SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-3153
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant Matrix_oc, proceeding by and through the Solicitor General of Ridgeway,
respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(5).
Attached hereto is a memorandum of law supporting dismissal.
Dated: July 8, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Insertreality
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
CYBERPHILIAC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MATRIX_OC, in his quasi-official capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Ridgeway
National Guard,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-3153
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
ON GUBERNATORIAL IMMUNITY
CYBERPHILIAC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MATRIX_OC, in his quasi-official capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Ridgeway
National Guard,
Defendant.
1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. On June 26, 2024, Matrix_Oc—Governor of Ridgeway and Commander-in-Chief of the
National Guard—was active on the Ridgeway National Guard team. Governor Matrix was located
at the primary residence of Adjutant General BrandonnLUV, joined by Mr. BrandonnLUV and
Lieutenant Governor Vincefant—both of them were also on the National Guard team. All three
officials were conducting a meeting regarding state secrets and foreign affairs.
At some point during the night, two individuals—now identified as Dataglitchs and
Cyberphiliac—silently drove a vehicle around the Oakland Heights neighborhood searching for
Mr. Brandonn’s residence. After scanning numerous mailboxes for a matching username, as well
as looking into the windows of nearby homes, Data and Cyber found Mr. Brandonn’s home and
parked their vehicle out front. At the time, Matrix, Brandon, and Vince were all inside of the
residence. Unhesitatingly, Data and Cyber rushed the front door, attempting to open it.
BrandonnLUV refused to let them in. For good reason, too. Not only did Data and Cyber rush
the home without consent or invitation, but they also have reputation for wreaking chaos and
destruction. Cyber recognized as much, stating that they were going to be “peaceful…at least [for
now].” (Def. App. 1). Governor Matrix subsequently instructed them to “get off the property” four
times over. Despite being ordered to leave the property, both Data and Cyber continued to harass
the occupants and obstruct their official duties. Having received authorization from BrandonnLUV,
Governor Matrix pulled out a baton and hit the window where Data and Cyber were standing.
Phased by the mere swing of a baton, Data and Cyber began rushing to their vehicle. Having
not yet exited the property boundary, Cyber was still on the grass. Matrix rushed out of the home,
pulled out a state-issued taser,1 and fired a single round of electrical contacts at him. The shot did
1 The TBS6 is a statewide device that is issued to law enforcement agencies, including the National Guard; its shot is
not lethal. While it does decrease player health, it cannot—and, in most cases, will not—cause another player to die.
2
not hit Cyber, nor did it injure Data in crossfire. Almost a week later, Cyber filed suit against
Governor Matrix, alleging, inter alia, that he: (a) brought unconsented harm; (b) deprived him of
due process rights; and, as a result of the alleged harm (c) committed an act that constitutes an
unauthorized exercise of his official functions. See Pl. Compl. at ¶ ¶ 33, 36, and 39.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Pleadings must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” See Rid. R. Civ. P. (Title III, Rule 8). Defendants may object to the factual
form of such allegations. Ibid. at 12(a)(5). To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(a)(5), a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted to be true, to “state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). A claim only has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the
court to draw a reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ibid.
ARGUMENT
I. Defendant Is Entitled To Absolute Immunity For His Official Acts as Governor.
The Governor carries a load like no other. From foreign and domestic policy to intrastate
considerations, he is left with lists of discretionary decisions that unequivocally affect the lives of
tens of thousands of citizens. The Framers of the Constitution recognized as much by leaving it
solely to the Governor to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” RID. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Indeed, there are core constitutional powers that no other branch of government—except for the
Governor—can execute in the interests of his constituents. Some exclusive core powers include
corresponding with the States, issuing pardons and remittances, and serving as “Commander-in-
Chief of the forces of the State…” Ibid. But a lot of core constitutional powers are nominal in
practice; their contours are loosely predicated on scholarly presumption. So understood, the
3
Governor must have “discretion to execute the laws as he sees fit, so long as he does so within the
bounds prescribed by Congress.”2 Such discretion is only necessary “to accomplish that end.”3
When the Governor enforces a core constitutional power in furtherance of his discretion,
neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature should imbue Executive considerations with interbranch
objections. See, e.g., Trump v. United States, No. 23–939, slip op. at 8 (2024) (“Congress cannot
act on, and courts cannot examine, the President’s actions on subjects within his ‘conclusive and
preclusive’ constitutional authority.”)4. This same wall that precludes courts from exercising power
to “control [the President’s] discretion * * * when he acts pursuant to [his constitutional powers],”
id., at 7, similarly prevents this Court from controlling the Governor’s exercise of core
constitutional powers—even if they are “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of [the
State Senate].” See Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
But, as relevant here, no legislative directive—express or implied—has cautioned against
the exercise of the Governor’s role as Commander-in-Chief. As such, this Court finds itself at the
“zone of twilight” where “[the Governor] and [State Senate] may have concurrent authority.” Id.
