IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
THR33SIX8,
Plaintiff,
v.
O72YSS, in his quasi-official and individual
capacities,
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-3384
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant in this matter is represented by the State with respect to both counts alleged
against him. Defendant submitted, through counsel, a motion to dismiss the second cause of
action (deprivation of rights under color of law) listed here on the basis that qualified immunity
applies to the defendant. Plaintiff is correct in assessing that “The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U. S. 800, 818 (1982). Plaintiff also correctly assesses that reasonable mistakes of law, fact, or
both can give rise to qualified immunity claims. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004).
While an arrest does open the door for a lawsuit of this kind as protections against
arbitrary arrest are indeed ‘clearly established constitutional rights,’ Defendant makes a
compelling argument with respect to the existence of a mistake of fact. It is clear to the court,
and undisputed in this matter, that the warrant was already executed at the time of the plaintiff’s
second arrest. Despite this, though, I am convinced that the warrant did in fact still show in the
system. An affidavit submitted by the defendant personally and further investigation into the
official records done by my clerk allow me to conclude, based on all reasonable factors, and
without objection by any party, that the warrant was ‘showing’—so to speak— as ‘in-effect’ at
the time of the second arrest.
Because there was a good-faith belief, based on the (generally) reliable in-game warrant
system, there is a mistake of fact present in this matter. In determining whether it is reasonable,
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the court considers what a hypothetical reasonable officer would have done, given that
information. A warrant for the arrest of a person is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Warrants do not constitute requests, but rather are commands, not to be questioned and only to be
executed if all seems proper in form on the paperwork. In light of this, a reasonable law
enforcement officer is very likely to have acted the same way, and proceeded with an arrest.
"After all, 'in a situation in which a warrant has issued upon probable cause, a police officer is
not called upon either to exercise discretion or to weigh the proof.'" Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241,
247 (4th Cir. 2017), citing Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 1999). Qualified immunity
clearly must then apply to the defendant with respect to the second cause of action.
ORDER
The motion to dismiss is GRANTED, the second cause of action is DISMISSED with
prejudice, nunc pro tunc to August 18, 2024.
Done: August 28, 2024 SO ORDERED:
At Palmer, Ridgeway
_______________________________
Hon. notsfeelings
Superior Court Judge
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