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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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SNIPERALLSTAR1,
Plaintiff,
v.
PRINZBAKYL,
Defendant.
MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
COMES NOW Defendant PrinzBakyl (the “Defendant”), by his undersigned attorney, and
hereby moves this Honorable Court for an order vacating the Judgment by Default entered on August
3, 2024, and permitting them to enter a defense in the above-captioned case. See Rid. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff SniperAllStar1 (the “Plaintiff”) filed the Original Civil
Complaint against the Defendant in this Court. It alleged that, between the late afternoon and early
evening of two days prior, the Defendant had engaged in an unrelenting series of tortious behaviors
that physically harmed the Plaintiff.
2. An attorney for the Plaintiff appeared and submitted an ambiguous request to the
presiding magistrate judge for permission to serve process, which was subsequently granted. Minutes
later, this attorney would inform the magistrate judge that he himself had furnished the process to the
Defendant via the direct messaging feature on a popular social media platform–Discord.
3. The Defendant, through his representation, responded only by filing the Special and
Limited Appearance to dispute the validity of the service of process. The Motion to Quash posited
that the service of process was not effectuated in accordance with the relevant rules. Specifically, the
Defendant contended that the Plaintiff’s attorney did not fit any descriptions listed under Rid. R. Civ.
P. 4(c), which restricts who is authorized to serve process in a civil case, and that, even if the
Plaintiff’s attorney was authorized, procedural due process requirements preclude using an interested
party to serve process.
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4. The Plaintiff’s attorney countered this assessment, stating that Rid. R. Civ. P. 4(c)
empowers a judge to appoint an individual to serve process, and it is customary for judges to appoint
plaintiffs’ attorneys to serve process.
5. Upon reviewing the arguments, the magistrate judge clarified that his granting of the
ambiguous request made by the Plaintiff’s attorney was intended to appoint him to serve process, not
just to sign off on the summons and ask for its service to be arranged, as the Defendant had assumed.
For this reason, chief among others, the magistrate judge denied the motion to quash. See Order
Denying the Defendant’s Motion to Quash.
6. Perceiving the Defendant’s dissatisfaction with the ruling, the presiding state court
judge hinted that the Defendant ought to solicit a reconsideration. The Defendant was given ten
minutes to do so orally and, in doing so, focused on the fact that most other jurisdictions make a
conscious effort to restrict persons with an interest in the case's outcome from serving process. The
Defendant reaffirmed that this phenomenon is attributable to procedural due process requirements.
7. In his Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider, the state court judge provided four
motives for his decision: (1) the Plaintiff’s attorney was appointed to serve process pursuant to Rid. R.
Civ. P. 4(c), and that rule does not explicitly state that such an appointee must be a disinterested party;
(2) the Plaintiff’s attorney is an officer of every court in which they are licensed to appear and thus
holds a level of trust sufficient to support their appointment to serve process; (3) since its inception,
the Superior Court of the State of Ridgeway has appointed plaintiffs or their attorneys to serve
process; and (4) at least one jurisdiction has rules—namely, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—that qualifies plaintiffs to serve process. See Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider.
8. With the exhaustion of the Special and Limited Appearance and the Defendant’s
failure to swiftly execute the contract with his representation required for a general appearance, this
Court determined that the Defendant had inadequately presented a defense within the allowed
timeframe and consequently ordered the controverted Judgment by Default.
9. The Defendant, reminded of the above-captioned case by the Judgment by Default,
sought to rectify his transgression by hastily contracting representation to submit the Petition for a
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Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Ridgway. The Petition expanded on the
arguments in the aforementioned Motion to Quash and the Motion to Reconsider.
10. The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was denied, not because of its merits, but because
the Defendant had not depleted all available remedies in this Court. See Justice Robert H. Jackson
(@shitterowner), Discord (Aug. 4, 2024, 5:02 PM), https://bit.ly/4ceP3mv.
ARGUMENT
I. THE ILLINOIS STANDARD IS PERSUASIVE
11. Rid. R. Civ. P. 37(c) states that “[f]or good cause shown [this Court] may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment has been entered, may likewise set it aside.”
12. Virtually every jurisdiction has a rule of procedure resembling Rid. R. Civ. P. 37(c)
and reached the same conclusion: the cause needing to be shown in a timely filed motion to vacate,
though good, need not be extraordinary. See, e.g., In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886.
13. “Where a litigant seeks to set aside a default…within 30 days…, the litigant need not
necessarily show the existence of a meritorious defense and a reasonable excuse for not having timely
asserted such defense.” Id. at ¶ 57 (citation omitted). Like in the State of Ridgeway, no rule of
procedure explicitly creates this standard in Illinois. Still, Illinois, like many, has adopted it because
“entry of default is a drastic remedy that should be used only as a last resort.” Id. at ¶ 69 (citation
omitted). “Our judicial system operates on the philosophy that, if possible, litigation should be
determined on the merits and according to the substantive rights of the parties.” Parmar v. Rai, 2023
IL App (1st) 211339-U, ¶ 41 (citing In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 69).
