STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
BLOXWATCH_CD, et al.,
Petitioner(s),
v.
PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Respondent(s).
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Case Number: RSC-AD-2774
Presiding: Hon. jyoungbird
PETITIONERS’
CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PETITIONERS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PETITIONERS, BloxWatch_CD, and Varkrus, by and through the undersigned counsel,
submits this cross-motion in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 38, and
respectfully moves the court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Petitioners, rather than
the Respondent, because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the Petitioners
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Attached hereto and herewith is a memorandum of
law in support of the Petitioners’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposition to the
Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
May 14, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Clarke, Feelings & Associates, LLP.
Associate Attorney
R. Bar. No. 23102
Notsfeelings
Clarke, Feelings & Associates, LLP.
Partner
R. Bar. No. 21101
Attorneys for Petitioners
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
BLOXWATCH_CD, et al.,
Petitioner(s),
v.
PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Respondent(s).
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case Number: RSC-AD-2774
Presiding: Hon. jyoungbird
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS...............................................................................................................3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................ 4
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 5
STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................................5
STANDARD OF REVIEW........................................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENTS............................................................................................................................... 6
I. THE PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT CANNOT INTERPRET 2 R. STAT. § 3235
UNDER THE CHEVRON DEFERENCE.................................................................................6
a. Standard of Review.......................................................................................................... 6
b. Analysis............................................................................................................................6
II. THE CRITERIA THAT THE PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT APPLIES DRAWS
OUT THE SUBJECTIVE NATURE OF 2 R. STAT. § 3235.................................................... 7
a. Alternate Account Criteria............................................................................................... 7
b. The Chevron Deference & The Subjective Nature of Reasonable Grounds................... 7
III. THE CRITERIA THAT THE PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT APPLIES IS NOT
OBJECTIVE NOR STATIC...................................................................................................... 8
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................. 9
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986) ........................................................................................................... 5
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ........................................................................................................... 5
Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
502 U.S. 129 (1991) ........................................................................................................... 5
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337 (1997) ........................................................................................................... 7
Rules & Regulations Page
Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b) ....................................................................................................................... 5
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ....................................................................................................................... 5
Statutes Page
2 R. Stat. § 3235 ......................................................................................................................... 6, 7
2 R. Stat. § 3201 ............................................................................................................................ 6
2 R. Stat. § 3202 ............................................................................................................................ 6
2 R. Stat. § 3203 ............................................................................................................................ 6
2 R. Stat. § 3233 ..................................................................................................................... 7, 8, 9
Other Page
Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Rid. Supp. Ct., RSC-AD-2774 (2024) ........................................................................... 7, 8
Palmer Police Department Regulation 53-2024,
Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix A, ............................................ 8
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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INTRODUCTION
There is no genuine dispute as to the material facts in this case—the Respondent has
willingly conceded that Petitioner BloxWatch_CD and Petitioner Varkrus were denied
employment due to their background checks, which alleged that they were alternate accounts.
The remaining question is therefore whether the denial was lawful—a question of law rather than
fact. Accordingly, summary judgment, rather than a trial, is appropriate in order to adjudicate this
case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about April 13th, 2024, Petitioner BloxWatch_CD and Petitioner Varkrus were
denied employment into the Palmer Police Department because they failed their background
checks, under the likelihood that they were alternate accounts. On or about May 2nd, 2024,
Petitioner BloxWatch_CD and Petitioner Varkrus submitted an administrative claim against the
Palmer Police Department, alleging that this denial was unlawful and contrary to the
law—seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, a party is entitled to, “at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor.” Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Summary judgment is appropriate
when the movant shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and “the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Indeed, the “movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). A dispute about material fact is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” A fact is only “material” if it is critical to, or “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” Anderson, supra, at 248.
Petitioners agree with Respondent that there is no dispute to material fact—as such, this
motion will only consider why Petitioners, rather than Respondent, is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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ARGUMENTS
I. THE PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT CANNOT INTERPRET 2 R. STAT. §
3235 UNDER THE CHEVRON DEFERENCE
a. Standard of Review
In this matter, the court is reviewing the construction of 2 R. Stat. § 3235 by the Palmer
Police Department. When doing so, it is confronted with two questions—first, whether the
Senate “has spoken to the precise question at issue.” If the intent of the statute is clear, it is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give way to the intent of the Senate.
