ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
Citation:
BLOXWATCH_CD, et al., v. PALMER
POLICE DEPARTMENT,
RSC-AD-2774
DATE OF JUDGEMENT:
25th of May, Two Thousand and Twenty
Four
BLOXWATCH_CD
Plaintiff
and
Palmer Police Department
Defendant
RULING AND JUSTIFICATION
IN THE MATTER OF BLOXWATCH_CD V. PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT
I. Introduction
[1] During the employment application cycle for the Palmer Police Department, which
had opened on March 31st and closed on April 7th, both plaintiffs Varkus and
BloxWatch_CD applied for employment. However, they were denied on the basis of
being a supposed Alternative Account.
[2] On May 1st, BloxWatch_CD, in conjunction with Varkus, lodged an
Administrative Complaint against the Palmer Police Department, contending that the
department had engaged in prejudicial hiring practices as established by the
Administrative Procedure Act.
[3] Following this, on May 7th, Solicitor General Stickza of the Ridgeway
Department of Justice would file a response to the complaint where a lot of the facts
that were provided by the plaintiff went uncontested.
[4] Without contention in regards to Material Fact, the case thus became a matter of
law and a Motion for Summary Judgement was filed by the defence on May 11th. A
cross-motion would subsequently be filed by the plaintiffs on May 14th.
[5] The Motion for Summary Judgement is granted in favour of the Plaintiff.
II. Findings of Fact
[7] BloxWatch_CD and Varkus both applied for the Palmer Police Department
throughout the application cycle which started on March 31st and ended on April 7th.
Both individuals are members of good standing within the State of Ridgeway.
[8] Both plaintiffs had initially passed the primary screening and the application stage,
before being denied at the background check stage. This was due to the department’s
belief that the plaintiffs were alternative accounts.
[9] Attempts to obtain remedy were conducted by the plaintiffs, with their attorneys
issuing a Cease and Desist letter to the Department on April 15th, and a letter to the
Governors Review Board on April 22nd. Neither of these letters would receive a
response.
[10] When no response to the request for relief issued by the plaintiffs, a civil suit
would subsequently be filed on May 1st.
III. Legal Standard
[11] Rule 38(b) of the Ridgeway Civil Procedure states that the defendant is able to
“at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits move for a summary
judgement in his favour” as long as a “claim is asserted” against said defendant. It is
further stated in Rule 38(a) that a Summary Judgement may be rendered “on the issue
of liability alone” and may be “rendered against the moving party.” In addition to Rule
38 of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
states that when there is “no genuine dispute of Material Fact” the “movant is entitled
to judgement as a matter of law.”
[12] Numerous sections of the Administrative Procedure Act are discussed within the
complaints and attached Affidavits, such as:
2 R. Stat. § 3201: “A primary agency shall be any as so defined:
(iii) The Palmer Police Department”
2 R. Stat. § 3202: “A secondary agency shall be any as so defined:
(ii) The Ridgeway Parks Service”
2 R. Stat. § 3203: “An auxiliary agency shall be any as so defined”
2 R. Stat. § 3208: “Agencies and departments may promulgate additional rules,
policies, or procedures which would otherwise extend these provisions to disallow
employment in either a primary or secondary.”
2 R. Stat. § 3226: “A non-competitive hiring round shall be any hiring round where
the number of spots is not limited.”
2 R. Stat. § 3229: “Complaints about a department violating the principles of the merit
system shall be directed to the Governor, who shall in all cases, investigate and
adjudicate violations of these claims. The Governor may seek a written legal opinion
from the Attorney General as to the legality of the violations.”
2 R. Stat. § 3233: “Background checks shall be over an objective criteria that shall
remain static and non-subjective.”
2 R. Stat. § 3235: “Departments shall background check applicants and new-hires on
the following criteria:
(i) Likelihood that the individual is an alternate account; which shall be evaluated
under reasonableness.”
2 R. Stat. § 3240: “A prejudicial or unfair hiring practice is a hiring practice that does
not conform to what has been established by law.”
2 R. Stat. § 3241: “It is a violation of law to engage in prejudicial or unfair hiring
practices.”
2 R. Stat. § 3301: “A person can petition the administrative courts for review of a
prejudicial hiring practice.
(iii) The cause of action is limited to systematic violations of statutory procedure for
hiring practices. Specific situations regarding an individual shall be handled through
§2.6.”
2 R. Stat. § 3305: “The administrative courts shall have original jurisdiction over all
civil claims involving administrative action, or policy, or rules of a government
agency.”
2 R. Stat. § 3307: “The administrative courts shall have the power to grant equitable
remedy as necessary to ensure proper enforcement of law;”
2 R. Stat. § 3308: “The administrative court may issue declaratory relief when
necessary.”
2 R. Stat. § 3314: “An administrative claim is a claim of law and not a claim of fact
that an action was arbitrary or without due observance of law. Administrative claims
shall be heard and decided only by an administrative court judge.
