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RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
NICKLAUS_S,
Plaintiff,
v.
MATTCERN, in his official capacity as
Colonel of the Ridgeway State Police,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-____
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Nicklaus_s (“Plaintiff”), by and through the undersigned counsel,
seeking all available relief, in and for his Complaint against Defendant Mattcern, in
his official capacity as Colonel of the Ridgeway State Police (“Defendant”), alleges:
INTRODUCTION
1. In June of 2026, Plaintiff applied for an advanced firearms license.
Like many others, Plaintiff sought a license so that he could possess and carry a
Stetson M1-A and a Stetson Cardiac-5 for self-defense. Also like many others,
Plaintiff had to wait weeks, if not months, to apply, because applications are usually
closed longer than they are ever open. And still like many others, Plaintiff had a
handful of arrests and citations on his record. It was because of those records alone
that Defendant denied his application, without ever affording Plaintiff a hearing,
even though Plaintiff has never been prosecuted or convicted of any crime.
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2. Plaintiff, to no surprise, is not alone. The Firearm Licenses Act of
2026, 9 R. Stat. § 411.001–414.002, categorically bars people with arrests or even
citations from being eligible to obtain an advanced firearms license. So, even if a
person only has a single citation for illegal parking, they are barred from lawfully
possessing or carrying automatic or high capacity firearms, such as the Stetson
M1-A and Stetson Cardiac-5.
3. Such a restriction is no doubt unconstitutional under the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Indeed, there is no
historical analogue for categorically barring, without a hearing, people with arrest
records and even traffic citations from keeping and bearing an entire class of arms.
Worse, the law violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
affording applicants no notice or opportunity to be heard before being denied their
fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms.
4. Accordingly, this action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
JURISDICTION
5. The Ridgeway Superior Court has original jurisdiction over “all civil
and criminal cases or controversies.” Rid. Const. art. 5, § 4.
6. Venue is proper as the acts and omissions which give rise to this
complaint occurred in the State of Ridgeway.
PARTIES
7. Plaintiff is an individual, resident, and citizen of the State of
Ridgeway.
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8. Defendant is an individual, resident, and citizen of the State of
Ridgeway. Defendant is the Colonel of the Ridgeway State Police. As Colonel,
Defendant “retains superintendence over” over the agency and “appoints peace
officers to accomplish the responsibilities of the” agency, and has the authority to
promulgate “administrative rules.” 9 R. Stat. §§ 223.202, 223.204. Relevant here,
Defendant is responsible for “issuing advanced firearm licenses.” 9 R. Stat. §
413.101. Defendant is sued in his official capacity.
FACTS
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
9. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.
U.S. Const. amend. II.
10. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme
Court rejected the nearly uniform opinions reached by the court of appeals, which
for years had claimed that the Second Amendment protects only a communal right
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of a state to maintain an organized militia. Id. at 581. Setting the record straight,
the Supreme Court explained that the Second Amendment recognizes, enumerates,
and guarantees to individuals the pre-existing right to keep and carry arms for
self-defense and defense of others in the event of a violent confrontation. Id. at 592.
12. Then, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), the
Supreme Court explained that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 791.
13. Next, in Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411 (2016), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Heller that the “Second Amendment extends,
prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were
not in existence at the time of the founding,” and that the “Second Amendment
right is fully applicable to the States.” Id. at 411.
14. Finally, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S.
1 (2022), the Supreme Court explained that the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments together guarantee individuals not only the right to “keep” firearms in
their homes, but also the right to “bear arms,” meaning “to carry a handgun for
self-defense outside the home,” free from infringement by either state or federal
governments. Id. at 10.
15. Bruen also outright rejected the methodology previously used within
multiple circuits to judge challenges under the Second Amendment, and instead,
consistent with Heller, McDonald, and Caetano, again directed courts to first
principles:
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“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an
individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively
protects that conduct. The government must then justify
its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with
the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s
conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s unqualified
command.”
Id. at 17.
