IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
MRPOP1034,
Petitioner,
v.
JAMESGARDAI,
Respondent.
Case No. RSC-CV-3211
BACKGROUND
On July 14, 2024, Petitioner Mrpop1034 filed, in this court, a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The petition was accepted, and writ issued upon Respondent JamesGardai and the
Department of Justice on the same day. Magistrate Derogatoryyy began hearing the matter and
arguments from each of the parties. On July 17th, 2024, an objection arose as to the statutory
authority of a Magistrate to hear matters of habeas corpus. Accordingly, then-presiding Judge
koala4life assumed control of the matter and appointed Magistrate Derogatoryyy as his clerk,
authorizing him to hear all hearings and arguments necessary and to make a recommendation to
him.
On July 23, 2024, the matter was transferred from the docket of Judge koala4life to my
docket. I immediately vacated the aforementioned order assigning Magistrate Derogatoryyy as a
clerk in this matter. Magistrate Derogatoryyy was further verbally instructed to hear this matter
and hear the matter in its entirety under the provisions of 1 R. Stat. § 2104 . That order, issued on
the minutes, is justified and ratified here.
OPINION
When considering whether to assign a Magistrate to a particular case, there are a number
of considerations that a Judge will make. Among them include the overall caseload of the court,
the load on that particular Judge’s docket or on the docket of each Magistrate which they
oversee, the relative expertise of learning experiences which may be relevant on a matter and to a
particular Magistrate, and more. Additionally, Judges are obligated to consider the statutory
requirements which must be met before assigning a Magistrate. Namely, a Magistrate may not be
assigned to any matter which involves “[(1)] indictment against a public official or [(2)] civil
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cases against the Government.” 1 R. Stat. § 2104. Here, it is clear that the matter pending before
the Court is not one of indictment. Thus, the second element must be assessed. The Court holds
that, while a writ of habeas corpus is construed against the government, it is not a civil case.
Accordingly, it is proper and permissible for a Magistrate to be assigned if the Judge responsible
deems it appropriate.
There are several things which make up what a ‘civil case’ actually is. Among them are
two basic elements that the Court identifies as being components of all civil cases: (1) that the
proceedings of a civil case are governed by the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) that
there is some statutory basis, normally (but not always) under the Civil Claims Act, which
constitutes what the cause of the civil action is.
RULES GOVERNING THE PROCEEDINGS OF CIVIL CASES
A civil action is, of course, governed by the Ridgeway Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Supreme Court is charged with prescribing rules governing the procedure of civil cases in all
courts. Art. V, Sec. IX, Ridgeway State Constitution. Despite this, the Supreme Court outlined
specific exceptions to the rules of civil procedure. Among them are “proceedings pertaining to
the writ of habeas corpus.” Rid. R. Civ. P. 54(a)(1)(1). While all civil cases are governed by
these rules, habeas proceedings are not, on the direction of the Supreme Court who is charged
with making rules for civil matters. This matter is further distinguished in the statutes. The
Judiciary Act outlines a process for how habeas claims ought to be handled. Despite clear
constitutional authority to prescribe procedures for the handling of civil and criminal cases, the
Legislature went further to make it clear that “[t]he Supreme Court may promulgate rules
pursuant to [the habeas] statute.” 1 R. Stat. 2213.
The Court also takes notice of the fact that civil cases, brought properly, are brought by
right. “Every person within this state ought to find certain remedy, by having recourse to the
laws, for all injuries or wrongs which one may receive. . . “ Art. I, Sec. I, Ridgeway State
Constitution. While rarely invoked specifically, the aforementioned provision is the basis by
which all civil cases come to fruition in the State of Ridgeway. This fundamental principle and
basis of our justice system is so understood that it has become a staple of the common law
cupboard so engrained that litigants need only provide for the jurisdiction and venue being
proper. There is no discretion for the court to decline to hear a civil case which complies with the
appropriate rules. "Habeas corpus is, however, a discretionary writ." Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
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672, 691 (1948). This is supported in the Judiciary Act, which provides that the Court “shall
either grant or deny review of the petition based on its merits.” 1 R. Stat. § 2211(ii). This
preliminary review of merits where the Court is infused with the power to exercise discretion
over whether a matter is reviewed is not an element of civil cases. That option is reserved only
for habeas filings.
