STATE OF RIDGEWAY
SUPERIOR COURT
MRPOP1034
Petitioner
v.
JAMESGARDAI
Respondent
_______________________________________/
Case No. RSC-CV-3211
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On July 12, 2024, MRPOP1034 (“Petitioner”) filed, through counsel, a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus to this Court pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 2210. The action was
docketed on that same day and review was granted pursuant to 1 R. Stat. § 2211(x). The
Solicitor General, on behalf of JAMESGARDAI (“Respondent”) appeared and alerted
the Court that the government would be opposing the petition. The Court called for
briefs and received a brief from the government in opposition to the petition and shortly
after, the Court granted leave for additional briefs consistent with 1 R. Stat. § 2211(viii)
and received a responsive brief from the Petitioner’s counselor BrendaPopplewell.
BACKGROUND
On June 1, 2024, there was a training session being conducted by the Ridgeway
National Guard. Attending the session was JamesGardai, isanzw, s_tems, Neffins,
Fa3n7ed, and an unknown individual who recorded the incident. The Petitioner is a
Ridgeway County Master Firefighter for the Ridgeway County Fire Department.
Petitioner sent multiple messages but the most noteworthy of the few were when the
Petitioner told Fa3n7ed—who appears to be the instructor of the training session—that
he was “loadin in” and then proceeding to message Fa3n7ed “omw once AGAIN”
which appears to be about the training session.
The Petitioner was seen on the video taken by the unknown recorder—
presumably another Recruit—driving extremely quickly using a Firetruck which was
marked with the decals and identifiers of the Ridgeway County Fire Department and
was equipped with emergency lighting systems which were activated by the Petitioner.
The Petitioner was in the incorrect lane of travel while continuing to drive using
his emergency lighting system and marked fire truck. As the Petitioner was driving
down the road at high rates of speed, the Respondent stepped into the road, specifically
into the lane that the Petitioner was occupying, and continued to drive at high speeds
down the lane. The Petitioner was approximately two hundred studs away from the
Respondent when he stepped onto the road. The Petitioner did not move his truck into
the proper lane to avoid the Respondent and, instead, he remained in the same lane and
continued to drive at high speeds toward the Respondent.
Only when the Petitioner is approximately ten studs distance away from the
Respondent does he attempt to avoid striking the Respondent with his vehicle. To avoid
striking the Respondent, the Petitioner swerves his firetruck left driving directly into a
group of guardsmen and knocking isanzw down to the floor. When the Petitioner struck
the group of guardsmen, the Respondent immediately drew his TB26, which is a taser,
and ejected the Petitioner from his firetruck to immediately place him into handcuffs.
The Respondent took custody of the Petitioner and arrested him for vehicular
assault in violation of R.C.C. § 7.22. The entered reasoning behind this arrest was as
follows: “Out of city limits; Suspect used his Firetruck and went at full speed, ramming
it into a divisional of recruits; [RNG.]”
DISCUSSION
Vehicular assault is codified under Ridgeway law, and it is defined as follows:
“The act of operating a motor vehicle and intentionally striking a vehicle or person.” It
is an undisputed fact that the Petitioner was operating a motor vehicle which was, in this
case, a firetruck.
In reviewing habeas corpus claims, the court must determine: (a) whether the
police were legally entitled to make an arrest; or (b) whether the suspect is innocent of
the charge for which they were arrested. See In re ZachCasisbeast, 1 R. Supp. 12
(2022). The police are legally entitled to make an arrest when they have “a judicial
warrant ordering an arrest” or the police have “probable cause that a crime was
committed.” Id.
“Probable cause is determined by a ‘totality-of-the-circumstances’ approach.”
Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). The inquiry "turns on two factors:
‘the suspect's conduct as known to the officer, and the contours of the offense thought to
be committed by that conduct.’" Id. (quoting Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184
(4th Cir. 2016)). While the court looks to the information available to the officer on the
scene at the time, the courts apply an objective test to determine whether a reasonably
prudent officer with that information would have thought that probable cause existed for
the arrest. Graham, 831 F.3d at 185. Evidence sufficient to secure a conviction is not
required, but probable cause exists only if there is sufficient evidence on which a
reasonable officer at the time could have believed that probable cause existed for the
arrest. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
(1963).