16. Applying this framework in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. __
(2024), the Supreme Court held that “an individual found by a court to pose a
credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed,” but
flatly rejected the argument that a person “may be disarmed simply because” he or
she “is not responsible.” Id., slip op. at 17 (emphasis added).
17. Recently, in Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. __ (2026), the Supreme Court
helpfully “beg[a]n with an overview of” Second Amendment law, id., slip op. at 2–10,
and explained that the inquiry under Bruen into whether a law violates the plain
text of the Second Amendment involves three subsidiary questions. First, whether
the law applies to “‘the people’,” which are “all members of the political community.”
Id. at 7. Second, whether the law concerns “any form of ‘arms’,” which includes “any
weapon customarily used for offensive or defensive purposes.” Id. And third,
whether the law places any restriction on the “‘keeping’ (i.e., possession) or the
‘bearing’ (i.e., carrying) of arms.” Id.
18. Wolford also made clear, once again, that if a law falls within the plain
text of the Second Amendment, “it is presumptively unconstitutional,” and may only
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be upheld by the government making a showing that the law does “not infringe the
historical understanding of the codified right.” Id.
19. To make such a showing, the Supreme Court in Wolford explained, as
in Bruen, the government must identify one or more “historical analogues,” or “old
legal rules from which a court may draw a strong inference that the modern law at
issue is consistent with the codified right.” Id. The inquiry then turns on “the
number of jurisdictions in which they were adopted,” “the extent to which they were
well-accepted,” and whether the analogue “is relevantly similar to the modern law.”
Id. at 7–8. An analogue is “relevantly similar” when “it imposed a restriction similar
to that imposed by the challenged law” and “its rationale was similar to that of the
new law.” Id. at 8.
REGULATORY BACKGROUND
20. In May of 2026, the State of Ridgeway enacted the Firearm Licenses
Act of 2026, S.B. 11-21, 11th Sen., Gen. Sess. (2026) (“S.B. 21”) to legislate the hole
in the regulatory scheme left by the passing of the inaugural laws.
21. As used in S.B. 21, “fully automatic” is defined as a firearm which has
the ability “to fire more than one bullet with a single continuous depression of the
trigger.” 9 R. Stat. § 411.008.
22. As used in S.B. 21, “high capacity” is defined as a firearm which
“utilizes” a magazine “with a capacity of more than 15” rounds. 9 R. Stat. § 411.009.
23. As used in S.B. 21, “civilian-grade firearms” are defined as those
incapable of “fully automatic fire” and which utilize magazines “with a maximum
bullet capacity of 15” rounds. 9 R. Stat. §§ 412.002–03.
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24. As used in S.B. 21, “advanced-grade firearms” are defined as those
capable of “fully automatic fire” or which utilize magazines “with a capacity of more
than 15” rounds. 9 R. Stat. §§ 411.008–09, 413.001.
25. It is unlawful to own or possess any firearm without first possessing a
Ridgeway Firearms License Identification (“RFLID”) card. 9 R. Stat. § 412.001.
26. An ordinary firearms license, or an RFLID, permits only the possession
of civilian-grade firearms. 9 R. Stat. § 412.002.
27. An advanced firearms license, or an AFL, permits the possession of
advanced-grade firearms. 9 R. Stat. § 413.001.
28. Defendant or his designee “shall be responsible for issuing advanced
firearm licenses” and “shall create and maintain a database of” licensees. 9 R. Stat.
§§ 413.101, 413.103.
29. To be eligible for an AFL, an applicant must actively hold a valid
RFLID and have “no previous arrests or citations” on their record. 9 R. Stat. §
413.102.
30. A Type I license permits personal possession and use of
advanced-grade firearms. 9 R. Stat. § 413.201. A Type II license is conditional on
the holder being a regular status employee in a business that requires or permits
the use of such firearms, and permits them to be used while representing the
business. 9 R. Stat. § 413.202. A Type III license is conditional on employment with
a government agency, and permits such firearms to be used on duty. 9 R. Stat. §
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413.203. Each license type carries the privileges of the tier below it. 9 R. Stat. §
413.204.
