IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY
ACTIVATED113,
Petitioner,
v.
TIERTWOKID,
Respondent.
Case No. RSC-CV-3042
Presiding Judge: Hon. Arthur_Chen
OPINION AND ORDER
1. Petitioner brings to this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition being received,
the government was instructed to reply. Both parties, in their filings, briefed the issue now before
the court.
2. Upon review, it is clear to me that counsel for the petitioner has obviously not read the case law
cited in the petition. The blatant misquoting and misapplication of the precedent handed down in
ZachCasisbeast is frankly disheartening and entirely unbecoming of an officer of this court. Let
me be clear: this court is not a stage for grandstanding your illiteracy. Counselors have an
obligation to this court to present the matter honestly, completely, and without attempting to bend
what is otherwise a very clear opinion to their whims by expressly leaving out the key contextual
information that is literally in the next sentence. The only ‘bright side’ on that fact is that the
counselor(s) responsible are likely doing this work pro bono.
BACKGROUND
3. Petitioner, a private citizen, and Respondent, a Ridgeway County Sheriff’s Deputy, were
standing outside the Palmer Police Department station when a third party began to stab
Respondent with a knife.
4. Petitioner fired two gunshots at the third party before the respondent tased them. After the third
party was tased, Petitioner continued to fire four more gunshots, striking and killing the third
party.
5. Respondent arrested and charged Petitioner with voluntary manslaughter in relation to this
incident.
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6. Petitioner argues that their actions are covered by the good samaritan statutes, and thus the
record must be cleared.
ANALYSIS
7. The correct test to be applied in this matter is that established in In re ZachCasisbeast, 1 R. Supp.
12 (2022), and consisting of two parts: (1) whether the police were legally entitled to make that
arrest, and (2) whether the petitioner is actually innocent of the charges with which they are
charged. If both answers are no, the charge must be removed.
8. Petitioner contends that, under the good samaritan laws, the police lost legal entitlement to make
an arrest based on the facts available to them. This could not be further from the truth—good
samaritan statutes are not a mandatory factor that police officers must consider before making an
arrest. Fundamentally, an arrest is lawful when “the police either had a judicial warrant ordering
an arrest, or the police had probable cause that a crime was committed.” Id. at 12. This context is
conveniently left out by the petitioner in their filing.
9. Probable cause exists that the petitioner committed voluntary manslaughter based on the facts
presented to the court.
10. With respect to the second test, petitioner contends that they are factually innocent, satisfying the
second element of the charge, based upon the good samaritan statutes found at 7 R. Stat. § 3201.
11. On its face, this is a plausible argument. The court agrees that the petitioner was, in fact,
defending the respondent from significant harm. However, § 3201 lists numerous exceptions to
the protections afforded by the statute. Among them are that “individuals who intentionally or
recklessly injure or obstruct on-duty members of an emergency service who are conducting their
official duties are not protected under this provision.“ 7 R. Stat. § 3201(iv).
12. The petitioner acted recklessly when they disregarded the attempt of law enforcement to
apprehend the third party assailant. A police response, by moving away from the attack and
drawing a non-lethal weapon, is clearly visible in the video submitted by the petitioner before
any shots are fired.
13. The petitioner obstructed the official duties of Respondent by killing a person they were trying to
apprehend.
CONCLUSION
14. Because there was probable cause to effect an arrest, the first element is satisfied and the second
element must be considered. Good samaritan immunity, if demonstrated, would satisfy the
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second criteria. Nonetheless, it is not demonstrated in this matter. Because Petitioner obstructed
Respondent, an on-duty member of an emergency service who was conducting official duties,
and did so recklessly, the petitioner is not eligible for good samaritan immunity. As such, the
second element is not satisfied. The court is not confident that a reasonable hypothetical jury
could not convict the petitioner based on all facts available to the court.
15. The petition for habeas corpus relief is DENIED.
Dated: June 20, 2024 SO ORDERED:
_______________________________
Hon. notsfeelings
Magistrate Judge
Ridgeway County, Ridgeway
APPROVED:
_______________________________
Hon. Arthur_Chen
Superior Court Judge
Ridgeway County, Ridgeway
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