IN THE RIDGEWAY ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
GRAMMA12221,
Plaintiff,
v.
PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT;
COMMISSIONER_ JASON, in their
official capacity as the Chief of Police of
the Palmer Police Department;
ROOTENTRY, in their official capacity
as a Captain of the Palmer Police
Department; ALLYCORETTI, in their
official capacity as an Acting Lieutenant
of the Palmer Police Department,
Defendants.
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Administrative Claim No.
DE FE NDAN T S’ MO T I O N T O DI SM ISS
Defendants Palmer Police Department, Chief Commissioner_ Jason, Captain RootEntry, and
Captain AllyCoretti, proceeding by and through the Solicitor General of Ridgeway, respectfully
moves this Court to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rid. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(5). Attached hereto is
a memorandum of law supporting dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Dated: July 10, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
GRAMMA12221,
Plaintiff,
v.
PALMER POLICE DEPARTMENT;
COMMISSIONER_ JASON, in their
official capacity as the Chief of Police of
the Palmer Police Department;
ROOTENTRY, in their official capacity
as a Captain of the Palmer Police
Department; ALLYCORETTI, in their
official capacity as an Acting Lieutenant
of the Palmer Police Department,
Defendants.
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Administrative Claim No.
MO T IO N T O DI SM ISS AD M I NI ST R AT I VE CO M P L A I NT
FO R FAI LUR E T O STAT E A CLA IM
1
FAC T UAL BAC KG RO U N D
A. TH E PUB LI C AFFA IR S UN IT .
In January of 2024, Lieutenant AyeItzSanti (“Santi”) was the command officer of the
Public Affairs Unit (“PAU”) of the Palmer Police Department. On the 19th of January, Santi
appointed Plaintiff Gramma12221 (“Gramma”) as the Sergeant of the Division. One month later,
Santi transferred from PAU to Special Investigations—as a parting note, Santi expressed much
concern regarding Gramma’s performance in the Division.1 These concerns were duly considered
by Department leadership, but no action was taken against Gramma.
Following Santi’s transfer, Lieutenant Junonisch (“Junon”) provisionally assumed
leadership of the PAU. During his tenure, Public Affairs was issued numerous tasks, including a
monthly press release. In February, the Division published the release; however, it was published
three (3) days after the assigned deadline, and it did not satisfy Department standards. 2 Gramma,
as Sergeant of the Division, handled and oversaw its day-to-day operations; as such, Department
command expressed to him their dissatisfaction with the February press release.3
Not even one month later, the Division underwent another major shift in leadership.
Junonisch was replaced by Lieutenant AllyCoretti (“Ally”) to lead PAU. Before leaving, Junon
briefed his successor on the current state of the Division, including Gramma’s performance. For
one month, business was usual—the Division was performing its ministerial tasks related to Public
Affairs, and everything was smooth sailing. In May, however, Sergeant Gramma filed a two (2)
month leave of absence request from June 11 to August 15. Because of the extended nature of the
leave, his request was turned over to Department leadership.4
It was agreed by both Gramma and Department command that his prolonged absence
would be detrimental to the orderly function of the Division.5 In turn, both mutually agreed that he
would be exempt from in-game activity but required to continue performing basic administrative
tasks through Discord.6 Two (2) months is an extraordinary request that is seldom issued; it was
1 App. 1.
2 Ibid. at 2.
3 Ibid. at 3.
4 Ibid. at 4.
5 Ibid. at 5.
6 Ibid. at 6.
2
therefore an extreme courtesy—a rare one, at that—for Department command to provide him with
such leniency. Even so, they entrusted that Gramma was a man of his word and granted his leave
of absence. In short time, Gramma would prove unreliable and lapse on the conditions of his leave.
Enter June 2024. The time has once again come for the Public Affairs Unit to prepare an
end-of-the-month press release. Chief Jason gave them three days to prepare a simple yet
informative graphic.7 On the day of the deadline, the Division made it clear that they could not
complete the graphic within the deadline.8 Instead of requesting an extension to complete the
graphic before the following month, Gramma requested to proceed without one at all and to
complete the assignment through other means (i.e., documented release).9
Having taken the lead to complete the assignment, Gramma willfully signed up to complete
it within its approaching deadline. When asked for an update on his progress, it became obvious
that Gramma was not able to coordinate the unit administratively or complete assignments as he
had initially agreed to.10 Chief Jason quickly addressed Gramma regarding his inefficacy—in
response, he stated that public affairs was not his “strong suit.”11 He also communicated to Chief
Jason that the conditions of his administrative leave were “not working out.”12 In turn, he requested
to transfer to the Tactical Response Unit.13 Chief Jason granted his request—one of many instances
where the Department was extremely forbearing to Gramma’s inefficacy.14
In light of Gramma’s desire to transfer, Captain RootEntry was authorized to conduct a
reform on the entirety of the PAU. However, because Gramma was halfway through his leave of
absence, and because Tactical Response Unit (“TIU”) is demanding of in-game activity,
Department command demoted Sergeant Gramma1221 to Corporal and retained him in Public
Affairs until he returned from his leave of absence.15 This was a seemingly considerate decision
because TIU is extremely demanding of activity. And because Gramma himself made it clear that
