STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
ANCIENTBULLDOG,
Defendant(s).
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Case Number: RSC-CM-3307
Presiding: Hon. t1dtony
Mag. HolyRomanRyan
MOTION TO DISMISS
MOTION TO DISMISS
DEFENDANT, AncientBulldog, by and through the undersigned counsel, submits
this motion in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P. 13. Defendant
respectfully moves the court to dismiss count one because it is time-barred, consequently
dismissing the above-entitled matter; or in the alternative, strike the affidavit of probable
cause because it is insufficient, consequently dismissing the above-entitled matter.
Attached hereto and herewith is a memorandum of law in support of Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss.
August 2, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Ridgeway Public Defender’s Office
Appellate Division
Assistant Chief Public Defender
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R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Defendant
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STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
ANCIENTBULLDOG,
Defendant(s).
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case Number: RSC-CM-3307
Presiding: Hon. t1dtony
Mag. HolyRomanRyan
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................4
INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................5
STANDARD OF REVIEW............................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENTS....................................................................................................................6
I. Count One Is Time-Barred by the Statute of Limitations........................................... 6
II. The Affidavit of Probable Cause Is Insufficient........................................................ 7
a. The Affidavit Was Not Sworn Under Oath...........................................................7
b. The Insufficiency of the Affidavit Warrants Dismissal With Prejudice............... 8
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................. 9
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INTRODUCTION
On July 27, 2024, Defendant AncientBulldog (“Mr. Bulldog”) was charged with
one count of second-degree murder for events that occurred on April 27, 2024.
The government, in its recently discovered enthusiasm to prosecute Mr. Bulldog,
reaches back a quarter of the year—now, over 90 days since the events transpired—to
bring one felony charge against him. However, pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 2401, the
government had until July 26, 2024, to charge Mr. Bulldog with felony charges arising
from his conduct. And because the statute of limitations ran out, the court shall dismiss
count one of the information, consequently dismissing the above-entitled matter.
In the alternative, the court shall reverse its finding of probable cause and dismiss
the information, because the affidavit of probable cause is insufficient.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a party may raise by
motion a “defense or objection which is capable of determination without trial of the
general issue.” Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(c)(2). Specifically, a challenge raising “a defect in
instituting the prosecution” or “a defect in the indictment or information” must be raised
in a pretrial motion “if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available and the
motion can be determined without a trial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). When
considering a motion to dismiss an indictment or information, it is an elementary rule that
“the allegations of the indictment must be taken as true.” Boyce Motor Lines v. United
States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n.16 (1952).
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ARGUMENTS
I. Count One Is Time-Barred by the Statute of Limitations
Section 2401 of the Ridgeway State Statutes sets forth the statute of limitations
period for felony offenses—specifically, it prohibits the government from investigating,
filing, or refiling most felony charges. See 1 R. Stat. § 2401. Indeed, it is also quite
generous—it gives the government around three months, or 90 days, to prosecute
individuals. Id. In the words of the statute itself, it unequivocally forecloses “felony
charges” from being “filed, refiled, or investigated” by the government, if the acts
constituting the offense “occurred ninety…days prior to the filing of a criminal
information or other forms of initiating a criminal proceeding.” 1 R. Stat. § 2401.
According to count one of the information, the defendant allegedly committed a
criminal act on April 27, 2024, at roughly 11:07 UTC. Thus, the government had 90 days,
or until July 26, 2024, at 11:07 UTC, to investigate and file criminal charges.1 This case,
however, suffers from a timeliness problem. The government did not submit a charging
document or even an affidavit of probable cause until July 27, 2024, at 16:19 UTC. Thus,
the charges brought by the government must be dismissed as time-barred by 1 R. Stat. §
2401—even if just by hours.
The only feasible argument here against count one being time-barred is that the
statute of limitations should end when a case is pending assignment or when a case is
docketed. But this plainly goes against the intent of the legislature. 1 R. Stat. § 2401
prevents felony charges from being investigated, filed, or refiled if the acts constituting
the offense occurs 90 days prior to “initiating a criminal proceeding.” 1 R. Stat. § 2401.
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https://www.timeanddate.com/date/dateadded.html?m1=4&d1=27&y1=2024&type=add&ad=90&h1=11&i1=07&s1
=0
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Yet, a criminal proceeding is only initiated by the filing of a “criminal information” or
“indictment.” Rid. R. Crim. P. 3(a). It is certainly true that a criminal case begins in the
prosecutorial agency “by the filing of a complaint,” but “it is equally true that there is no”
case in court “until an indictment or information is filed.” United States v. Van Duzee,
140 U.S. 169, 174 (1891). Where no charging paper is found, there is “no criminal
prosecution.” Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 223 (2008).