Determining who retains definitive authority in such a post is dependent on the circumstances of
the Governor’s actions. Id. History makes clear that Governor Matrix, with the exception of the
State Senate in few but rare cases, is the sole executor of his constitutional powers as Commander-
in-Chief. See FEDERALIST NO. 69 (“[Commander-in-Chief] amounts to * * * the supreme command
and direction of the military and naval forces.”). Hamilton touches on a particular instance where
2 Sophia Shams, Preserving Faithful Execution: An Examination into the Original Meaning of the Take
Care Clause and the Measures to Preserve It, Georgetown Journal of Law, Vol. 20 (2022).
3 Statement of James Madison (1789), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, 378, 379
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1854) (“If the duty to see the laws faithfully executed be required at the hands of the
executive magistrate, it would seem that it was generally intended he should have that species of power
which is necessary to accomplish that end.”).
4 While Trump discusses absolute immunity from criminal prosecution, immunity from civil liability has
also been touched on by the Supreme Court. See generally Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
4
the State Senate, rather than the Governor, directs Executive considerations—that is, when he
declares war.5 Otherwise, it is unequivocally the duty of the Governor, not the Legislature, to direct
the National Guard, oversee its operations, and ensure of its efficacy on behalf of the People.
A. The Governor Is Vested With Lists of Discretionary Policy Considerations.
Historically, courts have sanctioned immunity for government officials performing
discretionary functions within the scope of their authority. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
817 (1982) (“[I]mmunity generally is available only to officials performing discretionary
functions.”). This is because discretionary functions require much more independent judgment
than ministerial duties. Indeed, discretion is almost always “influenced by the decisionmaker’s
experiences, values, and emotions.” Id. at 816. The Framers of the United States Constitution
“sought to encourage energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy execution of the laws by placing
in the hands of a single, constitutionally indispensable, individual the ultimate authority that, in
respect to the other branches, the Constitution divides among many.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S.
681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
This principle was too reflected by the Framers of the Ridgeway Constitution. Indeed,
they vested the Governor with “supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and
sensitivity.” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. at 750. As such, he is entrusted with making “the most sensitive
and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under [the] constitutional system.” Id., at 752.
This fact alone frames a “great[er] public interest” in vesting the Governor with “the maximum
ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the duties of his office.” Ibid. (quoting Ferri v.
Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979). Judicial intervention undermines those interests. Indeed, the
5 This practice is rooted in Ridgeway’s history. See, e.g., Resolution 5, 5th Senate; Resolution 1, 6th Senate.
In both the former and latter instance, we reach the “lowest ebb” of the Governor’s powers, for the
Constitution does not grant him the core power to declare war, and such decisions are left to the Legislature.
This is one of many checks that the Constitution imposes upon the Governor and his most core powers.
5
“unique risks to the effective functioning of government” that arise when the courts interject in
core constitutional decisions might render the Governor “unduly cautious in the discharge of his
official duties.” Fitzgerald, ante, at 749, 751, 752, n. 32.
Consider a scenario that directly addresses Governor Matrix’s power as Commander-in-
Chief. In this role, he is expected to ensure that the National Guard is capable of competent
deployment, and to oversee its ministerial functions. One day, he calls a meeting with his
Lieutenant Governor and the Adjutant General—all three of them are on the National Guard team
exercising their official functions. This meeting is the topic of multiple classified materials that
concern state affairs. Governor Matrix, as Commander-in-Chief, has a constitutional duty to ensure
that the meeting—especially one of utmost confidence—is secure from enemy foray; indeed, it is
squarely within those duties to ensure that state secrets—some of which impact the day-to-day
lives of citizens—are kept confidential. During this meeting, two hoodlums breach the perimeter
of where the meeting is taking place. Consistent with his duties to ensure seamless and preclusive
operations of the National Guard, Governor Matrix issues several verbal warnings to the
individuals. They refuse to leave; in turn, he pulls out a state-issued baton and swings it at them.
