ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF RIDGEWAY
Civil Action No. RSC-AD-2774
RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent Palmer Police
Department, by and through the Solicitor General of Ridgeway, hereby respectfully moves this
Court for judgment as a matter of law. The grounds and authorities supporting this motion are set
forth in a Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment attached hereto.
Dated: May 11, 2024.
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Counsel for Respondent
BLOXWATCH_CD,
Petitioner,
v.
PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Respondent.
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF RIDGEWAY
Civil Action No. RSC-AD-2774
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BLOXWATCHD_CD,
Petitioner,
v.
PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Respondent.
1
LEGAL STANDARD
“A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted, or a declaratory
judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.’ Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b). The Administrative Court
decides “claim[s] of law and not claim[s] of fact * * *.” 2 R. Stat. § 3314. As such, summary
judgment is an appropriate forum to decide questions of law in the absence of issue with material
fact. Indeed, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where the court is satisfied * * * that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331
(1986). Given that there is no issue as to any material fact, Respondent is entitled to judgment.
ARGUMENT
I. The Palmer Police Department Retains Broad Discretion Under APA To Promulgate
Unrestrained, In-House Employment Requirements.
The Ridgeway Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) covers many areas of employment
law. From hiring practices to administrative determinations, the APA sets out procedure and
remedies for employees and employers alike. This suit falls under Section 3241 of the APA, which
alleges that PPD’s denial of Petitioners’ applications “is a prejudicial [and] unfair hiring practice.”
2 R. Stat. § 3241. In the context of Section 3241, a prejudicial or unfair hiring practice is one that
“does not conform to what has been established by law.” 2 R. Stat. § 3240. Petitioners’ one and
only argument is that PPD’s “objective” employment criteria does not conform to what has been
established by state law. Pl. Comp. ¶ 69-70. While the petitioners argue that the PPD’s criteria is
not “objective,” “non-subjective,” or “static,” the APA is silent on a universal framework; as such,
each individual agency is vested with broad discretion to command its own hiring requirements.1
1 This, of course, is not unreasonable; it is perfectly sensible that the Legislature encourages autonomy among state
agencies. Indeed, an agency that performs different duties in different jurisdictions cannot objectively determine if an
applicant satisfies a background check if the other agency is bound to the same employment requirements.
2
A. The Administrative Procedures Act Leaves Hiring Standards To Individual Agencies.
The APA offers no textual evidence to suggest that departments are bound to a universal
framework for minimum employment requirements. It does require, however, that background
checks are, at a minimum, based on an “objective criteria” that remains “static and non-subjective.”
2 R. Stat. § 3233. State departments are thus left to their own devices to interpret and determine
what preliminary criteria satisfies the APA’s threadbare objectivity requirements.2 Because the
APA does not mandate a central framework for preliminary requirements, the Palmer Police
Department, an entity empowered with the enforcement of hiring requirements, has interpreted the
broad scope of Section 2323, seeking to resolve the ambiguities within its silent language.
i. Primary Agencies’ Interpretation of Silent Law Hold Weight And Should Be
Afforded Credible Value In Statutory Jurisprudence.
Silent law is dangerous. So too is Section 3233 of the APA. The ambiguities of Section
3233 encourage an interpretive disaster which, in this case, is impending; its provisions are broad
and do not make mention of explicit minimum requirements for employment. Agencies are left in
the dust with little to no guidance regarding what employment requirements fit within the APA’s
narrow characterization. When, like in this case, the legislature “has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue,” the courts “do not simply impose [their] own construction on the
statute.” Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Rather, the courts
consider “whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id.
This is a judge-created doctrine known as Chevron deference. But where the terms of a statute are
clear and the ordinary canons of construction can resolve them, Chevron deference does not apply.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2292 (2021) (holding “Chevron deference does not
2 Agency discretion in promulgating their own hiring requirements—with a slight statutory burden—is not uncommon.
See, e.g., Hamlin v. Charter Township of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding employers may establish
minimum qualifications for a position but must show that it “actually imposes such requirements.”).
3
apply where the statute is clear.”). Here, the terms of the APA are not clear, and agencies who
enforce its provisions are left with the duty to broadly interpret them when they are silent.
The contours of Chevron deference are tricky, and its constitutionality is the subject of
escalating scrutiny in the U.S. Supreme Court. As it stands today, the Court seems poised to jettison
Chevron deference and the precedential value it assigns to agency interpretation. See Loper Bright
Enterprises v. Raimondo, cert. granted, 22-451 (argued Jan. 17, 2024). Despite the favorable
balance that Chevron deference affords agencies in their interpretations, we agree that an agency’s
interpretation of silent law should stop short of being weighed as precedential; after all, it is the
“province and duty” of the courts—not a state or federal agency—to ‘‘say what the law is.”