[13] Throughout the affidavits attached regarding Summary Judgement, a number of
common law precedents are mentioned, such as:
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803): “It is the province and duty of the
courts to determine what the law is, not a State or Federal Agency.”
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984): “A
government agency must conform to any clear legislative statements when
interpreting and applying a law, but courts will give the agency deference in
ambiguous situations as long as its interpretation is reasonable.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986): “Summary judgement is
appropriate when the court is satisfied.”
Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 502 U.S. 129, 148 (1991): “An
agency’s interpretation of a statute is only relevant if it is the only one which
administers the statute. It is inappropriate for the agency’s interpretation to be
continued if it applies to other agencies.”
Capital Castings v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec., 171 Ariz. 57, 60 (App. 1992):
“Agency interpretation of rules do not bind the court, however they do hold value.”
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997): “When forming an interpretation
of a statute, it is necessary to consider the specific context in which the language was
used and the context of the statute as a whole.”
Johnson v. Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2292 (2021): “Chevron defence cannot be applied
when the statute is clear.”
[13] Further provided by the defence is Palmer Police Department Regulation
53-2024, which invokes 2 R. Stat. § 3235 and its policy regarding background checks.
It interprets an account being viewed “reasonably” as an alternative account on the
basis that it is “more likely than not” an alternative account.
IV. Analysis
[14] After submitting both of their briefs, the defence has submitted a motion for
summary judgement, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure.
Because a claim has been made against the defence, they are able to submit a motion
for summary judgement. The considerations which are necessary prior to granting
summary judgement are further established by both the Federal and Ridgeway Rules
of Civil Procedure, with it being possible to grant it when there is “no dispute of
Material Fact.” This is further reinforced by precedents such as Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett. In both complaints, many of the material facts which were provided within the
initial complaint have gone undisputed by the defence. As a result of this, Summary
Judgement is a viable option, and it is integral we now consider the legality of the
interpretation.
[15] The main argument which is provided by the defence in their affidavit attached in
support of summary judgement is that because the Administrative Procedure Act is
vague in its wording and does not clearly establish a universal framework, it is the
duty of the agencies which are bound by it to interpret it and form their own opinion
on how it is applied. This interpretation of statutes which are left vague is supported
by the ruling held in Chevron U. S. A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, where it is stated
that “government agencies must conform to clear legislative statements,” however
should a piece of legislation be left “ambiguous” the “interpretation” of the law is
valid as long as it is “reasonable.” When considering the argument put forward by the
defence, we must consider not only the provisions of 2 R. Stat § 3233 and 2 R. Stat §
3255, but also how it is applied in general to the other departments.
[16] Throughout the main argument which was provided by the plaintiff, they argue
that because of the fact that the provisions applied by 2 R. Stat § 3255 are applied
universally to agencies which are defined in 2 R. Stat § 3201 & 2 R. Stat § 3202 (of
which the Palmer Police Department is a part of), then the precedent Ardesanti v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service would overrule it. In Ardestani, the Court
held that the interpretation of the agency is able to be considered if it is the only one
which administers the statute. However, because of the fact that the statute is universal
for agencies of the state the actual legislation supersedes the interpretation of the
department. Previously, both individuals had been members of departments which
were required under 2 R. Stat § 3233 to perform Background Checks on incoming
individuals, and they had passed said background checks. The results of these
background checks do not supersede those of the Palmer Police Department, nor do
the Palmer Police Department’s background checks supersede the ones of that
department. It is because of this that the argument invoking Chevron which is made by
the defence is overcome by the plaintiff’s argument, due to the universality of 2 R.
Stat § 3225.
[17] Because of the fact that it is impossible for the interpretation of one agency to
supersede another, it can be argued that there is no objective criteria which is required
by 2 R. Stat § 3233. Because of the difference in results for different department’s
background checks, it indicates that there is not a universal system which exists in
order to verify whether or not one is an alternative account. Because of this fact, it is
integral that the courts establish a test to evaluate whether or not an account is an
alternative one. Should an account fail more than 2 of the following questions, it can
be reasonably considered an alternative account and receive a denial for their
background check:
[i] Is the account older than 180 days?
[ii] Is the account in groups besides the State of Ridgeway group?
[iii] Whether or not the statistics of an account align with others of that same
age range.
[iv] Whether or not the user has previously held positions that require a
background check.
[18] Because of the fact that the defence violated 2 R. Stat § 3233 and engaged in
prejudicial hiring practices as defined by 2 R. Stat § 3240, the Court grants the
following relief:
1. Defendant, by failing to conduct background checks as prescribed by 2 R. Stat.
§ 3233 has acted outside the bounds of law and has violated the rights afforded
to applicants by the Administrative Procedure Act.
2. Defendant is hereby ordered to begin conducting background checks in
compliance with State law and to use the above written test when doing so.
V. Conclusion
Therefore, the Court hereby grants the Petitioner's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment and denies the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Dated at the City of Palmer, in the State of Ridgeway this 27th day of March, 2024.
Administrative Court Judge Jyoungbird