Both individuals scatter and leave the property. That is exactly the case here.
The Ridgeway Constitution does not explicitly confer upon Governor Matrix the authority
to defend state secrets in a meeting; it is implied in his all-encompassing duties as Commander-in-
Chief. That places us in the “zone of twilight,” Youngstown, at 637, where the distinct
circumstances of his implicit discretionary authority must be weighed to determine how it is best
distributed. Here, the Governor’s implicit constitutional obligation to defend state secrets and
ensure that the National Guard is functioning within the interests of the People is unequivocally
distributed to him and only him. No theories of law need be considered, as the above-mentioned
6
facts of this case draw this controversy to a short close: While the Senate can pass laws that regulate
activity pertaining to the intrusion of state secrets, the Governor must ensure that those laws are
faithfully executed; here, he did so by acting decisively to protect the security of the meeting—an
official one, at that—and the confidentiality of state secrets. Governor Matrix is thus entitled to
absolute immunity for his official acts as Commander-in-Chief, which relate to the adequate
function of the National Guard, but do not fall exclusively on explicit constitutional powers.6
B. Separations of Powers Principles Tilt Favorably For Absolute Immunity.
Aside from the rare scenario that has borne fruit before our very eyes, there exists a myriad
of other gubernatorial functions that should be free from interbranch objection. Take, for instance,
his ability to issue pardons and remittances. If at any time he deems it so necessary, the Governor
may, consistent with constitutional limits, pardon any offense—even if it flares the tempers of the
People or unfairly weighs against the scales of justice. See RID. CONST. art. IV, § 1. In such cases,
the Governor’s discretionary power to pardon is protected from judicial or legislative interference.
So too here. His actions as Commander-in-Chief—albeit mostly undefined—should on no
occasion be circumscribed by the courts or otherwise clipped by the legislature. See Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 646; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 241 (1926); Department of Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (“[C]ourts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.”). So too should this Court.
Like the President of the Republic, the Governor of our lone State has powers of “unrivaled
gravity and breadth.” Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800 (2020); Trump, supra, at 6. Such powers
6 Congress, for instance, has yet to raise notable objections to the President’s core constitutional power to
recognize foreign states. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 28 (2015) (“Over the last 100 years, there has
been scarcely any debate over the President's power to recognize foreign states.”). For good reason, too.
Indeed, in this respect, the Legislature has acknowledged the importance of speaking “with one voice.”
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000). As such, the weight of evidence indicates
that Congress, through its own acquiescence, has “accepted that the power to recognize foreign states and
governments and their territorial bounds is exclusive to the Presidency.” Kerry, supra. (emphasis added).
7
may no doubt be abused, “but that is a bad reason for having judges supervise their exercise,
whatever the legal formulas within which such supervision would nominally be confined.”
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 172 (1948). Indeed, “[t]he Founders, in their wisdom, made
[the Governor] * * * the Commander-in-Chief…” Id. at 173. (emphasis added). Plaintiff now seeks
an injunction that directly—if not inadvertently—affects his core constitutional powers as
Commander-in-Chief. If so issued, this Court would walk a fine line between separations of powers
interests and liberal interpretations of the State Constitution; indeed, an injunction—or any relief
of that matter—related to his official acts as Commander-in-Chief would “control [the Governor’s]
discretion * * *.” Trump, supra, at 7. The “unique risks to the effective functioning of government,”
id., at 13, that may arise out of an injunction are wholly problematic. This Court should thus reject
these claims, dismiss the Complaint, and affirm that Matrix is entitled to absolute immunity.
C. Private Suits for Official Acts Would Only Disrupt State Functions.
Civil damages liability, as the Supreme Court recognized in Fitzgerald, would “chill[] [the
Governor]” from taking the “bold and unhesitating action” required of an independent Executive.
Fitzgerald, ante, at 745. Although it is undoubtedly true that the Governor is subject to few suits,
“the threat of trial * * * [and] judgment” is a proven deterrent to “to distort [Gubernatorial]
decision-making.” Trump, No. 23–939 at 13. That is why there exists exclusive methods—
arguably intended methods—for Gubernatorial accountability.
