THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
Justthejudge1,
Plaintiff,
v.
TheOriginalSheriftom, in his individual
capacity.
Defendant.
Case Number: RSC-CV-3340
Presiding: Hon. ArthurSprings
_____Plaintiff Justthejudge1, by and through counsel, files this response in
opposition to Defendant TheOriginalSheriftom’s Rid. Civ. Pro R.12(a)(5) motion
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this
Court deny Defendant’s motion. Attached hereto is a memorandum of points and
authorities rebuking dismissal.
Respectfully submitted,
CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
s/___________________________
Singhski, Esq.
Ridgeway Bar No.25100
Counsel of Record
President,
Center for Individual Rights
T: (505) 503-4455
THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
Justthejudge1,
Plaintiff,
v.
Theoriginalsheriftom, in his individual
capacity.
Defendant.
Case No. RSC-CV-3340
RESPONSE TO THE MOTION TO
DISMISS
Presiding Judge: Hon. ArthurSprings
LEGAL STANDARD
_____In reviewing a Motion to Dismiss, the Court must accept all factual
allegations in the Complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable
to the Plaintiff. The Motion to Dismiss should be denied if the complaint states a
plausible claim to relief. See Bell Atl. Corp v Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007). It
is “only the extraordinary cases in which dismissal is proper” for failure to state a
claim. See United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.
1981). The Court may only dismiss a complaint as a matter of law only if the
complaint: (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory; or fails to to support a cognizable
legal claim. Robertson v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534, (9th Cir.
1984). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim can be granted under Rid.
Civ. Pro. R. 12(a)(5) and 28(b)(2) but should not be granted unless it appears that
beyond unreasonable doubt, that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
their claim which would entitle them to relief, (See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
ARGUMENTS
I. PEACE OFFICERS DO OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO THE
PLAINTIFF
The Plaintiff sees that this argument be countered first in our reply to the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Defendant makes an extremely absurd
assertion that peace officers do not owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff. That is
patently false, and the case cited by the Defendant also supports our reply brief.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago City. DSS, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); ‘‘the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state or local
governmental entity to protect its citizens from ‘‘private violence, or other mishaps
not attributable to the conduct of its employees.’’. It appears that the defense has
very purposefully omitted the citation in order to brew a liquid of confusion to feed
the Court. What the Supreme Court actually held in DeShaney was that peace
officers do not owe a duty of care to citizens from violence not inflicted by the
conduct of its employees. In this case, that is quite contrary. If we construed the
facts in our favor, the Defendant, due to reckless conduct, smashed the front of his
police cruiser into the back of the Plaintiff’s truck. Under the standard set in
DeShaney, the Defendant is liable for his actions, because he owes a duty of care to
the citizens of the State of Ridgeway in the form of appropriate conduct.
II. PER THE STANDARD IN THE MOTION TO DISMISS, THE
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS SUFFICIENT.
The Defendant’s reply lists three standards to ensure the sufficiency of a
civil complaint. The first standard, standard (a) is: ‘‘the Defendant owed a duty of
care to the Plaintiff–-per the standard set in DeShaney— he does. The second
standard, standard (b) reads: ‘‘the Defendant broke that duty of care’’ — with his
reckless conduct, smashing into the back of the Plaintiff’s car with his police
vehicle—he did. The third standard reads: ‘‘the Plaintiff became injured as a result
of that breach of duty’’ — he suffered damage to his property, and was put in
danger from the conduct of the Defendant— he did.
CONCLUSION
The Honorable Court should deny the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
s/___________________________
Singhski, Esq.
Ridgeway Bar No.25100
Counsel of Record
President,
Center for Individual Rights
T: (505) 503-4455