7 Ibid. at 7.
8 Ibid. at 8.
9 Ibid. at 9.
10 Ibid. at 10.
11 Ibid. at 11.
12 Ibid. at 12.
13 Ibid. at 13.
14 Ibid. at 14.
15 Ibid. at 15.
3
he could not meet modest activity requirement in PAU, it is unlikely he could do so in TIU. Gramma
protested this decision to Chief Jason and subsequently initiated pre-litigation actions.
B. TH E PRE SE NT CO N T ROVE R SY .
Following the demotion, Gramma—through his attorneys—filed a cease-and-desist letter
regarding “oppress[ion], coerce[ment], and harass[ment].”16 His attorneys further alleged that
Gramma’s demotion was the product of corruption, harassment, and official misconduct, inter alia.
Puzzled by the note, Chief Jason confronted Gramma, seeking to resolve his concerns. In response,
Gramma informed Jason and the Department that he instructed his attorneys not to send the
letter.17 This allegation prompted an inquiry by the Ridgeway Bar Association but was later
dismissed as it was later discovered that Gramma deceived Chief Jason regarding the letter.18 This
pattern of deceitfulness prompted Chief Jason to yet again confront Gramma. After speaking with
him, Gramma informed Chief Jason that he was challenging the employment practice.
In July of 2024, Gramma filed suit against the Palmer Police Department, naming Chief
Jason, Captain Root, and Lieutenant Ally as co-defendants. In his Complaint, Gramma alleges that
he was the subject of “targeting, harassment, coercion, obstruction, and abuse…” by Ally.19 This
discriminate treatment is alleged to have derived from “micromanage[ment] of the Public Affairs
Unit” that, at the time, “disallowed the plaintiff to speak his thoughts without oppression,
obstructing him from his duties.”20 Despite his recollection of events, Gramma was given complete
and total creative freedom over his assignments—he even assumed the lead over the July press
release without objection from Lieutenant Ally or any member of Department command.
Furthermore, Gramma was micromanaged due to his inefficacy in PAU.
Turning to the crux of his allegations regarding the unlawful demotion, those claims are too
unsupported by law, nor do they constitute a cause of action. Indeed, as depicted in the paper trail
of evidence above, Gramma knew—and mutually consented to—being demoted from his current
position. He also knew that this demotion was due, in part, to his inability to sustain the conditions
of his leave of absence—a fact that he, despite omitting in his Complaint, admitted and agreed to
16 Ibid. at 16.
17 Ibid. at 17.
18 Ibid. at 18.
19 See P. Comp. at ¶ 11.
20 Ibid. at ¶ 12.
4
with Chief Jason. The factual content of Gramma’s Complaint shifts a narrative that is supported
by evidence to one of mere conjecture that is sustainable only under his narrative of events.
STA NDAR D O F REVI EW
Pleadings must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” See Rid. R. Civ. P. (Title III, Rule 8). Defendants may object to the factual
form of such allegations. Id. at 12(a)(5). To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(a)(5), a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted to be true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). A claim only has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to
draw a reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.
ARGUM E N T
I. TH E DE M O T I O N O F SE RG E A NT GR AM M A WA S LAW F UL.
This case presents over seventeen (17) causes of action against the Palmer Police
Department, as well as Chief Jason, Captain Root, and Lieutenant Ally. The claims are divided into
several categories, as listed in order: (1) disciplinary action while on leave; (2) “fear” of disciplinary
action; (3) oppression, coercion, or obstruction of employment; (4) arbitrary punishment; (5)
issuance of a shadow blacklist; and (6) official misconduct. The defendants have no beef with the
factual allegation that Gramma was demoted; they do, however, contest the alleged ‘unlawful
nature’ of that action in light of the woeful misrepresentations and omissions of Gramma’s
Complaint. For the reasons below, this Court should dismiss the Complaint.
A. GR AM M A ST IP UL AT E D MUT UA L CO N DI T I O N S FO R LE AVE O F AB SE N C E .
The gravamen of the plaintiff’s claims rests on the notion that his demotion is unlawful.