II. The Affidavit of Probable Cause Is Insufficient
When a criminal proceeding is initiated by the filing of a criminal information, a
“complainant” must “convey to the court the facts constituting the basis for the
information.” Rid. R. Crim. P. 3(f)(1). The complainant may do this by writing or
recording. See Rid. R. Crim. P. 3(f)(1). A judge may “not authorize a criminal
information unless the information presented by the complainant establishes probable
cause to believe that the person against whom the information is sought committed an
offense.” Rid. R. Crim. P. 3(f)(2).
a. The Affidavit Was Not Sworn Under Oath
The Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure themselves, however, delineate that
the complainant “shall sign the information under oath, before an appropriate judicial
officer.” Rid. R. Crim. P. 3(f)(1). That is, the complainant must sign their statement under
oath, sworn before an officer authorized to administer said oath—because the word
“shall,” of course, is “ordinarily the language of command.” Alabama v. Bozeman, 533
U.S. 146, 153 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). This is not a novel
principle—generally, “[a]ll the facts necessary to constitute…probable cause must appear
upon oath or affirmation.” Ex Parte Bollman and Swartwout, 8 U.S. 75, 110 (1807). “The
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information necessary to show probable cause must be contained within a written
affidavit given under oath.” U.S. v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300, 1303 (5th Cir. 1991). One
certainly “cannot be tried on an Information unless it is supported by the oath of some
one having knowledge of facts showing the existence of probable cause.” United States v.
Morgan, 222 U.S. 274, 282 (1911). The account of the complainant, therefore, is plainly
an affidavit. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009).
The affidavit of probable cause in the present case, however, is fatally flawed. It
was not signed by an officer authorized to administer oaths. It was merely signed by the
complainant “declar[ing]” under the “penalty of perjury” that his account was “true and
correct.” Aff. of Prob. Caus. ¶ 3. But the absence of an administering officer renders the
affidavit deficient. See State of Ridgeway v. TidesAngles, Rid. Super. Ct., RSC-CM-3314
(2024). Indeed, the “constitutional requirement” that no cases shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation “is not to be cavalierly brushed aside as
an empty formality.” Dow v. Baird, 389 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 1968). It is irrefutably
true that “an oath administered by a person without authority is a void act. It imposes no
legal obligation on the person swearing to state the truth; nor is he punishable under any
law for swearing falsely in such a case.” United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. 238, 259 (1835).
“[A]n oath before one who has no legal authority to administer oaths…cannot amount to
perjury…or subject the party taking it to prosecution.” United States v. Curtis, 107 U.S.
671, 673 (1882).
b. The Insufficiency of the Affidavit Warrants Dismissal With Prejudice
The mere “commencement of criminal proceedings itself infringes on liberty
interests.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 297 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This
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isn’t unreasonable—the right to a speedy trial is designed “to minimize the possibility of
lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the…impairment of liberty imposed on an
accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and
the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8
(1982). Thus, the court holds “inherent powers to dismiss a prosecution” when “a
defendant’s rights have been violated or…the integrity of judicial proceedings has
otherwise been compromised.” United States v. Chavez-Tello, 510 F. App'x 506, 3 (9th
Cir. 2013). The court also “holds the power to dismiss with prejudice as a sanction
intended to prevent undue and unnecessary delays within the judicial process.” State v.
Gavin, 1 Rid. 74 (2022).
The erroneous finding of probable cause based on an invalid affidavit subjects the
defendant to unnecessary and unjustifiable legal jeopardy. The prosecution’s role in filing
adequate affidavits of probable cause “is not to be cavalierly brushed aside as an empty
formality.” Dow v. Baird, 389 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 1968). This court cannot allow the
government to hold the defendant hostage and allow another filing of an affidavit of
probable cause. The court erred in making a finding of probable cause despite an
insufficient affidavit, only furthering the impairment of liberty on the defendant. In any
action, “[a] plaintiff is required to conduct their due diligence in pursuing an action
before the court.” Gavin, 1 Rid. at 77. Nonetheless, the prosecution has failed to be
diligent.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court shall dismiss the criminal information.
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August 2, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Ridgeway Public Defender’s Office
Appellate Division
Assistant Chief Public Defender
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Defendant
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