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). But even then, this Court should not disregard
agency interpretation in its entirety; instead, it should afford considerable weight to agency
interpretation without requiring the courts to apply it as binding authority.3
ii. The Palmer Police Department Interprets 2 R. Stat. § 3233 To The Effect of
Imposing Unrestrained, Individual Preliminary Employment Requirements.
“Agencies * * * may promulgate additional rules, policies, or procedures which would
otherwise extend these provisions to disallow employment in [the agency].” 2 R. Stat. § 3208.
Later noted in this statutory scheme is the minimal requirement of agencies to perform background
checks “over an objective criteria that * * * remain[s] static and non-subjective.” Stat. § 3233,
supra. As seen at Section 3208, the APA expressly empowers agencies to make their own policy
decisions regarding applicant requirements. And while the APA imposes a mandatory review of
applicants based on explicit criteria in Section 3235, the agencies’ broad authority to impose their
3 Even in states that have abolished doctrines similar to Chevron, deference to agency interpretation of laws that they
enforce are not entirely discounted. Arizona—a state that vehemently discourages the use of Chevron deference—has
even held that agency interpretation is persuasive and should be considered. See Capital Castings v. Arizona Dep't of
Economic Sec., 171 Ariz. 57, 60 (App. 1992) (“[A]lthough agency interpretations of their own rules do not bind this
Court, we regard them as highly persuasive.”). This Court should incorporate a similar respect here.
4
own rules and policies—which could very well disallow employment—still stands. This authority
is regulated by the objectivity requirements set out in Section 3233; and other than those explicit
requirements, the APA is silent as to what “rules, policies, or procedures” fall into the ambit of
objectiveness. Conversely, the APA’s silence has forced agencies to interpret the scope of § 3235.
Other than the eight factors that the APA explicitly requires agencies to consider in Section
3235, it leaves additional requirements to be promulgated and listed by each individual agency.
See Stat. § 3208, supra. Palmer Police Department reviewed the petitioners’ applications under
Section 3233’s objective criteria, and it concluded, through reasonableness, that the applicants
were alternate accounts—the applications were denied under 2. R. Stat. § 3235(i).4 But Section
3235 is broad, and it is unclear as to how agencies should apply the “reasonableness” standard.
Upon appeal of the denial of the petitioners’ applications, Palmer Police Department utilized an
in-house interpretation of “reasonableness,” and applied its own “rules * * * [and] policies” to
both determine the scope of reasonableness and impose its own set of requirements. (Dept. Pol.
53-2024). In its interpretation, the Palmer Police Department clarified the APA’s silence.
Rule 53-24 provides that the “reasonableness” standard for denying an application on the
basis of alternative account is broad. Ibid. at p. 2. The Palmer Police Department thus has a duty
to explore the veracity of what constitutes “reasonableness” when denying an application out of
concern that the applicant is an alternate account. And as the Palmer Police Department correctly
held, “reasonableness” means, at a minimum, “that it was a legitimate decision to deny the
applicant because, more likely than not, the account was an alternative.” Ibid. The Department
further acknowledges, consistent with the traditional understanding of “reasonableness,” that its
4 Section 3235(i) provides, in pertinent part:
“Departments shall background check applicants and new hires on the following criteria:
(i) Likelihood that the individual is an alternate account, which shall be
evaluated under reasonableness” * * *.
5
interpretation “is designed to remedy a ‘certain issue.’” Ibid. Rule 53-24 resolves perhaps the most
ambiguous provision in the APA. To this point, Rule 53-24 is perfectly reasonable; it seeks to
resolve a dangerous silence in the APA, and more importantly, it is consistent with the traditional
canons of statutory construction. See Chevron, supra, at 844.
1) Under Rule 53-24, it was perfectly reasonable to deny the petitioners’ applications
for employment to the Palmer Police Department.
If chances are good that an applicant is an alternative account, their application is subject
to heightened review. This scheme is patently clear throughout Rule 53-24, which expands the
APA’s shorthanded “reasonableness” standard. Using this Rule, the Palmer Police Department
evaluated and applied its interpretation of “reasonableness,” and in doing so, concluded that the
petitioners are more likely than not alternative accounts. On second review, this decision was
affirmed, and the petitioners’ applications were denied in full.
When reviewing applications, the Palmer Police Department reviews several factors,
including badges, inventory, clothing, and friends. On review of the petitioners’ applications, it
was determined that: (a) their accounts’ age did not justify the low number of badges on their
profiles; and (b) the accounts have barely purchased any game passes or items—with the exception
of a few free items and shirts and pants. Petitioner Varkrus is also flagged by the Ridgeway County
Sheriff’s Office for dealing items. Each of these findings not only point to common characteristics
of an alternative account but are also completely justified under Rule 53-24. As such, the Palmer
Police Department did not lapse in judgment, and its denial was within the bounds of the APA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should issue summary judgment.
6
Dated: May 11, 2024.
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Counsel for Respondent
