Ridgeway Unified Courts

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF RIDGEWAY

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THE STATE OF RIDGEWAY RIDGEWAY SUPERIOR COURT Activated113 Plaintiff, v. Canyoudrown, in his quasi-official capacity as a City of Palmer Police Officer, Defendant. Case No. RSC-CV-3038 RESPONSE TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED Presiding Judge: Hon. Koala4life Plaintiff Activated 113, by and through counsel, files this response in opposition to Defendant Canyoudrown’s Rid. Civ. Pro R.12(a)(5) motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant’s motion. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. STATEMENT OF FACTS On the 11th of June, 2024, Plaintiff was standing in the center of the crosswalk near the Ridgeway National Guard recruitment building in the city of Palmer. By standing in the center of the crosswalk, Plaintiff did not force vehicles to go around them, thus deviating from normal traffic patterns because no vehicle would attempt a turn involving their vehicle covering the area where Plaintiff was standing. Plaintiff was standing in the middle of a zebra crossing crosswalk, in front of a pedestrian sidewalk and lamppost. Defendant parked his vehicle, then walked up to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff, seeing this, walked back onto the sidewalk and was cited by the Defendant for violating Title 7, Section 23 of the Ridgeway Vehicle Code. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW It is “only the extraordinary cases in which dismissal is proper” for failure to state a claim. See United States v.City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). A court may dismiss a complaint as a matter of the law only if the complaint: (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory; or fails to support a cognizable legal claim. Robertson v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534, (9th Cir. 1984). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume that the complaint’s factual allegations are true and should construe all inferences from them in the non-moving parties favor. See Thompson v Davis, 295 F.3d, 890, 895, (9th Cir. 2002); Baliestri v Palifica Police Department., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim can be granted under Rid. Civ. Pro. R. 12(a)(5) and 28(b)(2) but should not be granted unless it appears that beyond unreasonable doubt, that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief, (See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). As aforementioned in Thompson v Davis aswell as Baliestri v Palifica Police Department, the court must accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from the plaintiff’s (non-moving party) favour. Plaintiff’s complaint contains cognizable legal theories and sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss should be denied. III. ARGUMENTS A. Analysis of § 7.23 “The act of intentionally preventing motor vehicles from passing freely along a roadway, entering and exiting a roadway or hindering the regular flow of traffic. This includes obstruction of entrance and exit points for both private and public property”. To first understand whether the Plaintiff’s actions were in breach of § 7.23 of the Vehicle Code, we must understand the term “regular flow of traffic”. “In short, in order to interfere with the normal flow of traffic, some traffic must have actually been disrupted or blocked.” People v. Lucynski, SC 162833, (Mich. Jul. 26, 2022). In People v Lucynski, the standard for interference with the normal flow of traffic is that “some traffic must have actually been disrupted or blocked”. To tackle the first criteria for interference of the normal flow of vehicular traffic, which is that some traffic must have been “disrupted”, suggests that there has to be some degree of disorder in the flow of traffic. In the attached clip upon filing of the case, we can see that Defendant’s police cruiser is able to complete its turn onto the road, despite the Plaintiff not moving to give more way for the vehicle to complete the turn, suggesting that the hesitation of the turn was completely the decision of the Defendant, and not because the Plaintiff was standing where he was stood. After the Defendant’s successful turn onto the road, another vehicle makes the same turn, without hesitation quickly. Vehicles on the left of the Plaintiff were not moving because of disruption in the vehicular flow of traffic by the driver in the grey vehicle, the road was completely clear for them to complete their turn, or continue driving. To tackle the second criteria of People v Lucynski, some traffic must have been “blocked”. Block means to make movement completely impossible, in this case, two drivers, including the Defendant were able to successfully make their turn onto the road, suggesting that movement was completely possible, rather than impossible. “The statute's clear terms thus require some evidence that the accused's conduct actually affected the usual smooth, uninterrupted movement or progress of the normal flow of traffic on the roadway, which requires an assessment of traffic at the time of the alleged offense” People v. Lucynski, 509 Mich. 618, 648 (Mich. 2022). To decide whether the Plaintiff’s conduct disrupted the flow of traffic, we must also assess the traffic at the time of the alleged offense. Both vehicles were smoothly able to make their turn, and a third vehicle which made the turn after the Plaintiff steps over onto the sidewalk also demonstrates the smoothness of the flow of traffic regardless of the Plaintiff’s position on the crosswalk. In assessment of the video clip, which speaks to the flow of traffic, we can see that the second vehicle takes two seconds to complete it’s turn, whilst the Plaintiff was standing on the crosswalk. The third vehicle also, like the second vehicle, takes two seconds to complete its turn, establishing that regardless of Plaintiff’s position on the crosswalk, vehicles took the exact same time to make