The Impeachments Clause of the Ridgeway Constitution vests the Legislature with “the
power to order impeachments, which shall in all cases be by a vote of two-thirds of its members.”
RID. CONST. art. VI, § 3. Impeachments may be levied against “[e]very officer of State * * * judicial
or executive…” Id. This tried-and-true remedy for gross official acts exists for good reason—to
impose a constitutional check on Executive powers. Indeed, “[a] rule of absolute immunity” will
not leave the State “without sufficient protection against the * * * [misconduct of] the [Governor].”
8
Fitzgerald, ante, at 757. That is, of course, why there “remains the constitutional remedy of
impeachment.” Ibid. He is also subject to a myriad of informal checks on his power. For instance,
the Governor is “subjected to constant scrutiny by [both] the press [and the voters].” Ibid. And as
the Court noted in Fitzgerald, constant oversight by the Legislature “may [also] serve to deter
[Gubernatorial] abuses of office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment.” Ibid.
None of these checks on the Governor’s power—both formal and informal—compel nor
necessitate judicial counseling. That is precisely why the Governor is entitled to immunity from
civil actions. And because absolute immunity “is an immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense
to liability,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), courts have “repeatedly have stressed
the importance of resolving immunity” at the “earliest possible stage in litigation.” See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984). This Court
should thus resolve the question of immunity at this stage of the litigation, and Rule 12(a)(5)7
motions have traditionally been sufficient means for doing so. See, e.g., Seeds of Peace Collective
v. City of Pittsburgh, 453 F. App'x 211, 6 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[Immunity] is a proper basis for a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”); see also Thomas v. Independence Township, 463 F.3d 285, 291
(3d Cir. 2006); Smigelski v. Peters, 558 F. App'x 65, 3 (2d Cir. 2014) (“A [§ 3114] claim may * *
* be dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where * * * the movant is entitled to immunity.”).
II. Even If Absolute Immunity Is Rejected, Defendant Is Entitled to Blanket Immunity
From Claims That Do Not Explicitly Impose Liability Against The Government.
A State “cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.” Railroad Co. v. Tennessee,
101 U. S. 337, 339 (1880). This principle reflects the inherent nature of sovereignty, wherein a
State cannot be subject to the litigation of an individual without its consent. See Federalist No. 81
7 Rule 12(a)(5) motions are a state analogue to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The subsequently cited cases affirm that failure to state a claim motions—as permitted under
both 12(a)(5) and 12(b)(6) are generally permissible to resolve questions of immunity.
9
(Alexander Hamilton) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent.”). Thus, “[t]he State gives itself immunity from any claim except
for a few in which the legislature explicitly authorizes suit against the government.” Titanic v. Nev,
1 Rid. 80, 84-5 (2023) (citing 1 R. Stat. § 3203).
While the defendant is sued in his quasi-official capacity, this Court has previously
construed such a capacity as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”—or, in other words, a hodgepodge of
both individual and official capacity relief. See Seal_Love v. Dps_k, RSC-CV-2544 (2024). Indeed,
as this Court explained, claims in quasi-official capacity is the same as the case “being against the
public official in the official capacity.” Id. And consistent with state statute, “[c]ases against an
individual in official capacity [...] shall be construed as cases against the government.” 1 R. Stat.
§ 3205. But quasi-official relief is exclusive to the plaintiff’s third cause of action—which he is
wholly and absolutely immune from. He is, however, also immune from the first and second causes
of action because he was acting officially in his role as Commander-in-Chief, executing core
obligations and duties consistent with the State Constitution.
Under the Civil Claims Act, “[t]he government * * * is immune from all claims,” except
those under Section 2, “and later laws [unless] liability is explicitly created against the
government.” 1 R. Stat. § 3203. Governor Matrix is thus immune from the first and second causes
of action because he was acting in his official capacity, and they are located in Section 1 of the
Act. Thus, both Battery and Deprivation of Rights does not explicitly create liability for the
government. And because it is not located under Section 1, the Civil Claims Act confirms that there
exists statutory immunity from the plaintiff’s claims.
10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss the Complaint and entitle Governor
Matrix to absolute immunity, or, alternatively, dismiss Counts 1 and 2 for statutory immunity.
Dated: July 8, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Insertreality
Deputy Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
