All dates and times are in ISO 8601 format unless otherwise specified.
Filed on 2026-09-04 (UTC+00:00)
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
THR33SIX8, an individual,
Plaintiff,
-against-
ALBERTWELLESLEY, in his official capacity as
associate director of the Ridgeway State Bar,
RASHHYYYY, and COMPLAINAINTS, who are
defendants under a pseudonym.
Defendants.
RSC-CV-8427
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
Presiding Judge: Hon. N/A
Pursuant to Rid. Rule Civ. Proc. 7.1(4), Plaintiff files this response to Defendant
rashhyyyy's motion to dismiss.
RESPONSE BODY
1. Opinions are not defenses to claims of fraud.
Defendant rashhyyyy writes in the motion to dismiss, "An opinion, expressly labeled as
such, cannot form the basis of a fraud claim as a matter of law."
The tort of fraud, of which the statute is 7 R. Stat. § 121.202, is when someone1
"intentionally deceives another party to secure unfair or unlawful gain, or deprive a victim of a
legal right." Ibid.
The fact that Defendant stated "in my opinion" is a weak defense to liability for this tort.
As he was the complainant, he had to submit true, evidence-backed claims of professional or
statutory misconduct. In showing truth, he must also deal with any inquiries that an ethics officer
of the Ridgeway State Bar would ask: which rule was violated? Does this evidence prove the
facts the complainant puts forward?
1 See also Rid. Rule Civ. Proc. 9(9)(9), which is where this tort is circularly defined. Other torts are also defined
around Ibid.
Fraud, here, would occur if he left out a material fact. The material fact here is that the
date of the facts was before the Bar Integrity Act, S12-19, was passed, which is now codified as
3 R. Stat. §§ 411.001–411.301. The statute prohibits persons from having their bar license if they
are either active criminals or have "more than fifteen (15) criminal charges upon their official
record." 3 R. Stat. § 411.101.
Furthermore, that part of the statute is invoked when "[it is] established by a
preponderance of the evidence" that the attorney is disqualified under Ibid. Id., at § 411.102. Per
rules, the cause to act on such "criminal" behavior is analogous to Rule of Professional Conduct
8.3(b) ("[it is professional misconduct for an attorney to] commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as an attorney in other respects").
Defendant rashhyyyy either knew, or should have known from the duty put upon him as a
complainant to the Ridgeway State Bar that both avenues lead to Plaintiff being punished by the
Ridgeway State Bar, but the statutory (i.e., derived from the Bar Integrity Act) avenue puts a
burden on itself and the other avenue that he would to prove that plaintiff is an "active criminal"
or the crime committed reflects adversely on the offender's status as an attorney.
So, he said this: "a certified attorney, actively representing clients in court should not be
committing such crimes. it paints a dark light on the bar and also the court system as a whole. If
[attorneys like Plaintiff] themselves are comfortable committing a crime, how the hell can clients
and judges trust them in a court room." Compl. Statement of Facts ¶ 20. Why did he say that? He
was trying to connect the criminal acts to Plaintiff's career as an attorney. It follows that the
"opinion" is synonymous with Rule 8.3(b), so it follows that the opinion was merely a threadbare
attempt at conjuring up a Rule 8.3(b) violation from the facts and evidence.
It should go without saying that with the evidence, his complaint could be seen as an
attempt to trigger 3 R. Stat. § 411.102 disqualification. However, the facts, the accompanied
evidence, and the complaint itself were when the Bar Integrity Act was not in effect. Just like
how he said that multiple witnesses could corroborate the occurence of the criminal acts, those
same witnesses can corroborate the fact that it all took place before the Bar Integrity Act was in
effect.
For him to say, "in my opinion," does not create any distance between him and liabiilty: it
only creates one nanometer between him and the responsibility put upon him as a complainant to
make truthful representations to the Ridgeway State Bar. He should have stressed that the facts
took place before the Bar Integrity Act was passed, and, as shown, he fraudulently connected the
criminal behavior to Plaintiff's career as an attorney. Yet, he did not. He made the complaint
hoping that the Ridgeway State Bar would overlook it. And he had a stake in this outcome
because of his knowledge of an impending class action against him.
In conclusion, the facts overpower the simple "in my opinion" defense.
2. There is a cause of action for abuse of process.
Defendant rashhyyyy writes that there is no cause of action for abuse of process because
the complaint was not vexatious, fraudulent, or frivolous. Considering the facts presented against
him, he would have to back this claim up. I will not fight this defense hands on: this is better
fought during trial—should there be one. Rather, I will re-state the claim.
First, if fraud has been committed through a "legal process", and injury has consequently
followed, there is a cause of action for abuse of process. 3 R. Stat. § 121.402. If a complaint is
fraudulent, then it has come from a lie, and, the complaint is therefore a product of committing
the tort of fraud. That means it is an a fortiori element of abuse of process when a complaint was
used as an instrument in committing the tort of fraud; the complaint itself can be frivolous or
vexatious, and it can also be fraudulent.
Should that a fortiori element fail, there is also the fact that the criminal behavior is not
related to Plaintiff's career as an attorney. Compl. Statement of Facts ¶¶ 19, 21. If it were related,
then it would involve something done in Plaintiff's capacity as an attorney. This hypothesis is
often repeated when it comes to judges and other government officials. E.g., Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) ("First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i. e.,
actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity") (emphasis added). Defendant's complaint
does not put forward any facts or evidence connecting the crime to Plaintiff's capacity as an
attorney: thus, no violation of the rules of professional conduct has occurred.
Finally, Defendant had a stake in getting Plaintiff's bar license suspended. There was a
class action against him, and Defendant admits to knowing the class action. So, because the
complaint was frivolous, and there was stake in seeing Plaintiff's suspension, the "to get another
in trouble" element of abuse of process is satisfied.
Since there was no violation, it follows that the complaint is groundless and therefore
frivolous. I need not repeat that the interim suspension that followed prevented me from being
the counsel of record in many civil cases.
Therefore, there is a cause of action for the tort of abuse of process, of which Defendant
rashhyyyy is the tortfeasor, who remains defenseless to this tort.
3. There is a cause of action for tortious interference.
Because the complaint has been amended, the grounds for the claim that there is no cause
of action has become outdated. It is now clear there is a cause of action for tortious intereference.
No detailed response follows.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Pursuant to Rid. Rule Civ. Proc. 7.1(4), Plaintiff prays for the following to occur as relief.
While this does apply to this Court to act accordingly, see Id., at 7(3), I believe it is not a motion,
and so there is no proposed order with this document. Nonetheless, Plaintiff prays:
1. that Defendant rashhyyyy's motion to dismiss be DENIED in full.
Respectfully submitted,
———————————————
/s/ thr33six8
Filer of this document and Plaintiff of the
above-titled civil action;
Licensed Attorney in the State of Ridgeway
since July 23rd, 2026 (R.S.B. License
#19302).
Timezone UTC–05:00.
/s/ TonyBlony492
The attorney of Plaintiff/Client thr33six8;
Licensed Attorney in the State of Ridgeway
since August 18th, 2026 (R.S.B. License
#19309)
Timezone UTC+02:00.