However, if the court determines that the Senate “has not directly addressed the precise question
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute.” Rather, the court
is met with a second question—“whether the agency’s answer is based on permissible
construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
b. Analysis
Of course, a court may only offer deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute
when that agency is the one who “administers” that statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). When agency interpretations of
statutes that “applies to all agencies”, and “is not administered by any one in particular,”
deference is “inappropriate.” Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 502 U.S. 129,
148 (1991).
2 R. Stat. § 3235 unequivocally denotes that “departments” shall background check
applicants, not a singular department or agency. This, in itself, indicates a broader application
across multiple agencies rather than singular authority vested in a specific department or agency.
Additionally, 2 R. Stat. §§§ 3201, 3202, 3203 defines “primary”, “secondary”, and “auxiliary”
agencies, not a singular agency. Undoubtedly, no single department or agency possesses
exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and implementation of 2 R. Stat. § 3235, rendering
deference under Chevron inappropriate. Chevron articulates the purpose of deference is to
recognize the expertise and institutional competence of administrative agencies in interpreting
statutes within their purview. However, when a statute applies broadly across multiple agencies
and is not administered by any one entity in particular, as is the case with 2 R. Stat. § 3235,
deference becomes untenable. Indeed, it is the own argument of Respondent that “each
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individual agency is vested with broad discretion to command its own hiring requirements.”
Resp’s. Mot. for Sum. Judg., at ¶ I (emphasis added).
In conclusion, the interpretation of 2 R. Stat. § 3235 by the Palmer Police Department
cannot be subject to Chevron deference. The statute applies broadly across multiple agencies,
lacks exclusive administrative oversight, and mandates background checks by “departments,” not
a singular department or agency. Thus, deference is inappropriate under the framework of
Chevron, as no single agency administers the statute.
II. THE CRITERIA THAT THE PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT APPLIES
DRAWS OUT THE SUBJECTIVE NATURE OF 2 R. STAT. § 3235
a. Alternate Account Criteria
Undoubtedly, the criteria that the Palmer Police Department applies—whether developed
by legislation or by the department itself—must remain “objective”, “static”, and
“non-subjective.” 2 R. Stat. § 3233.
The Palmer Police Department contends that they are “vested with broad discretion to
command its own hiring requirements,” due to the lack of a guiding light in the legislature on
what criteria to apply to individuals when determining if they are alternate accounts, under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Resp’s.
Mot. for Sum. Judg., at ¶ I. With this, the Palmer Police Department contends that the
reasonableness 2 R. Stat. § 3233 demands shall be “supported by reasonable grounds that the
account is more likely than not an alternative account.” We disagree that the reasonableness
demanded by the statute should be restricted to the meaning of “reasonable grounds.”
b. The Chevron Deference & The Subjective Nature of Reasonable Grounds
Without a doubt, the action that Palmer Police Department took by denying Petitioner
BloxWatch_CD and Petitioner Varkrus must be in line with the “permissible construction of the
statute,” that is, the interpretation must be both “reasonable” and “rational.” This is, after all, the
question left before the court. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). To be a reasonable statutory interpretation, the interpretation must
account for both “specific context in which [the] language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997).
2 R. Stat. § 3233 unequivocally denotes that the background check criteria shall remain
“non-subjective.” 2 R. Stat. § 3235 additionally makes clear that the likelihood that an individual
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is an alternate account shall be “evaluated under reasonableness.” The Palmer Police Department
now interprets this “reasonableness” to mean “reasonable grounds.”1 This is a significant
departure from what 2 R. Stat. § 3233 mandates, and as such, it is critical to examine the nature
of reasonable grounds, which inherently lacks the characteristics of non-subjectivity.
Naturally, reasonable grounds are subjective to the interpretation of the specific facts
regarding the circumstances in question. Unlike an objective criteria, based on concrete facts and
evidence, reasonable grounds rely on subjective interpretation and judgment. This subjectivity
introduces the potential for inconsistency, bias, and arbitrariness in decision-making,
undermining the integrity of the hiring process and violating the statutory mandate of
non-subjectivity.
Overall, in light of these considerations, the Palmer Police Department has departed from
the clear statutory language of 2 R. Stat. § 3233 and 2 R. Stat. § 3225. The court, in all respects,
cannot grant judicial deference to the Palmer Police Department as to the meaning of these
statutes—they have, ultimately, failed to construct the statute permissibly. Not only is their
interpretation wrong, it is unreasonable, it opens up prospective employees of the department to
the unlawful denial of their application, on the, albeit wrongly, grounds that they are an alternate
account.
