STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
CEQTF,
Defendant(s).
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Case Number: RSC-CM-3321
Presiding: Hon. notsfeelings
MOTION TO DISMISS
MOTION TO DISMISS
DEFENDANT, ceqtf, by and through the undersigned counsel, submits this
motion in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P. 13. Defendant
respectfully moves the court to dismiss the above-entitled matter because the court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or, in the alternative, dismiss counts one and
three for failure to state an offense. Attached hereto and herewith is a memorandum of
law in support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
August 16, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Ridgeway Public Defender’s Office
Appellate Division
Assistant Chief Public Defender
R. Bar. No. 23102
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Attorney for Defendant
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STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
CEQTF,
Defendant(s).
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case Number: RSC-CM-3321
Presiding: Hon. notsfeelings
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................4
STANDARD OF REVIEW............................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENTS....................................................................................................................5
I. The Defendant Was Served Improperly......................................................................5
II. Counts One and Three Do Not Meet Their Required Thresholds............................. 6
a. Arson..................................................................................................................... 7
b. Brandishing...........................................................................................................8
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................. 9
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a party may raise by
motion a “defense or objection which is capable of determination without trial of the
general issue.” Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(c)(2). Specifically, a challenge raising “a defect in
instituting the prosecution” or “a defect in the indictment or information” must be raised
in a pretrial motion “if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available and the
motion can be determined without a trial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). When
considering a motion to dismiss an indictment or information, it is an elementary rule that
“the allegations of the indictment must be taken as true.” Boyce Motor Lines v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n.16 (1952).
ARGUMENTS
I. The Defendant Was Served Improperly
Personal jurisdiction “is an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district court.”
So much so, that without it, “the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.”
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999). It “is the authority of a court
to issue a judgment that binds a defendant.” Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 143 S.
Ct. 2028, 845 (2023). And “service of summons is the procedure by which a
court…asserts” that jurisdiction. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
444-45 (1946). Of course, “[t]he requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction
flows…from the Due Process Clause.” Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). It “represents a restriction on judicial power…as a
matter of individual liberty.” Id. Thus, before a court “may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.”
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Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). And that service must be
“in compliance with applicable law.” Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 716 n.6.
Yet, this case is flawed—fatally so. The Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure
require that a defendant “be notified of the criminal proceedings against him and of the
date of the return day by means of a summons. A copy of the criminal information or
indictment shall accompany the summons.” Rid. R. Crim. P. 6(a)(1). In this case,
however, the defendant was only served with a copy of the summons. See Gov’s. Prof. of
Serv. Nonetheless, the “jurisdiction of the district court over parties is acquired only by a
service of process, or their voluntary appearance.” Herndon v. Ridgway, 58 U.S. 424
(1854). And undoubtedly, that service must be “in compliance with applicable law.” Ins.
Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 716 n.6. A court “must have the power to decide the claim before
it (subject-matter jurisdiction) and power over the parties before it (personal jurisdiction)
before it can resolve a case.” Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 563
(2017). And when a district court is “unable to hear a claim, because of lack of
jurisdiction or some other legal hindrance,” it “has no choice but to dismiss.” Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 136 (1995). When “a court can readily
determine that it lacks jurisdiction over…the defendant, the proper course would be to
dismiss on that ground.” Sinochem Intern. Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Intern. Shipping Corp., 549
U.S. 422, 436 (2007).
II. Counts One and Three Do Not Meet Their Required Thresholds
Individuals facing criminal prosecution in our state have a right “to demand the
cause and nature of the accusation” that the government has made. Rid. Const. art. I, sec.
VI. “A defendant’s right to notice of the charges against which he must defend is well
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established.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1996). Thus, a charging paper is
only sufficient if it: contains the elements of the offense charged, fairly informs a
defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and finally, enables him to plead
an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. See Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974).
Each and every count in this matter parrot one another. They merely tell a
story—they allege that the complainant parked his vehicle at the scene of a house fire and
then turned around to find the defendant fleeing the scene, after shooting and setting his
vehicle on fire. But this isn’t enough—quite the opposite: a charging paper “must allege
all the elements of the charged crime.” United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102,
111 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A count must “fully, directly, and expressly, without
any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense
intended to be punished.” United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881). The rule is
such that “all the material facts and circumstances embraced in the definition of the
offence must be stated, and that, if any essential element of the crime is omitted, such
omission cannot be supplied by intendment or implication. The charge must be made
directly and not inferentially or by way of recital.” Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S.
197, 202 (1893). This only makes sense—for “no indictment is sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege all the ingredients of which the offence is composed.”
United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 174 (1872).
a. Arson
The elements of arson are well-settled. In particular, an individual must (1) set fire
to property; (2) deliberately; (3) without consent of the owner; and (4) while in city or
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residential areas. See 4 R.C.C § 8. But the charging paper barely scratches the surface of
any of these elements.
Most importantly, the charging paper omits any allegation that the defendant
committed arson deliberately. Yet, a crime “is made up of acts and intent; and these must
be set forth in the indictment, with reasonable particularity of time, place, and
circumstances.” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875). By including the
word “deliberately” in the structure of the criminal statute, the legislature sought
explicitly to demand the inclusion of intent as an element. See, e.g., Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1951) (holding that the inclusion of “knowingly or
willingly” in 18 U.S.C. § 2385 demands an element of intent). When “criminal intent is
necessary to the crime, it must be charged in the indictment.” Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
United States, 208 U.S. 452, 471 (1908). If “intent is such a critical element of the
offense…notice of that element is required.” Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647
(1976). An accident is not the same as an intentional criminal act. By failing to allege
anything in relation to an intentional act, count one must be dismissed.
The count also fails to allege that the defendant acted without consent. No where
in the charging paper, including in the affidavit, does the government suggest that the
defendant acted in the absence of consent—neither paper even mentions consent, in
regard to the actions of the defendant, a single time. By failing to allege the absence of
consent, count one must be dismissed.
b. Brandishing
Likewise, to prove brandishing, the government must allege enough factual
content to prove that the defendant did indeed: (1) draw or exhibit a firearm; (2) in the
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presence of any other person; (3) in a rude, angry, or threatening manner; or (4)
unlawfully uses a firearm in any fight or quarrel. See 5 R.C.C. § 4.
Like the former count, brandishing also falters, for it fails to allege that the
defendant acted in a rude, angry, or threatening manner—or otherwise unlawfully used a
firearm in a fight. It parrots all other counts when it solely says that the complainant
parked his vehicle at the scene of a house fire and then turned around to find the
defendant fleeing the scene, after shooting and setting his vehicle on fire. The charging
paper mentions no manner in which the defendant acted. The court must dismiss count
three, because it fails as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court shall dismiss the criminal information; or, in
the alternative, dismiss counts one and three.
August 16, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Ridgeway Public Defender’s Office
Appellate Division
Assistant Chief Public Defender
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Defendant
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