31. AFLs expire after one year and must be renewed. 9 R. Stat. § 413.106
32. Defendant has the right to “deny AFL licensing,” “revoke an active
AFL,” and “blacklist an active AFL,” “for any reason.” 9 R. Stat. §§ 413.104–05.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
33. Plaintiff wishes to possess a Stetson M1-A and Stetson Cardiac-5 for
lawful purposes, including self-defense.
34. The Stetson M1-A is a bearable arm in common use for offensive and
defensive purposes.
35. The Stetson Cardiac-5 is a bearable arm in common use for offensive
and defensive purposes.
36. The Stetson M1-A is an advanced-grade firearm under S.B. 21 because
it is an automatic and high capacity firearm.
37. The Stetson Cardiac-5 is an advanced-grade firearm under S.B. 21
because it is an automatic and high capacity firearm.
38. Plaintiff must therefore possess an AFL to lawfully acquire, possess,
and carry, or otherwise own and utilize, a Stetson M1-A and a Stetson Cardiac-5.
39. Since 2024, Defendant has issued over 700 AFLs.
40. At all relevant times, Plaintiff has actively held a valid RFLID.
41. On or about February 28, 2026, Plaintiff was cited for driving without
headlights when required.
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42. On or about March 8, 2026, Plaintiff was cited for driving the wrong
way.
43. On or about March 15, 2026, Plaintiff was cited for criminal speeding.
44. On or about March 15, 2026, Plaintiff was arrested for criminal
speeding.
45. Plaintiff maintains that he is innocent of his arrest and citations.
46. Plaintiff has never been prosecuted for a crime.
47. Plaintiff has never been convicted of a crime.
48. On or about June 21, 2026, Plaintiff applied for a Type I AFL.
49. Plaintiff satisfied all eligibility requirements for a Type I AFL, except
that he had previous arrests and citations on his record.
50. On or about June 21, 2026, after submitting his application, Plaintiff
was messaged by “RSP | Firearm Licensing Unit” providing:
“Your AFL application has been denied.
Reason: Criminal Record”
51. Defendant did not identify which specific arrest or citation formed the
basis for denial.
52. Defendant did not afford Plaintiff notice of any process or appeal by
which to contest the denial.
53. Defendant did not provide any opportunity for Plaintiff to be heard
before or after the denial.
54. Plaintiff continues to lack an AFL and continues to wish to lawfully
acquire and possess a Stetson M1-A and Stetson Cardiac-5.
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55. Plaintiff intends to reapply for a Type I AFL but for his previous arrest
and citations, and Plaintiff otherwise satisfies, and will continue to satisfy, the
eligibility requirements for a Type I AFL.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Right to Bear Arms, U.S. Const. amends. II and XIV – 7 R. Stat. § 121.403)
56. Plaintiff repeats and reincorporates paragraphs 1–55 above as though
fully incorporated herein.
57. Defendant was, at all times relevant, acting under the color of state
law and in the course and scope of his employment.
58. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II.
59. S.B. 21 conditions the ability to “own or utilize” any “advanced-grade
firearms” on the “possession of an advanced firearms license.” 9 R. Stat. § 413.001.
60. S.B. 21 conditions the “eligibility requirements for obtaining an”
advanced firearms license on having “no previous arrests or citations.” 9. R. Stat.
413.102.
61. S.B. 21 applies to “the people.” Plaintiff is a member of the political
community and is not among any class of persons unable to bear arms.
62. S.B. 21 concerns “arms.” The Stetson M1-A and Stetson Cardiac-5 are
weapons customarily used for offensive and defensive purposes.
63. S.B. 21 restricts both the “keeping” and “bearing” of arms, as it
requires an advanced firearms license to “own or utilize” any automatic or
high-capacity firearm.
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64. S.B. 21 therefore falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment,
so it is presumptively unconstitutional, and Defendant bears the burden of showing
that it is consistent with historical tradition.
65. Defendant cannot carry such a heavy burden. Barring those with
arrests and citations from possessing and carrying firearms, without any
individualized process, is not consistent with historical tradition. Such a practice is
entirely atextual and ahistorical, representing a novel scheme developed in recent
months, completely without any historical analogue.