III. THE CRITERIA THAT THE PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT APPLIES IS
NOT OBJECTIVE NOR STATIC
Petitioner Varkrus was denied employment in the Palmer Police Department due to
failing his background check. The reason for the failure of his background check is due to the
“likelihood that [he] is an alternate account.” Respondent Palmer Police Department justifies the
likelihood that the Petitioner Varkrus is an alternate account because his account age “did not
justify the low number of badges” and his account has “barely purchased any game passes or
items.” Resp’s. Mot. for Sum. Judg., at ¶ I(A)(ii)(1). The crux of Respondent’s argument is that
the Palmer Police Department “is vested with broad discretion to command its own hiring
requirements,” and can therefore use its own criteria to determine whether an individual is an
alternate account. See Resp’s. Mot. for Sum. Judg., at ¶ I. Regardless of who constructs the
alternate account criteria, it must—ultimately—remain objective, static, and non-subjective.
1 App. A., PPD Regulation Rule 54-2024,
https://drive.google.com/file/d/11pcg0JyDUB99ahQ38VLovAEcdBT8qp9F/view. Accessed 12 May. 2024.
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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The standard, therefore, is whether the criteria that the Palmer Police Department applies
is “objective”, “static”, and “non-subjective.” 2 R. Stat. § 3233.
Petitioner Varkrus was denied employment because he lacked badges, game passes, and
other items. Petitioner Varkrus created his account on September 7th, 2014. He has around 317
classic clothing, 289 accessories, 61 gamepasses, 1,686 badges, and 49 friends.
Now, we will turn to the employees of the Palmer Police Department—we will start with
Chief Commissioner_Jason. His account was created on March 15th, 2015. He has around 315
classic clothing, 49 accessories, 22 gamepasses, 439 badges, and 178 friends.
The account of Petitioner Varkrus was created in 2014, the account of
Commissioner_Jason was created in 2015. Let’s look to the differences in their accounts:
Petitioner Varkrus has 317 classic clothing while Commissioner_Jason has 315.
Petitioner Varkrus has 289 accessories while Commissioner_Jason has 49.
Petitioner Varkrus has 61 gamepasses while Commissioner_Jason has 22.
Petitioner Varkrus has 1,685 badges while Commissioner_Jason has 439.
Petitioner Varkrus has 56 friends while Commissioner_Jason has 178.
Petitioner Varkrus is suspected of being an alternate account because he, albeit wrongly,
lacks badges and has barely purchased any items. This is unreasonable—Petitioner Varkrus has
more clothing, accessories, gamepasses, and badges compared to Commissioner_Jason. Does the
Palmer Police Department also contend that their Chief is an alternate account? The criteria that
the Respondent uses must be “objective,” that is, it must have the goal of weeding out alternate
accounts. In its pursuit of this goal, it has failed, for Commissioner_Jason is considered an
alternate account on the same “reasonable grounds” as Petitioner Varkrus. It must also be
“non-subjective” and “static”—being based on facts, and remaining unchanging for each and
every individual. The very standards by which Petitioner Varkrus was judged align perfectly with
those indicating that the Chief of the Palmer Police Department operates as an alternate account.
As such, Commissioner_Jason should be considered an alternate account. If he is not, it is to
contend that this standard is not static—that it changes for every individual.
CONCLUSION
The Palmer Police Department cannot turn to the Chevron deference because they are not
the sole department or agency responsible for administering background checks. Regardless of
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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the criteria for determining whether an individual is an alternate account—developed by
legislature or department—the criteria must remain objective, static, and non-subjective.
However, we have shown in this motion that the Palmer Police Department has failed on all three
of these standards. For the foregoing reasons, the court shall grant the Petitioners’ Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment and deny the Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
May 14, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Clarke, Feelings & Associates, LLP.
Associate Attorney
R. Bar. No. 23102
Notsfeelings
Clarke, Feelings & Associates, LLP.
Partner
R. Bar. No. 21101
Attorneys for Petitioners
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
BLOXWATCH_CD, et al.,
Petitioner(s),
v.
PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Respondent(s).
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case Number: RSC-AD-2774
Presiding: Hon. jyoungbird
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nicklaus_s, do hereby certify that a copy of this document and the contents thereof has,
on May 14th, 2024, been served upon the opposing parties of the above-entitled matter and all
proceedings within.
May 14, 2024 So serviced,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Clarke, Feelings & Associates, LLP.
Associate Attorney
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Petitioners
LAW OFFICES OF CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES, LLP.
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