Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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1 RSC-CV-3286 Document 5 07-24-2024 THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT JOSEPHRICHMOND, Petitioner-Plaintiff, v. CHICKEN10135, in their official capacity as a Deputy in the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office, Respondent-Defendant. Case No. RSC-CV-3286 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Presiding Judge: t1dtony PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND COMPLAINT Petitioner-Plaintiff, JosephRichmond, by and through undersigned counsel hereby brings this action against Chicken10135 and in support thereof alleges as follows – ALLEGATIONS 1. On the 8th of July, 2024, the Petitioner-Plaintiff JosephRichmond, hereinafter referred to as either “Petitioner” or “Plaintiff” took a turn into the Sterling Railyard Entrance’s parking lot where he communicated with three deputies standing in the railyard asking “what are COs doing in the wild”. 2. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent-Defendant Chicken10135 hereinafter referred to as either “Respondent” or “Defendant” pulled into the parking lot to pick up the deputies at the railyard’s parking lot. 2 3. As day turned to night, Petitioner (who did not have his headlights on as it was day) whilst trying to leave the railyard’s parking lot was behind the Respondent’s department-issued police vehicle. 4. Respondent then proceeded to abruptly turn into the Petitioner’s vehicle's path and wail using his vehicle’s siren control box. 5. Respondent then proceeded to say to the Petitioner “Headlights buddy” an order pursuant to 7 R. Stat § 7.17 which reads; “The act of operating a motor vehicle without utilizing headlights at night, during the rain, or during a thunderstorm”. 6. To this order given by the Respondent, Petitioner obliged and immediately turned on his headlights. 7. Petitioner then stated “we’re in the cd” and “it’s not a road”, and when Respondent left his car, Petitioner confirmed his headlights were on by flashing them to ensure the Respondent could visibly see the headlights. 8. Plaintiff was then detained and placed in the police vehicle and brought to the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO) Sub-station in Sterling Heights. 9. Plaintiff, at the RCSO’s Sub-station was charged and arrested for 2 R. Stat § 2.04 misdemeanor failure to comply, which, as stipulated by the Ridgeway State Code, holds a sentence of five (5) minutes incarceration. 10. Failure to comply is described by 2 R. Stat § 2.04 as; “The act of disobeying a lawful order which has been given by a peace officer prior.”. The Petitioner did not disobey the lawful order given by the Respondent as his headlight remained on during the brief conversation, and the headlights only 3 turned off when Petitioner was demonstrating to the Respondent that the headlights were indeed on and functioning, by flashing them. 11. Petitioner’s actions did not constitute/satisfy the description of the offense he was charged with. 12. Respondent Chicken10135 did not have probable cause to believe that the Petitioner was in violation of § 2.04. 13. Chicken10135 is certified to date as a peace officer by the Law Enforcement Training Center (“LETC”) .1 14. Chicken10135, as part of his training with the LETC received relevant education and/or training on the requirements for Failure to Comply and probable cause to make arrests. 15. Therefore, Chicken10135’s actions were unauthorized, and due to his background with the LETC, he knew these actions were unauthorized. PARTIES 16. Petitioner and Plaintiff JosephRichmond is a resident of the State of Ridgeway and an individual. 17. Respondent and Defendant Chicken10135 is a resident of the State of Ridgeway and a Deputy with the Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Office. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 18. The Court has original jurisdiction over this Complaint under Article V, Section IV of the Ridgeway Constitution. 22. 1 See Exhibit C. 4 19. Venue is proper in this Court because the tortious actions alleged in this Complaint occurred in Ridgeway County, State of Ridgeway. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Pursuant to the Judiciary Act, 1 R. Stat. § 2210, et seq.) Petitioner against Respondent in his quasi-official capacity as a Deputy with the RCSO 20. Petitioner incorporates the allegations within all prior paragraphs as if they were fully set wherein. 21. In analysis of 2 R. Stat § 2.04, we can establish that three things are required; a. There must be a lawful order. b. The order must be given by a peace officer. c. There must be disobedience to that order. 