66. As a direct and proximate result of the enforcement of S.B. 21 by
Defendant, Plaintiff has been deprived of his fundamental right to keep and bear
arms, and continues to be unable to lawfully acquire, possess, or carry automatic or
high-capacity firearms like the Stetson M1-A and the Stetson Cardiac-5.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 – 7 R. Stat. § 121.403)
67. Plaintiff repeats and reincorporates paragraphs 1–55 above as though
fully incorporated herein.
68. Defendant was, at all times relevant, acting under the color of state
law and in the course and scope of his employment.
69. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that “no State shall…deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
70. Plaintiff has a liberty interest in the fundamental right to keep and
carry lawful firearms, including the Stetson M1-A, Stetson Cardiac-5, and
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automatic and high-capacity firearms as defined by S.B. 21, for lawful purposes.
U.S. Const. amend II; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778.
71. When a person is deprived of a property or liberty interest, due process
requires notice and that a hearing be provided before an impartial decision maker
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
72. With limited exceptions, the government must afford a person with due
process before depriving him or her of a protected interest. Otherwise, due process
must be afforded after that deprivation.
73. It obviously follows that the government cannot deprive someone of a
protected interest, much less a fundamental constitutional right, without any
process whatsoever.
74. S.B. 21 affords, and Defendant provides, applicants no process of any
kind before or after denying an application for an advanced firearms license. S.B. 21
does not require Defendant to provide a specific basis for denial, does not establish
any avenue by which an applicant may contest a denial, and does not provide any
opportunity, before or after denial, for an applicant to be heard.
75. S.B. 21 compounds this deficiency by providing that Defendant may
deny an application for any reason, granting Defendant standardless, unreviewable
discretion to deny a license wholly untethered from any criteria whatsoever.
76. Defendant deprived Plaintiff of his protected liberty interest when it
denied his application for an advanced firearms license.
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77. Defendant offered Plaintiff no constitutionally adequate notice or
hearing before or after denying his application for an advanced firearms license.
78. As a direct and proximate result of the enforcement of S.B. 21 by
Defendant, Plaintiff has been deprived of his liberty interest in keeping and bearing
arms without due process of law, and continues to lack any constitutionally
adequate process by which to obtain an advanced firearms license.
RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the court enter judgment in his favor and
against Defendant as follows:
a. Declare that 9 R. Stat. § 413.102(b) is unconstitutional under the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution by categorically barring
individuals with arrests or citations from being eligible to obtain an AFL;
b. Declare that 9 R. Stat. § 413.104 is unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
permitting denial of an AFL application without notice or any opportunity to be
heard and by granting Defendant unbridled and standardless discretion to deny an
AFL application;
c. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendant,
his officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons acting in active concert or
participation with him who receive actual notice of this injunction, from enforcing 9
R. Stat. § 413.102(b) or otherwise categorically barring individuals with arrests or
citations from being eligible to obtain an AFL;
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d. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendant,
his officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons acting in active concert or
participation with him who receive actual notice of this injunction, from enforcing 9
R. Stat. § 413.104 insofar as it permits denying AFL applications without
constitutionally adequate process, including notice and an opportunity to be heard,
and without constitutionally adequate standards sufficient to cabin official
discretion, and from otherwise denying any AFL applications without such process
and standards;
e. Order Defendant to provide written notice of these declarations and
injunctions to all personnel responsible for processing AFL applications, and to
conspicuously display to prospective and current AFL applicants a copy of these
declarations and injunctions in a manner reasonably calculated to inform them of
their rights;
f. Grant an award of the fees and costs incurred in filing this suit;
g. Grant such further relief as the court deems just and proper.
Dated: July 24, 2026 /s/ Nicklaus_s
Nicklaus_s (Rid. Bar No. 10241)
Managing Partner
NICKLAUS & ASSOCIATES LLP
1 Jackson Road
Palmer, Ridgeway 90025
(123) 456-7890
[email protected]
In propria persona
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