STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
AHMADKAPLOT,
Defendant(s).
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Case Number: RSC-CM-3043
Presiding: Hon. koala4life
Mag. insertreality
MOTION TO DISMISS
MOTION TO DISMISS
DEFENDANT, AhmadKaplot, by and through the undersigned counsel, submits
this motion in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to Rid. R. Crim. P. 13(d)(2) and Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). Defendant respectfully moves the court to dismiss count one
because it fails to state an offense. Attached hereto and herewith is a memorandum of law
in support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
July 2, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Ridgeway Public Defender’s Office
Paralegal
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Defendant
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STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
AHMADKAPLOT,
Defendant(s).
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case Number: RSC-CM-3043
Presiding: Hon. koala4life
Mag. insertreality
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................3
INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................4
STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................................................4
STANDARD OF REVIEW............................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENTS....................................................................................................................5
I. Count One Does Not Meet the Required Threshold of First-Degree Murder............ 5
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................. 6
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INTRODUCTION
The government, in its recently discovered enthusiasm to prosecute Defendant
AhmadKaplot (“Mr. Ahmad”), reaches back almost a quarter of the year to bring two
felony charges against him. Nonetheless, count one of the information is deficient in the
eyes of the law because it fails to state an offense by not alleging all of its necessary
elements. Consequently, the Court shall dismiss count one of the information.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 16, 2024, Mr. Ahmad was charged with four counts of first-degree
murder, unlawful display of a firearm, unlawful discharge of a firearm, and unlawful
possession of government-issued equipment, respectively, for events that occurred on
April 12, 2024. The government later motioned to nolle prosequi counts two and three
due to them being time-barred by the statutes of limitations, leaving counts one and four
(hereinafter referred to as counts one and two, respectively) of first-degree murder and
unlawful possession of government-issued equipment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Ridgeway Rules of Criminal Procedure, under Rule 4(a), unequivocally
demands that an indictment or criminal information “contain a caption as provided by
law” and “a plain, concise description of the act which constitutes the crime…thereof.”
Thus, an indictment or information is only sufficient if it (1) “contains the elements of the
offense charged”; (2) “fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must
defend”; and (3) “enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future
prosecutions for the same offense.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974).
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Of course, it is an elementary rule that when reviewing “a motion to dismiss the
indictment…the allegations of the indictment must be taken as true.” Boyce Motor Lines
v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n.16 (1952). The same is true for a criminal
information. That is, the Court must view all facts “in favor of the government.” U.S. v.
Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2006); see also New York v. Tanella, 374 F.3d
141, 148 (2d Cir. 2004).
ARGUMENTS
I. Count One Does Not Meet the Required Threshold of First-Degree Murder
Individuals facing criminal prosecution in our state have a right “to demand the
cause and nature of the accusation” that the government has made. Rid. Const. art. I, sec.
VI. “A defendant’s right to notice of the charges against which he must defend is well
established.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1996). For this reason, the
prosecution must be able to “set forth each element of the crime that it charges.”
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998). The same is true for count
one. A count may be outlined in the words of the criminal statute itself, but nonetheless,
those words must “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set
forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.” United
States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881). “The charge must be made directly, and not
inferentially or by way of recital.” Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893)
(emphasis added). Nonetheless, “[t]he general rule in reference to an indictment is that all
the material facts and circumstances embraced in the definition of the offense must be
stated, and that if any essential element of the crime is omitted, such Commission cannot
be supplied by intendment or implication.” Id.
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The requirements of first-degree murder are well-settled—an individual must
either: (1) commit murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit
kidnapping, burglary, robbery, arson, obstruction, or retaliation; or (2) murder a peace
officer or civil department employee (a) discharging a lawful and official duty and (b)
with the knowledge of the person being a peace officer or civil department employee; or
(3) commit murder with malice aforethought. 3 R.C.C § 09. For count one, however, the
government alleges that “...the Defendant fired upon and killed Karomsuk, a demarcated
employee of the Ridgeway County Fire Department.” Information, at ¶ 1.
Yet, this allegation barely scratches the surface of the elements necessary to
support a charge of first-degree murder. In the present case, the information merely states
that the victim was an employee of the Ridgeway County Fire Department. It fails to
allege that the victim was discharging a lawful and official duty at the time of the murder.
It fails to allege, albeit inferentially, that Defendant should have or would have known
that Karomsuk was a civil department employee. Nonetheless, the court has long held
that in all cases, “the offence must be set forth with clearness, and all necessary
certainty.” United States v. Mills, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 138, 142 (1833) (emphasis added). For
“no indictment is sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege all the ingredients
of which the offence is composed.” United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 174
(1872) (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall dismiss count one of the criminal
information. After all, “dismissal of an indictment is in many ways less drastic than
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remedies resorted to in other contexts where constitutional rights have been violated.”
Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 360-61 (1984).
July 2, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Ridgeway Public Defender’s Office
Paralegal
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Defendant
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STATE OF RIDGEWAY
COUNTY OF RIDGEWAY
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF RIDGEWAY
STATE OF RIDGEWAY,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
AHMADKAPLOT,
Defendant(s).
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case Number: RSC-CM-3043
Presiding: Hon. koala4life
Mag. insertreality
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Nicklaus_s, do hereby certify that a copy of this document and the contents
thereof has, on July 2, 2024, been served, by electronic means, upon the opposing parties
of the above-entitled matter.
July 2, 2024
Palmer, Ridgeway
Beneath my hand,
Nicklaus_s
Counsel of Record
Ridgeway Public Defender’s Office
Paralegal
R. Bar. No. 23102
Attorney for Defendant
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