a turn onto the road. In parts, we can analyze the language of the statute and how Plaintiff’s actions, passing the standards in People v Lucynski, do not constitute Obstruction of Traffic as per the statute; (1) “The act of intentionally preventing motor vehicles from passing freely along a roadway, entering or exiting a roadway” ”, “freely” implies without restriction, two vehicles, including the Defendant’s were able to “freely” make the turn onto the road near Ridgeway National Guard’s Recruitment Center, and another vehicle demonstrated how little the Plaintiff’s presence affected their ability to “freely pass along a roadway”. Plaintiff’s presence also did not hinder the ability of motor vehicles to “enter or exit a roadway”, as aforementioned, three vehicles were able to make a turn with the same success, regardless of Plaintiff’s presence, and in terms of “exit[ing] a roadway”, the grey vehicle at the exit was the only obstacle preventing the free movement of motor vehicles from the exit point. (2) “or hindering the regular flow of traffic” as aforementioned, we have established what the meaning is of “regular flow of traffic” and how the Plaintiff’s actions did not constitute it. An RCTA officer told the Plaintiff to move from the crosswalk, and Plaintiff obliged, although the RCTA operator was more or less, throughout the clip, in the same position as the Plaintiff. If RCTA operators stand in the same position as the Plaintiff to conduct their duties, and it doesn’t constitute Obstruction of Traffic, neither should the Plaintiff’s actions constitute Obstruction of Traffic. It is important this Court rule with the Plaintiff as it would define the standard required for Obstruction of Traffic, otherwise, the statute would remain vague as to the “regular flow of traffic”. Also, unlike other statutes in other states, § 7.23 does not allege attempting to restrict the free flow of traffic, so is strictly broken if there is enough evidence that the Plaintiff hindered the regular flow of traffic, which there is not, due to the assessment of the flow of traffic required in People v Lucynski. B. There must be intent to hinder the regular flow of traffic. (holding that an officer lacked probable cause to stop the defendant for obstruction of traffic because there was no evidence that the defendant actually hindered or endangered the normal use of the street or had the intent to do so). ” C.W. v. State, 76 So. 3d 1093, 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), citing Underwood v. State, 801 So.2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Although the situation in the case is not quite similar to the situation in the aforementioned matter, it establishes that there must be solid intent to hinder the regular flow of traffic. In the video clip attached upon filing of the civil action, we are able to see that the Plaintiff gestures to the Defendant to complete his turn, suggesting that the Plaintiff was attempting to direct traffic. Plaintiff at the time of the clip was employed with the RCTA, and although not in his capacity as an operator, we can infer that the Plaintiff would not have harmful intent to hinder the regular flow of traffic due to his obligations which would contradict any negative intent. “The facts in this case show an intent to impede or hinder the free flow of traffic” C.W v State, 76, So. 3d, 1093, 1096 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App.2011). This is not the case in the case at hand, as the facts do not show an intent to impede or hinder the free flow of traffic because the Plaintiff continually gestured Defendant to make his turn, as well as other aforementioned reasons within this paragraph. C. Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim where relief can be granted “Any individual who is a public servant and commits an act relating to his office but constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official functions, where a reasonable person with his training, expertise, and experiences should know that such act is unauthorized; or refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.” Under 1 R. Stat. § 3114, official misconduct occurs when a public servant commits an unauthorized act relating to his official functions or refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law. Defendant’s actions, as detailed in the complaint, clearly constitute an unauthorized exercise of his official functions. Defendant cited Plaintiff on false pretenses. Due to the Defendant’s background in the LETC and formerly as a traffic officer with the Palmer Police Department, Defendant was completely aware of the true application of the statute, and therefore, his conduct completely aligns with the language of the statute. “Constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official functions”; Plaintiff wrongfully cited the Plaintiff as mentioned in the past two paragraphs. “where a reasonable person with his training, expertise, and experiences should know that such an act is unauthorized”; Defendant is trained as a traffic officer and is certified by the LETC, so he knew that his actions were not authorized. Defendant has also sufficiently demonstrated “concrete injury to himself” as required by the second part of the statute. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged all the requirements of the statutes and thus has supported a cognizable legal claim as per Robertson v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534, (9th Cir. 1984). CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has sufficiently stated claims for false imprisonment and official misconduct, supported by factual allegations and applicable legal standards. The Court must allow these claims to proceed to trial. CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS s/___________________________ Singhski, Esq. Ridgeway Bar No.25100 Counsel of Record President, Center for Individual Rights T: (505) 503-4455 E: [email protected] D: singhski

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