RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT
The State of Ridgeway,
Prosecution,
versus,
AncientBulldog,
Accused.
ORDER
August 8th, 2024
ORDER
The Accused’s motion to dismiss (Doc 3), is hereby denied. The State shall submit a new
afϐidavit of probable cause within forty-eight (48) hours of the publishing of this order. If
probable cause is refound, arraignment will immediately proceed. The following schedule is
to take effect:
1. Forty-eight (48 hours), or before, the conclusion of arraignment, the Court shall
schedule both the pretrial conference and the pretrial hearing, the former shall take
place no later than twenty-four (24) hours after the conclusion of pretrial.
2. At the conclusion of the arraignment, a seven-day (7) pretrial period will be issued.
State’s discovery is due within forty-eight (48) hours from the start of this period, the
Accused’s evidence is due thirty-six (36) hours from this date. All pretrial motions are
to be ϐilled within the ϐirst ϐive (5) days of the start of pretrial, responses are due by
the end of pretrial.
3. At the conclusion of pretrial, the Court will convene for a pretrial hearing, covering all
business as stipulated in the rules of procedure. The pretrial report is due before the
Court convenes.
So ordered this 8th of August, 2024,
HolyRomanRyan
Magistrate Judge
The State of Ridgeway,
Prosecution,
versus,
AncientBulldog,
Accused.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
August 8th, 2024
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
The Court ϐiles the following memorandum of law, ruling on the Accused’s motion to
dismiss, submitted on the 2nd of August—
Introduction
The Accused in this matter ϐiled a motion to dismiss the action against him. He contends
that the prosecution of the case is barred by the statute of limitations governing felony
prosecutions. This Court ϐinds otherwise.
Memorandum
1 R. Stat. § 2401 provides:
No felony charges shall be ϐiled, reϐiled, or investigated by the State if the act which offended
the State occurred ninety (90) days prior to the ϐiling of a Criminal Information or other forms
of initiating a criminal proceeding. This shall not apply to matters in which the action or
offense: (i) involves the sale, distribution, or possession of police-grade equipment, (ii)
involves the obstruction of an active criminal investigation via means of unlawful disclosure,
(iii) involves the disclosure of information that has harmed or put the jeopardy the life and
safety of others, (iv) involve making fraudulent statements to a government ofϐicial, (v)
involves misconduct of a government ofϐice where they refrained from a lawful duty or
intentionally performed an action outside their scope of authorization.
The Accused relies on this statute wholesale in his motion to dismiss the action, arguing
that this absolves him of liability in this matter. But as this is a statutory matter, this Court
will start with the plain text of the statute. Ridgeway Parks Service v. SteKing2008, 1 Rid.
1, 9 (2022).
The text of § 2401 is that of a limitation on the prosecution of felony charges. In the
State’s criminal information, they charge the Accused with one count of Second-Degree
Murder, a felony falling under this statute’s regulatory sweep. The charging document
alleges that the offense was committed on the 27th of April, 2024, while being ϐiled on the
27th of July. Taking the Accused at their word, this would seemingly bar prosecution.
However, the State counters this by arguing that the docketing of case stops the timer
imposed by § 2401. The primary bone of contention here, is whether the phrase “or other
forms of initiating a criminal proceeding” is applicable here. This Court holds it is not.
Charges may be ϐiled via two routes: government agents have the right to be charged
by way of indictment, whereas non-government agents do not. In this matter, the Accused
was charged without a formalized indictment, but through the ϐiling of a Criminal
Information. It is reasonable to assume that this dichotomy between the methods of
charging is reϐlected in § 2401 by its inclusion of the conjunction “or.” The Schoolhouse
Rock song “Conjunction Junction” famously remarks that the purpose of a conjunction is
to connect words and/or phrases. The conjunction or provides a choice—this or that. One
cannot have both, but one. For the Court to side with the State in this matter would be to
deϐile the meaning of or and contravene sing-song grammar education videos. Perhaps
more importantly, it would be reading § 2401 contrary to its plain language, and
rendering the ϐirst clause superϐluous—a clear violation of canons of statutory
construction. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137,
146 (1995) ("We assume that Congress used two terms because it intended each term to
have a particular, nonsuperϐluous meaning").
But that’s not all. The State could ϐind shelter in the word “prior” in § 2401. To be prior
is to come before; and, clearly, the offense came before the ϐiling of the information. But
does the word “prior” modify the proceeding timeframe (90 days), to include or preclude
the day of ϐiling? The answer to this question determines the fate of the government, but
logic and reason dictates that the latter is the proper answer. When the legislature
included the word “days” in § 2401, it could be interpretated as a prior of twenty-four
hours, or from 00:00 to 23:59 local time. Both are a common meaning of the word in
question, but yield two separate answers. Consequently, the Court looks to what guided
the construction of the statute—the legislative context.
Unfortunately, there are no committee records, legislative debates, or clues otherwise,
as § 2401 was enacted as an inaugural law. Thus, this Court turns to the general purpose
of a statute of limitations. “Such statutes are designed to prevent prejudice by precluding
prosecutors from bringing stale charges when the defense would be handicapped by the
inevitable loss of evidence.” The Statute of Limitations in a Criminal Case: Can It Be
Waived?, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev 823 (1977). This is not a concern in Ridgeway, as evidence
is often in videographic form, which, save for very certain circumstances, is not destroyed.
However, due to the nature of this game, witnesses either leave the community or are
hesitant to testify out of pure laziness. It is unlikely that either interpretation of §
2401will reduce or enhance prejudice in this case, which makes this of no help. But this
Court cannot assume the framers of § 2401 were stupid, they understood that oftentimes,
it is simply impossible to pin down an exact time when something happened, given the
nature of this game. To hold otherwise would be to unduly constrain the interest of the
State to impose punishments on those that break its laws, therefore, the Court declines to
do so.
Yet, this Court is still left with the question of how to compute when the bar on ϐiling
begins. Given that the common purpose of § 2401 is not particularly useful, this Court
turns to federal precedent to guide its decision. The common rule is that Circuits follow
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6. Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F. 3d 196, 200 (CA5
1998), cases cited. Rule 6(a) provides in relevant part: When the period is stated in days
or a longer unit of time: (A) exclude the day of the event that triggers the period.”
Recognition of this rule in line with both the concept of stare decisis and the
understanding that Ridgeway law is not fully developed and that there in holes in the
rules and precedent. Consequently, the State has not contravened § 2401, the Accused’s
motion is denied.
So ordered this 8th of August, 2024,
HolyRomanRyan
Magistrate Judge