The dispute lies in the determination of whether the Petitioner was acting
intentionally. For the purposes of applying the statute, the court will read it as it is
textualized. See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 818 (1999). The Court will
apply the intentional mens rea as an act that was simply intentional which led to a
vehicular assault. "Criminal intent serves to separate those who understand the wrongful
nature of their act from those who do not, but does not require knowledge of the precise
consequences that may flow from that act once aware that the act is wrongful." United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 469 n.3 (1994) (citations omitted).
There is no set legal definition for intent, but you know it when you see it.
For the first piece of analysis, the court will examine the Petitioner’s conduct as
known to the officer. Seen in the video1 submitted by the government in support of the
arrest is the Petitioner having ample time to move to the other lane or to be in the
correct lane to begin with. When examining the Petitioner’s conduct, it is imperative
that the court not lose sight of reasonableness because “the probable-cause inquiry looks
to the reasonableness of an officer's understanding of the facts.” Heien v. North
Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 77 (2014). The Respondent was witness to the Petitioner
swerving into a group of guardsmen seemingly to avoid striking the Respondent. It
seems that the conduct of the Petitioner made clear to the officer the reasonable
existence of probable cause to believe that the Petitioner performed an intentional act
that led to the vehicular assault of another. It is undoubtedly important to include that
the Court will not conduct a de novo review of probable cause for these purposes but
instead the Court looks to what the officer reasonably ascertained at the time. Therefore,
the court finds that the police were legally entitled to make this arrest.
If there is a finding that the police were legally entitled to make an arrest, such
as this arrest here, then the inquiry turns to whether the Petitioner is “actually innocent
of the offense for which they were arrested” and to determine this the court looks to
whether the petitioner can demonstrate “actual innocence by establishing facts that
make the prospect of a hypothetical conviction on the charges virtually impossible.” In
re ZachCasisbeast, supra, at 12.
To make a showing of actual innocence, the Petitioner must eliminate any
possible avenue of conviction which is to make a showing that he is absolutely
innocent. To prove actual innocence, the Petitioner seeks shelter under the protection of
7 R. Stat. § 6404 which provides that “[m]embers of an emergency service faithfully
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vw1u-0PnZz4
executing their duties shall not be held liable for Vehicular Assault.” This exception is
attached to the vehicular assault statute and the court bears the onus of developing its
applicability to this situation. The Petitioner claims to have been “responding to a local
fire emergency pursuant to his official duties”, Pet’r’s Reply Br. at ¶ 6, and if this were
substantiated then it would absolve the Petitioner of criminal liability and would act as a
bar to conviction under the vehicular assault statute. One who invokes a defense under 7
R. Stat. § 6404 must do more than simply claim its protections because the Petitioner
inherits the onus of demonstrating his own innocence in a habeas corpus proceeding.
See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011).
To meet the burden required to invoke the protection of 7 R. Stat. § 6404, the
Petitioner would be required to make a showing that he was responding to a fire or other
emergency, or otherwise that he was executing an official duty. The Petitioner outlines
the incident as if the Petitioner was responding to a fire and it just so happens that he
passed by a Ridgeway National Guard training session. The Court rejects this because
not only is the Petitioner a National Guard Recruit, but he told the instructor of the
training session that he was coming to the session. The Petitioner has failed to show that
he was executing an official duty and because the evidence produced by the Respondent
outweighs the probative value of the unsubstantiated claims of protection under 7 R.
Stat. § 6404, the Petitioner has not met his burden and therefore the Court will reject
this defense.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that on this 24th day of July 2024, that
the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus disposes of the matter.
By:
Derogatoryyy
Magistrate Judge
Ridgeway Superior Court
