IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
FOR THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
HALO4ASIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RIDGEWAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE,
Defendant.
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Case No. RSC-CV-5191
MEMORANDUM
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON QUESTIONS OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Plaintiff submits this Memorandum of Law so that the unresolved questions of statutory
interpretation identified in the Court’s Minute Order of July 12, 2026 may be resolved through
further proceedings, as the Order itself contemplates. Plaintiff does not seek reconsideration of
the denial of summary judgment. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the
Court, the Court has found the material historical facts largely undisputed, and the operative facts
bearing on these questions are admitted of record. Resolution of the questions presented
therefore may dispose of Counts I, II, and VI without trial.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether an appointing authority satisfies the duty under 4 R. Stat. Sections 122.404 to
“specify the reasoning for the negative result” of a background investigation by providing
only a citation to the statutory criterion applied.
2. Whether the notice duties of 4 R. Stat. Sections 122.308 and 122.404 are subject to an
unwritten qualification for governmental security interests, and if any legitimate
confidentiality concerns exist, whether it can excuse the provision of no reasoning at all.
ARGUMENT
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I. A BARE CITATION IS NOTICE OF THE CRITERION, NOT A
SPECIFICATION OF REASONING.
Section 122.404 imposes two duties, not one: where a denial rests on a negative background
result, the authority “shall notify the applicant and specify the reasoning for the negative result.”
A citation to the criterion is notice of the criterion. If the citation also counted as the “reasoning,”
the second command would do no work at all, and statutes are not read to render their words
surplusage. Section 122.404(a) confirms the distinction: it permits an authority to satisfy the duty
by publishing “their reasoning” on an application results tracker, contemplating content beyond
the criterion itself, since the criteria are already published for all applicants in Section 122.402.
The surrounding provisions read the same way. Section 122.308 requires that an applicant “be
notified of the reasons for the determination.” Section 123.501(c) secures the right to “a clear
and defined reason” for denial., and Section 123.501(d) the right to request information
pertaining to that reason. Section 121.103 requires the authority to indicate all attributes of merit
and demerit. A regime in which a bare citation satisfies every one of these provisions at once
would nullify each of them.
The purpose of the duty is to make response and appeal possible. On the undisputed record, it
was not: the tracker carried only a citation to Section 122.402(a) (Exhibit E); Lt. Azap634
admitted that “all but about two factors were deemed indicative” while never identifying a single
factor (Exhibit H); and Capt. errcore closed the door on inquiry entirely, stating “I will not
respond to anything further” (Exhibit N). The Defendants’ own prior filing in this matter
conceded that Section 122.404 imposes a genuine duty. And while counsel has asserted that this
question has been resolved for the government in every prior case, no decision, docket, or court
has been identified, and the Court cannot defer to precedent that is asserted but never cited.
II. THE STATUTE CONTAINS NO SECURITY-INTEREST EXCEPTION, AND
ANY LEGITIMATE CONFIDENTIALITY CONCERN GOES TO THE FORM
OF THE REASONING, NOT ITS EXISTENCE.
No security qualification appears in Section 122.404 or anywhere in the
background-investigation provisions. Where the legislature intended exceptions and
qualifications within Section 307, it wrote them expressly: Section 307(c) enumerates five
specific exceptions to the bar on considering out-of-state activity; Section 307(f) contains
express expungement and clemency exceptions; Section 307(g) addresses restricted-state
residency. The omission of any security carve-out from the notice duty is presumed deliberate,
and the Court may not supply an exception the legislature declined to write.
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Nor have the Defendants ever identified a concrete security interest that specifying the reasoning
would impair. Identifying which statutory factors were deemed indicative discloses no
investigative methods; the factors themselves are published in the statute. The State’s own
uniform policy confirms that fairness and confidentiality coexist: by Order of July 12, 2026
(submitted as supplemental authority, Doc 26), the Attorney General has directed that in
administrative investigations, a more sensitive context where witness safety is directly at stake,
disclosure to the subject is the default, material may be withheld only narrowly, every
withholding must be documented and is reviewable, and even then a summary sufficient to
permit a meaningful response must ordinarily be provided. As the Attorney General put it,
procedural fairness to the subject and the protection of legitimate confidentiality interests are
complementary obligations, not competing ones. A fortiori, an applicant can be told which
factors failed him without any harm to security.
Practice proves the point. The Department of Transportation applied the identical criterion to the
identical evidence, engaged with that evidence, and reversed its determination to a pass (Exhibit
AA), without any suggestion that doing so compromised any interest of the State. At most, a
genuine and articulated confidentiality concern could shape the form of the reasoning provided,
through summary or redaction. It cannot justify providing no reasoning at all. The word “shall”
is not amended by administrative convenience or by the unexplained invocation of security.
III. CONSEQUENCE
Because the material historical facts are largely undisputed, and the facts operative here are
admitted, only a citation was provided, the factors were never identified, inquiry was refused,
and the exculpatory evidence was not considered (Exhibits E, F, H, N), resolution of the
questions presented in Plaintiff’s favor disposes of Counts I, II, and VI as a matter of law. The
fact-bound claims of biased review, retaliation, and arbitrary action would proceed on the
schedule the Court sets.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court set a response schedule for the Defendants on this
Memorandum, resolve the questions presented, and enter judgment for Plaintiff on Counts I, II,
and VI, together with such other relief as the Court deems just.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that on this date a true copy of this Memorandum was
served on counsel for the Defendants by electronic means through the case channel and e-filing
system.
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Respectfully Submitted,
_________________________
/s/ Halo4asin
HALO4ASIN
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Ridgeway State Bar License No. 18110
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