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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
WILFORDSHULMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMESGARDAI, in his official and
quasi-official capacity as Sergeant in the
Ridgeway National Guard,
Defendant.
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Civil Claim No. RSC-CV-3172
MO T IO N FO R SUM M ARY JU DG M E NT
Defendant JamesGardai, proceeding by and through the Solicitor General of Ridgeway,
respectfully moves this Court to enter summary judgment pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
Attached hereto is a memorandum of law supporting the summary judgment in his favor.
FAC T UA L BAC KG RO U N D
On June 22, 2024, several candidates gathered at the front of the Palmer County Hall to
campaign for an upcoming gubernatorial seat. Voting was drawing to a quick close, so several
citizens made their way to the County Hall to fulfill their civic duties and cast their votes for the
next Governor of Ridgeway. Taking advantage of the large crowds, a group of members
representing the Sanctuary of New Hope picketed outside the County Hall to promote their
theology; they clasped wooden signs that displayed ominous warnings that “The End Is Near” and
for willing proselytes to “Join [the Sanctuary] To Be Saved.” At least ten of members of New Hope
picketed outside of the County Hall, and without a state-issued permit to do so.
JamesGardai was one of many law enforcement officers on scene during the picketing. After
taking notice of the signs, James confirmed with other law enforcement officers that New Hope did
not have a state-issued permit to assemble and protest in a group of four more individuals. At first,
James attempted to civilly request New Hope to “disperse” rather than being amalgamated into a
single group. The members became agitated and made attempts to defy James’ authority, stating
that he “[couldn’t] do anything” about the unlawful assembly. James nonetheless forbearingly gave
New Hope several opportunities to disperse and continue picketing, but to no avail. After several
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more minutes of noncompliance from New Hope, James began detaining its members. One
member, WilfordShulman, was subsequently arrested for unlawful assembly. Mr. Shulman filed for
habeas corpus relief on July 8, challenging the grounds of that charge.
STA NDA R D O F REV I EW
“A party against whom a claim * * * is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at
any time * * * move for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.” Rid. R. Civ.
P. 38(b). Summary judgment is appropriate “when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). Defendant
takes issue with no portion of the Complaint or any factual matter therein. He is thus entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law for reasons set forth herein.
ARGUM E NT
I. TH E UNL AW F U L ASSE M B LY STAT UT E DO E S NO T EX C LU SIV E LY AP P LY
TO ONLY A GRO UP O F IN DI VI D UA LS WI T H BAT S.
Petitioner Shulman seeks to reverse an arrest for unlawful assembly after he refused to
disperse from a picketing event for New Hope Sanctuary. The unlawful assembly statute, Rid.
Crim. C. § 2.14, makes it unlawful for “a group of 4 or more individuals with bats on their persons
who are acting in a violent manner or rallying without a valid permit”1 to publicly assemble. § 2.14
(emphasis added). Shulman now contends that because New Hope’s members did not possess a
bat during their picketing, the statute does not apply, and his arrest is unlawful; that reading of the
statute would not only disturb the legislative intent, but also legalize a broad canvas of unregulated
assembly practices that do not apply exclusively to the New Hopes of the world but legalize non-
permitted protests of other clamorous organizations as well. Shulman’s reading of the statute
should be rejected, and this Court should accordingly issue judgment against him.
1. Under Article III of the Constitution, it is “emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803). In
carrying out this elementary judicial function, courts begin, as always, “with the text of the
statute.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992). When that text is clear,
1 In this Court’s July 16 Order granting habeas corpus, it took issue with a concern regarding the permits and how
acquired. That is a question not for this Court to answer, but for the Legislature to confront. “Valid permit” should be
read in its plain meaning and construed to fit the statute as best as possible. In Ridgeway, there exists an application for
permits. This Court should thus hold that a “valid permit” is one authorized by state law.
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and the language of the statute plain, this court must enforce it “according to its terms.” Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 600 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Neither Shulman nor Gardai have beef with the language of § 2.14—both agree that its
language unequivocally makes it unlawful for four or more people to convene. But under what
circumstances? If the statute is read to simply criminalize the gathering of a certain number of
people, the number of events that it would criminalize are bountiful. A backyard barbeque with
friends and family? Unlawful assembly. A monthly book club meeting with members of a church
group? Unlawful assembly. These are scenarios—among several others—that can be reconciled by
uncovering the function of the statute—a main point of contention between the parties in this case.
For instance, Shulman contends that an individual can only be charged when he participates in an
assembly of four or more people “with bats.” Under this purported function of the statute, non-
permitted organizers could amalgamate in the streets of Palmer to publicly speak vile epithets as
long as they do not possess bats. But that proposed function is wrong—egregiously wrong; it is
dissonant with the legislative scheme and defiant of the clear and intelligible language of the statute.
Rather, this Court should disjunctively construe the statute—or, in other words, “give
terms connected by a disjunctive…separate meanings.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339
(1979). In Reiter, the Court held that Congress’ use of “or” in the phrase “business or property”
indicated that “business” was not meant to modify “property,” nor was “property” intended to
modify “business.” Id. In § 2.14, the State Senate separates the groups of people who are criminally
liable for unlawful assembly with a disjunctive—those in a group of four or more people “with bats
who are acting [violently]…or… “rallying without a permit.” Id. Like Congress in Reiter, the State
Senate did not intend for the phrase “with bats” to modify the phrase “rallying without a
permit”—it simply makes two separate classes of assembly unlawful. See Holly Farms Corp. v. Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd., 517 U.S. 392, 413 (1996) (“[T]erms connected by a disjunctive [are] given
separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise.”). The context of § 2.14, as well as the
legislative intent, makes clear that the statute was not meant to exclusively criminalize non-
permitted assembly of persons with bats; it criminalizes all non-permitted assembly.
2. In one fell swoop, the interpretation of a statute of one outlying judge can cripple
decades of statutory construction principles and facilitate the eschewing legislative intent abroad;
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if this Court adopts Shulman’s reading of § 2.14, it may inadvertently do just that. The simple fact
that this potent judicial authority rests at the fingertips of many judges in our circuit is why the
Supreme Court prefers “the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute” as opposed to any
“curious, narrow, hidden sense” that nothing but the “acute study” of an ethereal mind “would
discover.” Im_Thunderr v. Nephral, 3 Rid. ____ (2022) (slip op. at 3). Rationally speaking,
Shulman’s interpretation is absurd. So much so that, if adopted, it will produce a result
“demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458
U. S. 564, 191 191 571 (1982). The tie must go to the most rational reading of the statute—that with
or without bats, an unpermitted assembly of four or more people is unlawful. Plain and simple.
Because New Hope and its members were not permitted to picket outside the County Hall,
their assembly was unlawful and subject to the criminal penalties of § 2.14. Shulman’s arrest is thus
lawful and grounded in “probable cause.” Zachcasisbeast, 1 R. Supp. at 12. And because he too was
not permitted to participate in a picket, he is not “innocent” of the crime. Id. For these reasons,
this Court should enter summary judgment in Defendant’s favor.
CO NC LUSIO N
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should issue summary judgment
Dated: July 23, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
