IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
ZONED_JJ,
Petitioner,
v.
O_RANGEGAMING,
Respondent.
Case No. RSC-CV-3395
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Zoned_JJ, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby petitions for a writ
of habeas corpus, requesting this court to issue relief consistent with habeas procedure under
law. Habeas corpus proceedings are recognized under state law and Rid. R. Civ. P. 54(a)(1)(1).
JURISDICTION & VENUE
1. This Court retains jurisdiction pursuant to Art. V, Sec. IV of the State Constitution,
which states that “[t]here shall be a Superior court which shall exercise original
jurisdiction for all civil and criminal cases or controversies…”
2. This Court retains further jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to 1 R.
Stat. § 2210.
3. Venue is proper as the actions as alleged in this petition took place within Ridgeway
County, State of Ridgeway.
FACTUAL STATEMENTS
4. On or about the date of August 4th, 2024, the petitioner was driving around the City of
Sterling in his Pink Pioneer. During driving, he caught himself in the middle of a vehicle
pursuit being partaken by multiple departments, including the Ridgeway Park Service,
Palmer Police Department, and Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office.
5. Upon being caught in this ordeal, the petitioner immediately tried exiting and allowing
law enforcement officers to continue in their pursuit.
6. Unfortunately, the petitioner drove in front of a Ridgeway Park Service vehicle, driven
by Park Ranger o_rangegaming, the respondent. After driving in front of this vehicle, the
respondent immediately got out of his vehicle, drew his taser, pulled the petitioner out of
his vehicle, and took him into custody, charging him under R.C.C. § 2.07, Obstruction of
Justice for “obstructing officers from apprehending their suspect[.]” See Arrest Report
(ID: 202484749e15228).
CAUSE OF ACTION
(Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus - 1 R. Stat. § 2210)
7. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as reference as if fully set forth herein.
8. In assessing habeas petitions, this Court must determine “whether the police were legally
entitled to make that arrest — that is, the police either had a judicial warrant ordering an
arrest, or the police had probable cause that a crime was committed.” See In re
ZachCasisbeast, RSC-CV-367 (2022). If the arrest was not lawful at the outset, “the
inquiry ends there; the record must be removed.” Id. If not, the next and final question is
whether the petitioner was actually innocent of the charge or charges for which they were
arrested.” This means determining whether a “reasonable and well-informed jury could
not convict the petitioner in a hypothetical trial if they were aware of those facts, and
those facts were admissible evidence.” Id.
9. The Obstruction of Justice statute reads that obstruction of justice is “[t]he act of
interfering with the process of justice and hindering any county official or law
enforcement officer from performing their duties.”
10. To satisfy this charge, the petitioner must have (1) interfered with the process of justice;
and (2) hindered any county official or law enforcement officer from performing their
duties.
11. Similarly to many other statutes, Obstruction of Justice does not define some of its terms,
including what a “process of justice” is. As such, this court must defer to its “ordinary
meaning.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 2006 (2012).
12. Courts before us have spoken on what a “process of justice” is. For example, the
Supreme Court of the United States has spoken on terms similar to the general meaning
of a process of justice, inferring that such is a term relating to a judicial process. See
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (“The action taken by the accused
must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough
that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation
independent of the court's or grand jury's authority.”).
13. In the State of Ridgeway, when you are arrested by a law enforcement officer, you are
not brought to court or anything of the sorts. Instead, you are sentenced in jail for a
certain amount of time–that being in this case 10-20 minutes–by discretion of the
arresting officer, and immediately released with a record of arrest, with no further action
done.
14. This, inherently, cannot be in regards to a judicial process. Indeed, generally, a judicial
process “refers to the legal proceedings and actions taken in a court of law.”1 The
petitioner could not have possibly been interfering with a judicial process because law
enforcement officers chasing an individual who is fleeing does not meet the above
definition of a judicial process. An attempt to arrest conducted by a law enforcement
officer is not an action done “in a court of law.” As such, because the arresting officer
lacked probable cause to effectuate the arrest, “the record must be removed.”
ZachCasisbeast, supra.
1 LSDefine Legal Dictionary
https://www.lsd.law/define/judicial-process#:~:text=Judicial%20process%20refers%20to%20the,the%20final%20ju
dgment%20or%20determination. (Accessed 05 August 2024)
15. But even if this Court does not accept that a process of justice is referring to a judicial
process, we now go to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals who has spoken on this term
of the “process of justice” in relation to a similar statute.
16. In Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch ("Valenzuela Gallardo I "), 818 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2016),
the Court spoke considered the Board of Immigration Appeals’ new definition of "an
offense relating to obstruction of justice" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) as the "the
affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of
justice." Id. at 811.
17. Similar to Ridgeway’s Obstruction of Justice statute, the Board of Immigration Appeals
did not give an indication of what a “process of justice” is or what is included in a
“process of justice”.
18. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall
[...] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
19. The “[v]agueness doctrine is an outgrowth [...] of [that clause]. A conviction fails to
comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that
it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008). “What renders a
statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine
whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the
indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is. Thus, we have struck down statutes that tied
criminal culpability to [...] wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions,
narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.” Id. at 306, 128 S.Ct. 1830. “The
prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law,’ and a
statute that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due process.’” Johnson v. United States,
supra, 135 S.Ct. at 2556–57 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46
S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)).
20. The Court held that the Board of Immigration Appeals’ usage of “process of
justice”—just like Ridgeway’s Obstruction of Justice statute—raised "grave
constitutional concerns" because it used "an amorphous phrase—‘process of
justice’—without telling us what that phrase means." Lynch, supra, at 822.
21. As the Court agrees, the term “process of justice” as used in the Obstruction of Justice
statute is very vague. Although the Court invoked the constitutional avoidance doctrine
and did not specifically answer whether the statute is in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, this Court should still take their opinion as extremely persuasive in regards
to determining whether a “reasonable and well-informed jury could not convict the
petitioner in a hypothetical trial if they were aware of those facts, and those facts were
admissible evidence.” supra.
22. Because the Obstruction of Justice statute is extremely vague and undefined as to what a
“process of justice” is, it is not possible for a “reasonable and well-informed jury” to
convict the petitioner on such a charge. As such, “the record must be removed.”
ZachCasisbeast, supra.
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
23. Expungement of the arrest arising from this incident (ID: 202484749e15228).
Date: 08/05/2024
_________________________________
JamesGardai, Esq.
Senior Associate
CLARKE, FEELINGS & ASSOCIATES
Ridgeway Bar No. 24101
652 Palmer Blvd, Palmer Plaza Suite 6020
Palmer, Ridgeway
fishfromocean
Counsel of Record
