification for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons from Possessing Arms,” 20 Wyoming Law Review 249 (2020). In 1777, for example, the Council of Safety in New Jersey was ordered “to deprive and take from such Persons as they shall judge disaffected and dangerous to the present Government, all the Arms, Accoutrements, and Ammunition which they own or possess” Ibid. at 265. Virginia shortly followed suit, declaring that “it is very improper and dangerous that persons disaffected to the liberty and independence of this state shall possess or have in their own keeping, or elsewhere, any firearms” Ibid. America was preventing groups of people that it deemed dangerous—in modern days, those with criminal records—from possessing or using firearms. In this case, our regulations seek to do the same. Criminals like Plaintiff are dangerous to the health and safety of the community. Colonial laws thus support restricting his access to high-capacity firearms, lest he use them in a dangerous or irresponsible manner. C. Modern Discretionary Permits Perhaps our strongest and most relevant historical evidence exists to this day. In Connecticut, officials have discretion to deny a permit to anyone who is not a “suitable person,” see Conn. Gen. Stat. §29–28(b), but this has been upheld as it precludes permits only to those “individuals whose conduct has shown them to be lacking the essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted with a weapon.” Dwyer v. Farrell, 193 Conn. 7, 12, 475 A.2d 257, 260 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Aligning more strongly with Connecticut, the State of Ridgeway imposes its criminal record requirement to ensure that individuals with a mature temperament and sense of responsibility possess dangerous, high-capacity firearms. Therefore, a wealth of history exists to justify our regulations in preventing people with a history of irresponsible, erratic, and dangerous behavior from being eligible for a license. III. High-capacity magazines are not considered “arms” under the Second Amendment and therefore do not receive constitutional protection. In his complaint, Plaintiff includes high-capacity magazines as part of his facial challenge to the Firearms Licenses Act. Under the standard advanced in Heller and undisturbed by the Court’s ruling in Bruen, “arms” under the Second Amendment include only weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”—in particular, weapons “in common use” for self-defense. Id. at 625. This remains consistent with ratification-era definitions of firearms, which encompassed “[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence [sic]” 1 Dictionary of the English Language 106 (4th ed. 1773). Magazines, of course, do not fall into this narrow definition. And even if we adopted a broader spectrum of firearms, magazines will always be treated as an accessory—or ‘component’ of the firearm. As one Ridgeway jurist once quoted, “[magazines] ‘generally have no use independent of their attachment to a gun’ and ‘you can't hurt anybody with [one] unless you hit them over the head with it” Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island, No. 22-CV-246 JJM-PAS, 2022 WL 17721175 (D.R.I. Dec. 14, 2022). The Ninth Circuit has similarly found that “large-capacity magazines provide significant benefit to soldiers and criminals who wish to kill many people rapidly. But the magazines provide at most a minimal benefit for civilian, lawful purposes” Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087, 1106 (9th Cir. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Bruen, supra. Accordingly, high-capacity magazine bans have been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court and appellate courts across the country. Magazines are accessories, and they always will be. High-capacity magazines certainly will be too, but they will invariably pose more of a danger to the public. No one, except for criminals and active duty soldiers, can justify a liberty interest in possessing a magazine that is capable of wiping out an entire room of people. Accordingly, this court should uphold that magazine are not firearms within the meaning of the Second Amendment and are therefore not protected by Bruen nor required to embark a historical exposition on their use and tradition. CONCLUSION Therefore, this Court should grant Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, resolve the legal issues herein, and nail this door of litigation shut once and for all. July 27, 2026 /s/ S. Stickza ` Stickza Assistant Solicitor General Ridgeway Department of Justice Palmer, RW 33368 [email protected]

Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.pdf

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