IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
notsfeelings,
Plaintiff,
v.
Matrix_oc,
Defendant.
___________________________/
CIVIL DIVISION
CASE NO.: 01-2025-CV-003569
JUDGE: HON. ENFORCEMENTBEYOND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS MATTER came before the Court by motion of Defendant matrix_oc. Defendant
believes that this case lacks legal merit and that it should be dismissed. Based on the foregoing,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED, for the reasons explained therein.
I. BACKGROUND
The defendant allegedly posted a photograph that “has been edited to superimpose one of
the defendant’s campaign shirts onto the torso and arms of the plaintiff” in channels of the State
of Ridgeway discord server. The campaign shirt in question supposedly reads: “MATRIX 2025”
and “ALL THE WAY”, written above and below a photograph of the defendant’s face,
respectively.
Defendant now files a motion to dismiss, stating primarily that the complaint does not
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Along with this, two other grounds to dismiss this
case are also presented:
I. Both claims are constitutionally barred as they seek to restrict protected political speech
under the First Amendment.
II. Plaintiff fails to allege specific and sufficient facts to establish actionable harm or
damages.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendant claims that misappropriation of name or likeness requires:
I. Use of the Plaintiff’s name or likeness;
II. Without consent;
III. For commercial benefit or personal gain.
Defendant states that, due to the lack of commercial purpose, it does not constitute
misappropriation of name or likeness. He cites Parsi. See Parisi v. Sinclair, 845 F. Supp. 2d 215
(D.D.C. 2012). Stating “the alleged image alteration was used in the context of political speech,
which is distinct from commercial activity”. Branching off of this statement, the case ruling also
states:
“To state a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must allege the following:
(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff;
(2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party;
(3) that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence;
(4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm
or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm”.
To assert whether or not the cause of action for defamation survives, it will be analysed
according to these four points. Firstly, defamation is defined as “the act of communicating false
statements about a person that injures the reputation of that person”. It can be deemed
reasonable to assume that the statement, in this case the posted image, could at the very least be
subject to a raised eyebrow.
Due to the parties being adversaries in a political race for office, it is deemed unlikely
that an opponent, who has not formally conceded their campaign, suddenly outs their support of
their opponent.
Second, did the defendant publish the statement (that did not apply to any category of
privilege) to a party other than the plaintiff? The court answers in the affirmative, as the image
was posted to a communications channel that was publicly accessible to all citizens of the state
of Ridgeway. Furthermore, to answer whether the information was privileged, the court looks at
the four common types of privilege:
I. Absolute privilege
II. Qualified privilege
III. Fair report privilege
IV. Neutral report privilege
The statements to typically fall under absolute privilege are those made in judicial or
legislative proceedings, or by officials in the course of their duties. A campaign for re-election is
a private matter and thus not protected under such privilege.
Qualified privilege applies when the speaker has a moral, legal, or ethical duty to
communicate the statement, and the audience has a reciprocal interest in hearing it. The court
does not find that the defendant had a moral, legal or ethical duty to release this image.
The fair and neutral report privileges protect accurate reporting of official proceedings or
public meetings. The keyword being “accurate”. As mentioned in the analysis of the first point of
the four-pronged test, the accuracy of this report of events is at the center of the lawsuit. As such,
the fair report privilege can not apply.
Third: did the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amount to at least negligence?
Negligence is defined as the “failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in like circumstances”. It is hard to believe that this image was authentic (see above)
and so it can be attributed to at least reckless behaviour on the part of the defendant, he would or
should have known that this image did not portray the situation accurately.
Finally: was- or could there be harm inflicted by this image being posted to the citizens of
the State? It is reasonable to assume that not all citizens eligible to vote might have scrutinised
the image. As such, it is likely that voters could have been swayed by the image’s content.
Further, the defendant claims this image falls under first amendment protection, namely
parody and satire. Satire is defined as “a literary work holding up human vices and follies to
ridicule or scorn”. Parody is defined as “a literary or musical work in which the style of an
author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule”.
For it to fall under either of these categories, it must clearly demonstrate these attributes.
An example of satire are caricatures in the newspaper where things are exaggerated on purpose.
A parody is essentially a copy of the original work with the intent to ridicule or for comedic
effect. The court does not find this image to fit into either category.
Defendant further claims that the plaintiff fails to state a claim for false light, and that, for
this claim to succeed, plaintiff must prove:
I. Respondent publicized a false statement or depiction placing Plaintiff in a
false light highly offensive to a reasonable person.
II. Respondent acted with actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth.
The plaintiff counters by stating that “the content must be offensive to a ‘reasonable
person’. The reasonable person standard is objective.“ Citing Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.)
467, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (Court of Common Pleas 1837). He goes on to further explain this by
sketching a scenario: “(...) if President Donald Trump released images of Representative
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez which implies Ms. Ocasio-Cortez’s endorsement of him, despite their
very public disagreements.” and concludes by stating: that would certainly pass the reasonable
person standard as offensive, and the same applies here and now.
The court deems that, indeed, being associated with someone or something you do not
represent can be seen as offensive, especially if this has not been confirmed by the person being
depicted as the endorser. Secondly, the court deems it to be highly unlikely that the defendant
was unaware that the plaintiff would not be endorsing him, as they are political rivals. The court
deems that the image was recklessly posted with a disregard for a true depiction of facts.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court holds that the defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED in chambers in Milton, Ridgeway
County, Ridgeway, this 26th day of January, 2025.
/s/ bommes
BOMMES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies to: Plaintiff / Defendant
