SUPERIOR COURT OF RIDGEWAY
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-3089
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Ab_bae, proceeding by and through the Solicitor General of
Ridgeway, respectfully moves this Court to enter summary judgment pursuant to
Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Attached hereto is a memorandum of law supporting the
entrance of summary judgment in his favor.
Dated: June 29, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Counsel for Defendant
YAAHZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
AB_BAE, in her quasi-official capacity
as a Sergeant of the Palmer Police
Department,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. RSC-CV-3089
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
YAAHZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
AB_BAE, in her quasi-official capacity
as a Sergeant of the Palmer Police
Department,
Defendant.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A party against whom a claim * * * is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought may, at any time * * * move for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof.” Rid. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Summary judgment is appropriate “when
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). Defendant takes issue with
no portion of the Complaint or any factual matter therein; thus, as a matter of law,
he is unequivocally entitled to summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO STATUTORY IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 3114 CLAIMS.
For decades, courts have liberally construed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims to create
an immunity for government officials. Generally, when officials abuse their offices,
“action[s] for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). But in
a time where officials who merely execute their sworn duties can be the gravamen
for a civil lawsuit, “the * * * fear of personal monetary liability and harassing
litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” Ibid. Thus, the
immunity described above—called “qualified immunity”—protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1986). An official qualifies for qualified immunity in two ways: First,
courts must decide (1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out
a violation of a constitutional right; and, if so (2) whether that right was “clearly
established” at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001). This immunity is recognized as a defense to §3114 claims.
See generally Seal_Love v. Dps_K, R. Supp. RSC-CV-2544 (2024).
1. Plaintiff was sitting in his home when numerous vindictive officers
swarmed his home, searched his vehicle, and attempted to effectuate a siege of his
tranquil neighborhood. That is the first narrative of this case. See Appendix A. On
its face, the video evidence supports the plaintiff’s narrative and makes for good
rhetoric to find these officers liable. But the second narrative is arguably the most
contradictory. See Appendix B. It illustrates the real-world costs of video editing
software and counsels a strong case in favor of statutory immunity. In contrast to the
first narrative, the second shines light on the breadth of the evidence in this case.
While the edited video (App. A) shows ill-intentioned officers raiding a seemingly
innocent civilian, the uncut video (App. B) shows a crazed gunman—the plaintiff—
in the midst of a stationary assault on law enforcement from inside his home. For
over fourteen minutes, the plaintiff tormented his community by opening fire at law
enforcement officers and recklessly firing stray bullets at neighboring homes. If it
were not for supplemental video evidence, these officers could lose their jobs, suffer
a devastating blow to their reputation, and be forced to fork out hundreds of dollars,
if not thousands, to cover both damages and legal fees because of illusory evidence.
a. It is a well-settled rule of constitutional law that every citizen has the
right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure.1 See U.S. CONST. AMEND.
IV. A seizure is reasonable when, and only when, there exists probable cause “to
believe that the individual has committed a crime.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 213 (1979). Generally, probable cause exists “where the facts and circumstances
within [an officers] knowledge * * * [are] sufficient in themselves to * * * [believe]
that' an offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be arrested].”
1 Reasonable seizures are deeply rooted in a wealth of learned treatises concerning private property.
John Locke is an attested source for philosophical understanding of contemporary systems,
particularly property. Under his analogy of the question, property originates in the state of nature;
or, in other words, property “that which God gave to mankind in common.” John Locke, The
Second Treatise on Civil Government § 25 (1690). The acquisition of private property is thus
outside the concept of mutual compact, and instead rooted in the belief of natural rights—life,
liberty, and property. Locke’s understanding underscores the fundamental understanding that the
government—or more broadly, the public—must respect and protect these natural rights.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). Defendant had more than enough
to reason to believe that the plaintiff was committing a crime because, in the presence
of law enforcement, he unlawfully discharged his firearm, killed and attempted to
kill police officers, and intentionally resisted arrest. Those facts alone, especially
because crimes had been—and still were—being committed, justify the search and
debilitate the plaintiff’s claim that it constituted an unconstitutional seizure.
b. There was not a clearly established constitutional or statutory right that
prevented or otherwise cabined the defendant from searching the plaintiff’s vehicle.
A right is clearly established “when its 'contours [are] sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In practice, it could plausibly be
asserted that the Fourth Amendment is “clearly established” in §3114 cases because
it invariably applies to the actions of police. But the right allegedly violated “must
be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it
was clearly established.” Id. at 641. In this case, the inquiry is one of objectivity:
whether a reasonable officer could have believed that searching a vehicle, with
probable cause to believe that the owner is committing or has committed a crime,
was a lawful execution of his duties in light of the information the officers possessed.
Elemental Fourth Amendment principles unequivocally confirm that a search based
on probable cause, as is here, is not unreasonable. Indeed, it is “not obvious” from
the general principles of the Fourth Amendment “that the conduct of the
officer[]…violated the Amendment.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 616 (1999).
Accordignly, no right was clearly established, and the plaintiff is not entitled to
further pursue civil action against a defendant who is entitled to statutory immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should issue summary judgment in favor
of the Defendant and deny relief to Plaintiff.
Dated: June 29, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ S. Stickza
Stickza
Solicitor General
Ridgeway Department of Justice
1 County Annex
Palmer, Ridgeway 33368
Counsel for Defendant
