Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT WilfordShulman Plaintiff, v. JamesGardai, in his quasi-official capacity as a Lieutenant with the Palmer Police Department. Respondent. Case No. RSC-CV-3172 Presiding Judge: Hon. Judge Koala4life Petitioner WilfordShulman, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby files this reply in opposition to Respondent JamesGardai’s Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b) Motion for Summary Judgement. Attached hereto is a memorandum of law in opposition of motion for summary judgment in his favor. STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing a Motion for Summary Judgment, the court is required to determine whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact that would warrant a trial. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In this case, given the unresolved factual issues regarding the enforceability of Ridgeway Criminal Code § 2.14 and the lack of a clear permit process at the time of the Plaintiff’s arrest, there are significant disputes that require examination by a jury. Therefore, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied as these disputes are material and preclude a determination as a matter of law. ARGUMENT I. THERE WAS NO WAY FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO APPLY FOR A PERMIT UNDERLINED BY LAW. The Court is called to examine the enforceability of the permit requirement under Ridgeway Criminal Code § 2.14, which mandates a valid permit for a group of four or more individuals to rally. At the time of the Plaintiff’s arrest (the 22nd of June, 2024), no procedure existed to obtain such permits, rendering the permit clause unenforceable on its face. We are able to look back at the records of legislation via the Ridgeway State Senate’s trello, on this trello, we are able to find that on the 26th of June, 2024, President of the Senate, Vincefant, added the card for the Protester Permit Act (the entire bone of contention here) to the trello. A day later, on the 27th of June, 2024, the Protester Permit Act passed 3-1-1 . Three days later,1 the Governor vetoed the act. Regardless of this veto, at the time of the Plaintiff’s arrest, no such legislation existed which underlined where permits were to be obtained from . This circumstance warrants the Court’s recognition that the2 Plaintiff could not have been in violation of a non-operational statute. Essentially, on the 22nd of June, 2024, the date of the Plaintiff’s arrest, we were a State which 2 Now, almost a month later, the PPA is still a tabled docket item pending in the Senate. There is still no legal means for anyone in our State to obtain a permit besides proactivity of individuals who have read the previously failed/ now tabled piece of legislation. However, the law does not mandate proactivity from individuals, just means from which a permit can be obtained. 1 https://prnt.sc/BWjgBMLdIrs6 - PPA trello history ( beginning 4 days after the Plaintiff’s arrest for unlawful assembly) did not require a permit, like New Hampshire, Alaska, Wyoming, Montana and South Dakota. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates that laws must clearly inform individuals of what behavior is prohibited and the penalties for violating the law. This requirement ensures that laws provide “fair warning” of their prohibitions and consequences in a manner which is understandable to normal people. The law must delineate these boundaries as clearly as possible. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1964), the Court held that a criminal statute must clearly indicate what constitutes a crime and cannot require individuals of “common intelligence” to “guess at its meaning”. Indeed, the Plaintiff would be forced to “guess at its (the statute’s) meaning” as the law did not prescribe where a permit could be obtained at the time of his arrest. The Court has always pushed the narrative that fair notice of what is prohibited must be given to those subject to the legislation; See Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); “Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.” Id. at 48 (emphasis added). The law did not provide explicit standards as to how the Plaintiff could obtain a valid permit, and therefore, it was open ground for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement against the Plaintiff, as Defendant Gardai did. So, there are two elements to § 2.14; (a) four or more violent persons with a bat on their persons; (b) rallying without a valid permit. Based on the facts of the case, which are to be reviewed in the favor of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff was not in possession of a bat, and nor were his fellow protesters and, there was no way outlined by the legislation as to where the Plaintiff could obtain a permit. II. THE ARGUMENT MADE BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL FALLS APART. If the Solicitor General’s argument is that the statute was not exclusively criminalizing non-permitted assembly of persons with bats but was criminalizing non-permitted assembly in general, the argument completely falls apart. For the aforementioned reasons, the Plaintiff could not obtain a permit, and the permit prong of the statute is completely unenforceable on its face. The fact is, the Senate prematurely updated the State criminal code to include the unlawful assembly statute before it passed the act which underlined where a permit could be obtained from–what this means is that the gap between when the statute § 2.14 was added to the state code and the passing of the Protester Permit Act (before it was vetoed three days later) was a period of time where the statute was completely unenforceable because there were no means to obtain a permit. The Solicitor General, with this argument, basically proves our point, the arrest was unlawful because by law, a permit is required, but, by law, there is no means to get one. When a statute is not operational, it cannot be enforced; see United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) (where the Court discussed indefiniteness and uncertainty in statutory text, failure to define standards and implication of vagueness on enforceability) (citations omitted). The Solicitor General’s argument is actually “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 191 191 571 (1982). This is because, with one read of the act, you can see the emphasis the drafters of the legislation (who also drafted the statute) placed on the requirement of a permit. If a permit is not obtainable, then the statute simply can not be enforced, and if it is, it’s a serious violation of the Plaintiff’s (or any other individuals) due process rights protected by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Protester Permit Act actually does specify where you can obtain the permit; from either the Governor or the Chief of Police of the city where the protest is taking place, however, at the time of the Plaintiff’s arrest (five days before the act was passed), this act didn’t even exist, so he couldn’t have been mandated by law to get a permit from these two individuals. Since the permit requirement under § 2.14 could not be operational without a defined process for issuance, it effectively existed in a state of desuetude at the time of the Petitioner’s arrest. III. PLAINTIFF DID NOT VIOLATE THE UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY STATUTE. Take for example the California Penal Code § 308, which states it is unlawful for “[a]ny person under 21 years of age to purchase or possess any tobacco product, or any product designed to deliver nicotine, with intent to use that product” (Cal. Penal Code § 308). The language here, similar to § 2.14 is clear and unambiguous: the prohibition is limited to individuals younger than the age of 21. If we were to apply an interpretation which, say, extended this restriction to all individuals, regardless of age, it would not only distort the plain text of the statute but it would also undermine the legislative intent of the drafters. Just as this misinterpretation of Cal. Penal Code § 308 would ignore the statute’s clear language and intent, so too would an erroneous reading of § 2.14. The statute reads that; “a group of 4 or more individuals with bats on their persons who are acting in a violent manner or rallying without a valid permit”. The law requires two things and without one of these two things, the statute cannot be enforced; (a) the individuals with bats on their persons must be acting in a violent manner; (b) they must not have a valid permit. The Plaintiff and his congregation have not satisfied either of these requirements– a religious congregation hardly constitutes “ acting in a violent manner”, and regardless, the question of whether the individuals were acting in a violent manner is a triable issue– therefore the issue of material fact here is the arrest being issued completely falsely. The statute does not criminalize the act of people standing with bats, it very specifically stipulates that the action is only illegal if it is with a violent manner or without a valid permit. The Plaintiff could not have obtained a permit and his congregation were not acting in a violent manner, thus, the congregation did not meet the requirements of § 2.14 and shouldn’t have been charged with it. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Respectfully submitted, CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS /s/_________________________ Singhski, Esq. Ridgeway Bar No.25100 Counsel of Record President, Center for Individual Rights T: (505) 503-4455 E: [email protected]

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