Branching off that core allegation, plaintiff alleges that the demotion is doubly unlawful because it
was issued while he was on a department-approved leave of absence. It is agreed that his demotion
was processed while he was on leave; it is denied, however, that the demotion was unlawful. First,
Gramma knowingly agreed to continue performing various administrative tasks while on his leave
of absence, with the exception of in-game activity requirements. Those conditions were stipulated
and agreed upon by both Gramma and Chief Jason. Second, when he failed to sustain the conditions,
he willingly subjected himself to administrative action. Even so, neither the Department nor Chief
Jason took immediate action when Gramma failed to fulfill them. Instead, both Gramma and Chief
5
Jason agreed that the conditions were not working, and that it would be best if he were relocated to
another division. These are both material omissions that Gramma intentionally left out of his
Complaint because they are detrimental to both his case and the reliability of his allegations.
1. Gramma Was Not Entitled to Section 3401 Protections.
Plaintiff contends that his demotion is in violation of state law because his leave was met
with “fear of * * * [and execution of ] termination, retribution, or other forms of disciplinary
action.” 2 R. Stat. § 3401. This specific provision concerns an employee’s right to a leave of absence
for seven days—or, if requested, an extension to no more than fourteen days; during this period,
the statute explains, the employee cannot be subject to administrative action. In a scenario where
this statute is meant to be enforced—such as in cases where an employee must take leave due to a
family or medical emergency, real-life vacation, or other emergency responsibility—it is
unequivocally true that an employer cannot take any administrative action against the employee.
But Gramma did not invoke his right to leave under Section 3401; it was requested pursuant to an
exclusive department policy because his request for leave did not relate to a special circumstance
that warranted leave by right. See, e.g., § 3405(i)-(iv).
Employees that are issued provisional leave through their employer are not entitled to the
same guarantees under §3401. Indeed, employers—like PPD—reserve discretion to grant or deny
a leave of absence request unless it is invoked by right under §3401. This key distinction between
statutory leave and discretionary leave cannot be understated—one is required by law, and the
other is left to the discretion of an employer. If so granted, an employee is at the behest of their
employer, and they are subject to any administrative action—unless prohibited by law—while they
are on discretionary leave. That is precisely the case here—Gramma filed a request for
discretionary leave through his employer; he did not invoke his right to leave under §3401. He
concedes this point at the very beginning of his Complaint.21 This uncontested fact thus confirms
that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim a violation of a statute that he never invoked.22
21 Ibid. at ¶ 9.
22 It could be plausibly argued that any request for leave of absence automatically invokes §3401, and that an employee
is entitled to its statutory protections for a minimum seven days—or, if requested, a maximum of fourteen days. But
even if this construction of the statute is accepted, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim a violation of §3401 because he
did not claim an extension. Nor was he within the statutory timeframe to be free of administrative action while on leave.
Indeed, by the time he was terminated, his leave of absence had exceeded one (1) month—at this point, the department
6
2. Gramma Failed to Sustain the Conditions of His Discretionary Leave.
Discretionary leave is often stipulated by an employer and the employee; the conditions for
leave are generally based on individual circumstances. So too here. Instead of invoking his leave by
right, the plaintiff requested a two (2) month leave of absence through his employer’s policies.
Because this request exceeded the statutory timeframe under §3401, Chief Jason and Gramma
stipulated his absence on the condition that he continue to perform administrative tasks over
Discord. For over one month, Gramma neglected those conditions and refused to uphold his role
as Sergeant of the PAU—he too recognized this, admitting that the conditions were “not working
out.” Chief Jason nonetheless gave him numerous chances to redeem himself and made available
several opportunities for Gramma to fulfill the conditions of his leave. For weeks, these back-to-
back opportunities were dismissed or otherwise neglected by Gramma.
3. Gramma’s Demotion Was Agreed Upon With Department Command.
Gramma’s acquiescence to the conditions of his leave constitutes a reasonable
understanding that he knew he would be accountable for neglecting them. Indeed, Gramma knew
at the time—and still knows today—that he was not entitled to leave by right under §3401 because
his request exceeded the statutory timeframe. As such, his leave was at full discretion of Chief
Jason and the Department command. Thus, when he neglected the conditions of his discretionary
leave, it was up to his employer to weigh administrative action, and so they did. Rather than taking
immediate action, however, Chief Jason gave Gramma another shot by offering to transfer him to
another unit. But he only offered to facilitate a unit transfer after his leave of absence because TRU,
in contrast to PAU, is demanding of in-game activity—something Gramma could not offer.