22. To charge an individual with failure to comply, all three prongs must be satisfied. The first two are satisfied, there was a lawful order, and the Respondent who gave this order was a peace officer, however, the last prong, prong c is not satisfied. “Disobedience” is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as “the failure or refusal to obey rules or someone in authority”. 23. The Petitioner’s actions do not satisfy the definition of disobedience as he did not fail to or refuse to [obey rules] or [someone in authority], in fact, his actions are quite contrary to the definition as the Petitioner was showing his 5 compliance with the lawful order by demonstrating his headlights were functioning to the Respondent .2 24. The Court should therefore grant this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus because the Petitioner is “actually innocent” of the offense for which he was arrested and/or there was a lack of probable cause to make the arrest. See In re Zachcasisbeast, 1 R. Supp., at 12 (2022) (frostbleed, J.) 25. Petitioner, pursuant to 1 R. Stat § 2210-12 is entitled to immediate expungement of the record dated Jul. 08, 2024 at 12:59 EST (Arrest record no. 202478d39ae26c8) .3 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Official Misconduct - 1 R. Stat § 3114 Plaintiff against Defendant in his quasi-official capacity as a Deputy with the RCSO 26. Petitioner incorporates the allegations within all prior paragraphs as if they were fully set wherein. 27. Whereas, the State of Ridgway Criminal Code protects citizens from being victims of Official Misconduct; 28. Whereas, Official Misconduct is defined in 1 R. Stat § 3104 as “Any individual who is a public servant and commits an act relating to his office but constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official functions, where a reasonable person with his training, expertise, and experiences should know that such act is unauthorized; or refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.” 3 See Exhibit B. 2 See Exhibit D. Respondent states that the reason he made the arrest was because the Plaintiff “taunt[ed] an officer of the law” – this reasoning is in fact not a reason to arrest someone for failure to comply as it is not a violation of the statute. 6 29. The Defendant “ [who is a public servant] commit[ted] an act relating to his office but constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official functions where a reasonable person with his training, expertise and experiences should know that such act is unauthorized”. 30. Probable cause is required to make any arrest, see Draper v United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) . This also means that to make an arrest for4 failure to comply, as the Defendant did, probable cause is required. Probable cause, as per the standard set in Draper v U.S. confirmed that probable cause for an arrest exists when facts and circumstances known to the officer would lead a prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense . (See also in re5 Zachcasisbeast). 31. Any prudent person would not be inclined to believe that an individual, who was flashing a headlight to show compliance with a lawful order has committed/is committing an offense. 32. Under the Ridgeway Constitution, persons have the right “to hold themselves … free from search or seizure.” Rid. Const. Art. I, Sec. III. The Defendant’s arrest was unsupported by probable cause and therefore constituted a violation of the rights of the Plaintiff protected by Ridgeway’s Constitution's Article I, Section III. In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 697 (1949), the Court held that when a public official exercises an “unconstitutional use of 5 See Exhibit D, although the Defendant acknowledges that the Plaintiff was in fact in compliance with his lawful order, the arrest was still made. 4 “In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act”. Officers must act on “reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” 7 power” their actions are not “validly authorized by the sovereign” .6 33. Defendant knew his actions were unauthorized because he did not have probable cause to believe that the Plaintiff had committed an arrestable crime. EVIDENCE Exhibit A - Video clip of the incident. Exhibit B - Arrest record no. 202478d39ae26c8. Exhibit C - Chicken10135’s Class 13 LETC certification. Exhibit D - Chicken10135’s acknowledgement that JosephRichmond was demonstrating that his headlights were functioning. 6 “For that reason, a suit for specific relief, to obtain the property, was not a suit against the sovereign, and could be maintained against the defendants as individuals.” 8 Respectfully submitted, CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS /s/_________________________ Singhski, Esq. Ridgeway Bar No.25100 Counsel of Record President, Center for Individual Rights T: (505) 503-4455 E: [email protected]

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