14. The reasoning employed in Illinois on this matter is not restricted to that jurisdiction.
Again, all courts should, and most do, adhere to the principle that a judgment by default is a drastic
remedy to be employed only when absolutely necessary. Anything less might not guarantee that
“substantial justice is being done between the litigants.” In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 57.
Residents of the State of Ridgeway deserve to be confident, as they would be elsewhere, that their
courts do all that is possible to guarantee substantial justice.
II. THIS MOTION MEETS THE PERSUASIVE ILLINOIS STANDARD
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15. The Defendant has made a coordinated effort to defend himself against the Plaintiff’s
Original Civil Complaint. The Motion to Quash, Motion to Reconsider, and Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari raised many points that, while this Court erroneously may disagree with, demonstrate a
transparent engagement with this proceeding.
16. Admittedly, when the Special and Limited Appearance was exhausted, the Defendant
did not immediately (i.e., within five days) sign a contract securing representation for him once more.
That said, he did not abandon his defense in its totality. On the record, he did note that he has “been
super busy.” PrinzBakyl (@graetwhiteshark), Discord (Jul. 31, 2024, 1:14 PM),
https://bit.ly/46CI6dM. While he could have handled the situation better, under influential Illinois
doctrine, his transgression does not warrant that the Judgment by Default is unmoved following a
timely motion to vacate.
17. All facts indicate that the above-captioned case can still be resolved on its merits
without notable prejudice to the Plaintiff, even considering the Defendant's brief lapse in resecuring
representation. Therefore, this Court should vacate the Judgment by Default to guarantee substantial
justice is being done between the litigants.
III. THE FEDERAL STANDARD IS PERSUASIVE
18. To vacate a judgment by default in federal court, a litigant must show more compared
to what would be necessary in Illinois. Still, they need not show a great deal.
19. “In deciding a motion to vacate a default judgment, the district court is to be guided
principally by three factors: (1) whether the default was willful, (2) whether the defendant
demonstrates the existence of a meritorious defense, and (3) whether, and to what extent, vacating the
default will cause the nondefaulting party prejudice.” S.E.C. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir.
1998) (citation omitted).
20. “[A]ll doubts must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from the judgment
in order to ensure that to the extent possible, disputes are resolved on their merits." New York v. Green,
420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
IV. THIS MOTION MEETS THE PERSUASIVE FEDERAL STANDARD
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21. No section of the record indicates that the judgment by default was the will of the
Defendant. In fact, the record suggests the opposite. Prior to the entry of the judgment by default, the
Defendant remarked that he has recently “been super busy,” which, given how ROBLOX should be
prioritized in one’s life, makes it likely that the Defendant simply forgot to respond to the legal action
due to his preoccupation with other, more important, matters. PrinzBakyl (@graetwhiteshark),
Discord (Jul. 31, 2024, 1:14 PM), https://bit.ly/46CI6dM. Of course, to be deemed willful, the
Defendant’s “failure to file an answer to the complaint” must be “the result of a shortcoming more
culpable than negligence or even gross negligence.” McNulty, 137 F.3d at 738.
22. “In order to make a sufficient showing of a meritorious defense in connection with a
motion to vacate a default judgment, the [D]efendant need not establish his defense conclusively”
McNulty, 137 F.3d at 740 (citation omitted). “Defendants' allegations are meritorious if they contain
‘even a hint of a suggestion’ which, proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense.” Keegel v.
Key West Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Moldwood Corp. v.
Stutts, 410 F.2d 351, 352 (5th Cir. 1969)). Merely alleging a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
denying the commission of tortious acts, “[t]hough somewhat broad and conclusory…[,] adequately
meet[s] the meritorious defense criterion for setting aside the default.” Ibid. The Defendant, in the
instant case, maintains, inter alia, that he has a complete defense insofar as he denies specific
allegations made by the Plaintiff that are required to establish the causes of actions raised.
23. The Plaintiff will not experience prejudice if the Judgment by Default is vacated,
other than having to wait an additional five days for the case to be resolved. No authority exemplifies
that this sort of brief delay deserves consideration.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Defendant moves for an order vacating the Judgment by Default.
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August 4, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
_______________________
Notableants
Attorney for Defendant PrinzBakyl
Advocates for Disabled Defendants
E: [email protected]
P: +1 (120) JUS-TICE
101 Justice Ave.
Lumina Springs, RW 00000
United States of America
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COMPLAINT
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Notes
DOCUMENT CONTROL NO. #02-JSE.pdf — archived from the Trello docket (https://trello.com/c/D8kFxyb6)