In light of the gross inactivity of PAU, Captain Root, with approval from Chief Jason,
conducted a reform on the Unit. By the time of this reform, both Gramma and Chief Jason had
stipulated that the conditions of his leave were “not working out,” and that his services would not
be needed until he returned from his leave of absence. Captain Root therefore demoted Gramma to
Corporal because he had practically removed himself from the Unit. Despite his previous
had full discretion to take whatever action necessary to remedy his inefficacy. See, e.g., Chevron USA Inc. v. Echazabal,
536 US 73, 80 (2002) (“expressing one item… excludes another [related one] left unmentioned.”). Because the statute
prevents an agency from taking administrative action against an employee during leave, it does not exclude the agency
from taking such action once the specific conditions of statutory leave cease to apply.
7
correspondence with Chief Jason, Gramma took issue with this action, and he now challenges it in
this Court. That challenge falls flat on its face for two reasons.
a. First, his “demotion” was the product of a mutual agreement by both Gramma and Chief
Jason. He literally agreed to being demoted because he knew that he could not faithfully uphold the
conditions of his discretionary leave. Yet he now challenges that very agreement, seeking to paint
a misconstrued picture and attempting to portray Chief Jason as an unfaithful, corrupt employer.
Neither characterization suffices, and the evidence here favors the legality of his dismissal.
b. Second, even if his demotion was made during a leave of absence, Gramma is not entitled to
recuperate damages for the administrative action. On one hand, he never invoked leave by right; he
simply requested leave through his employer, which is distinct from statutory leave under §3401.
On the other hand, his leave exceeds the seven-day timeline—including an extension—set out in
§3401, foreclosing him from claiming statutory leave. Gramma at all times was on leave at the
behest of his employer; thus, he is not entitled to claim a violation of statutory leave.
B. “SH AD OW BLAC K LI ST S ” DO NO T RE LAT E TO IN -HO U SE EM P L OY M E NT
CO N SI DE R AT IO N S ; TH EY ARE CO N FI NE D TO HI RI N G PR AC T I C E S.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, it is unlawful for departments to review an
application and issue a “shadow-blacklist.” 2 R. Stat. § 4110. But, like most terms, the APA does
not define “shadow-blacklist” within its provisions. When faced with such an ambiguity, it is
emphatically the province of the judicial branch to “say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 177 (1803). When interpreting the statute, this Court is to “enforce [the] plain and
unambiguous statutory language according to its terms.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,
560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010). That is, terms reasoned by their “ordinary, common meaning.” Holster
v. Gatco, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1575, 1577 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But the terms here are not
unambiguous, nor do they end this inquiry at its first step. Rather, they require an in-depth inquiry
as to what constitutes a “shadow-blacklist” and whether it is applicable here. Cf., Holster v. Gatco,
Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1575, 1577 (2010) (“[i]f the * * * terms are unambiguous, our review…ends.”).
In its ordinary use, a “shadow-blacklist” is traditionally coupled with the practice of an
employer passing the preliminary stages of an application but failing the final outcome. Generally,
employers will execute a “shadow-blacklist” because of their subjective view of an applicant. This
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practice curtails civil liability against employers because, on its face, a “shadow-blacklist[ed]”
application is just that—one performed in utmost secrecy that appears normal to the public.
A statute like the APA requires careful attention from courts—its language affects virtually
every employer and employee in the State; as such, there is little to no room for error in its
construction. The meaning of a “shadow-blacklist” is no exception. In interpreting its meaning,
“[i]t is foundational” that the statute be “read as a whole” because statutory language, “plain or
not, depends on context.” King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff alleges that Chief Jason facilitated a “shadow-blacklist” by “issu[ing] a permanent
demotion * * * from Sergeant to Corporal” that, in practice, “[prevents] the plaintiff from ever
reaching the rank of Sergeant again.”23 Not only is this factually untrue, but the demotion is easily
reconciled with the text of the APA because it does not constitute a bona fide “shadow-blacklist.”
Indeed, when read in harmony with the surrounding provisions of the APA, a “shadow-blacklist”
is smack dab in the middle of provisions concerning hiring practices and employment applications.
Context and structure both confirm that a “shadow-blacklist” thus only relates to hiring decisions,
not in-house employment actions—including demotions. But even if this Court disagrees with that
construction, and the statute is read as applied by the plaintiff, his claim fails twice over.24
CO NC LUSIO N
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss the Complaint.
Dated: July 10, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
23 Ibid. at ¶ 71
24 The plaintiff’s “permanent demotion” does not constitute a “blacklist” from regaining his position in the future.
When Chief Jason stated that the action was “permanent,” he was referencing that the demotion was exclusively
“permanent” and not subject to reversal. Read in harmony with the context of his messages, Chief Jason never implied
that the demotion foreclosed Gramma from assuming role as Sergeant in the future. Plaintiff nonetheless paints the
picture that Chief Jason curtailed the language of the APA, defied its provisions, and blacklisted him—that is untrue.