The Court recognizes, as well, that there are separate filing requirements in order to bring
a habeas claim versus a civil claim. In a civil claim, litigants are expected to plead sufficient
facts to make a case “plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions . . . will not do.” Id. at 555. A civil case, of
course, proceeds to a fact-finding mission. A habeas claim, instead, disobeys the key holdings of
Twombly. There is no fact-finding mission to occur in a habeas proceeding. The procedures to be
followed include a petition, reply brief with supporting documents, and additional briefs or
arguments only if the Court finds it necessary. In fact, every argument a petitioner intends to
make in a habeas claim must be in the petition which is filed to begin the proceeding. A petition
which does not offer legal conclusions is likely to be denied, without the option of appeal, by the
officer who reviews it.
STATUTORY BASIS BY WHICH A CLAIM IS BROUGHT
The basis by which a civil claim is brought is usually under the provisions of the Civil
Claims Act. A civil claim, established in a State statute, generally consists of a description of
conduct which makes a person liable, provisions for which relief may be granted, and limits on
relief which may be granted. For example, the tort of battery is brought when a person “brings
unconsented harmful or offensive contact against another person.” 1 R. Stat. § 3102. This statute
sets the relief available at punitive damages, and provides a maximum amount of punitive
damages to be $4,500. These torts become causes of action on the civil complaint.
With respect to a habeas claim, however, there is no civil complaint. Indeed, while
conduct which gives rise to a civil claim based on tortious conduct may also give rise to a habeas
petition, they are two separate functions of the law. A petition for habeas relief is a separate
document altogether. Having already established that there are separate requirements for what
must go in each pleading, the Court further notes that a habeas petition is a separate type of
pleading, not a cause of action which is fit to reside within a civil complaint. The petition, with
unique form and procedural requirements, cannot be amalgamated with a civil complaint.
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LABELING HABEAS PROCEEDINGS
Indeed, there are different sectors of our common law system. Among them are, of
course, the original ‘gang’ of criminal and civil law. Under these labels, anything which is not
criminal law is automatically classified as civil law. The State of Ridgeway has long departed
from these strict labels, however. For example, the Administrative Court, established by our
State’s first legal scholars, practices administrative law. No reasonable legal professional would
venture out so far as to say that the Administrative Court somehow practices civil law. No, it is
recognized as its own sector of the common law system. This is, largely, due to the fact that
administrative law proceedings cannot and do not meet the requirements I outlined in this
opinion to be considered civil cases. Administrative cases neither adhere to the Ridgeway Rules
of Civil Procedure nor find their constituting instruments in the Civil Claims Act. Indeed, there
are now three labels: criminal, civil, and administrative law. Who is to say that these are the only
labels? This Court rejects the notion that these three labels are the exclusive labels applicable to
which ‘sector’ a legal proceeding falls into.
Indeed, there is a provision of law which outlines, specifically, which jurisdiction the
Superior Court has in certain matters:
“There shall be a Superior court which shall exercise original jurisdiction for all
civil and criminal cases or controversies under the rules as set by the Supreme
Court; the Superior Court shall have right to hear expungements, and provide
writ of habeas corpus; the Superior Court shall be composed of judges, the
amount to be specified by the Legislature, who are to be administered by a Chief
judge; the Chief judge is nominated by the Governor with advice and consent of
the Senate.” Art. V, Sec. IV, Ridgeway State Constitution (emphasis added).
It is clear to every reasonable person that expungement proceedings are not civil nor criminal in
nature, and it was clear to the framers of our judicial system too. When writing the Constitution,
a conscious decision to separate the powers of expungement and habeas corpus from the powers
to hear civil and criminal cases was made. These powers, separated intentionally and held in
preservation in our Constitution, justify the holding of this Court beyond any other provision
which may be brought up.
Habeas claims and civil claims are nothing alike. Even when considered under the same
umbrella, they are treated differently in every respect other than how they are filed on the
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broken, outdated, and relatively unresponsive in-game system. It must be considered: if it looks
like a rock, it probably is a rock. Habeas proceedings seem more like trees than rocks, however,
and while this Court will not put a label on it, this Court cannot—by any logical reason—classify
them as civil cases.
ORDER
Therefore, it is ORDERED, nunc pro tunc to July 23rd, 2024, that the objection in
relation to a Magistrate’s authority is OVERRULED, Magistrate Derogatoryyy is assigned to
hear the matter before the court in its entirety, and to make a ruling on the same, subject to the
necessary approvals.
Done: July 26, 2024 SO ORDERED:
At Palmer, Ridgeway
_______________________________
Hon. notsfeelings
Superior Court Judge
Copies to: Petitioner
Respondent
Counselors
Magistrate Judge Derogatoryyy
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